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Abstract
In this opening chapter, we make the case for the need for a book 
on critical physiotherapy at this moment in history, provide a brief 
sketch of the meaning and practice of critical thinking, and suggest 
some possible alternative pathways for reading the book.
Introduction
This is the first book of its kind devoted to a critical examination of 
the discipline, profession, and practice of physiotherapy. Like all criti-
cal work, its aim, our aim as editors and authors, is transformation. 
working ag ains t the g r a in
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We do not aim to provide a neutral or objective reading of physio-
therapy. Instead, we want to shake things up, perturbate, instigate, 
revolutionize, manipulate. Our title, Manipulating Practices, with its 
multiple meanings conveys our commitment to extending, rethink-
ing, and reshaping the ossified ways physiotherapy is understood, 
practiced, taught, and researched. Etymologically, “manipulation” in 
its earliest form simply referred to a “handful” of something, and by 
1828 was understood as the skillful handling of objects or persons. 
In physiotherapy, manipulation refers to a therapeutic technique of 
applying a manual thrust to a joint at end range of motion (Rubinstein, 
van Middelkoop, Assendelft, de Boer, & van Tulder, 2011). The term 
“manipulative physiotherapy” has also come to be used as an umbrella 
term for a range of hands-on therapeutic skills. In contemporary 
usage, manipulation can also have a negative connotation, referring 
to unfairly influencing another. In all of these usages, manipulating 
has always been about the hands, about metaphorically or physically 
touching others in order to make a change. In this book, we interro-
gate the narrow range of outcomes that dominate the physiotherapy 
landscape, to manipulate practice and theory towards a more expan-
sive vision for the profession. The manipulations you will find in these 
chapters are handfuls of clay, molded into temporary forms that can be 
taken away and refashioned for other purposes. The reader is invited 
to handle the material in whatever ways deemed useful to influence 
positive change in the profession and the world.
In this introductory chapter, we first outline why this book is 
vitally important at this moment in the history of the profession 
before providing a brief sketch of “criticality” and its application to 
physiotherapy. We conclude with a discussion of the chapters and 
suggest a number of pathways for navigating the book.
Why this book and why now?
To date, physiotherapists have been relatively slow to engage in the 
kinds of professional self-scrutiny that have become increasingly 
gibson, nicholls , setchell and groven
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common in medicine, nursing, occupational therapy, psychology 
and elsewhere in the last half-century. What is more, few from 
outside the profession have shown much interest in physiothera-
py’s practices, its particular approach to the body, or its role as an 
agent of change in healthcare history. It is only in the last decade 
that we have seen the emergence of scholarship critically analys-
ing why physiotherapy is what it is, what it does, where it came 
from and how it might have navigated its way to becoming one 
of the largest and most established orthodox health professions 
in the world.
Perhaps the origins of this newfound interest in physiotherapy’s 
professional self-scrutiny can be traced to two significant events. 
The first might be broadly termed the professionalization of 
physiotherapy education. This process, which began in earnest in 
the 1980s, ushered in changes to a curriculum that for 35 years 
had remained largely unchanged. Professionalization made it 
possible for educators and students to develop capabilities in 
subjects that had for a long time been marginalized in favour 
of developing technical competencies (Dahl-Michelsen, 2015; 
Higgs, Hunt, Higgs, & Neubauer, 1999; Hunt, Adamson, Higgs, & 
Harris, 1998; Lindqvist, Engardt, & Richardson, 2010). New fields 
of study like ethics, the humanities, social sciences, and research 
increased interest in the idea that physiotherapy had a culture and 
a history of its own that was worth studying (Higgs, Refshauge, 
& Ellis, 2001; Trede, Higgs, Jones, & Edwards, 2003). While past 
preferences for content-heavy, didactic and “hands-on” learning 
still persist, the professionalization of physiotherapy education 
instigated a move towards more critical and analytical forms of 
learning.
The second significant event occurred with the neoliberal eco-
nomic and political reforms that gathered momentum in the 1970s 
and continue across the world. These reforms introduced new 
working ag ains t the g r a in
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managerialism and accountability to healthcare and education. 
They promoted individual responsibilities over social welfarism and 
marked the beginning of a lengthy project to reduce the size and 
influence of central government in people’s lives. Having relied on 
public healthcare, legislative support and funding for over 40 years, 
the physiotherapy profession in many countries was forced to face up 
to greater competition with other practitioners, and the slow decline 
of public health systems and structures that had once sustained it. 
Governments and private funders alike demanded greater account-
ability and assurances that increasingly took the form of “evidence-
based practice”, standardized outcomes, and indicators of efficient 
use of resources. Concurrent with these two events (professionaliza-
tion and neoliberal reform), physiotherapists were increasingly pur-
suing graduate degrees. Some of these scholars breached disciplinary 
boundaries to ask questions about the nature of physiotherapy prac-
tice and its professional identity (Nicholls, 2017).
Although attempts to locate physiotherapy’s professional identity 
can be traced back to acts of protective legislation and early contests 
over terminology (for example, the debates described by Murphy 
(1995)), between American doctors and therapists over the right to 
be called “physiotherapists” the earliest efforts to define a distinctive 
physiotherapy “identity” may well have been Helen Hislop’s 1975 
Mary McMillan lecture (Hislop, 1975), in which she codified physi-
cal therapy as a “pathokinesiological” profession. Others followed, 
attempting to look to broader, more humanistic, and  political influ-
ences to define the profession’s scope of practice and the paradig-
matic assumptions underpinning research, education and practice 
(Broberg et al., 2003; Cott et al., 1995; Heap, 1995; Higgs, Refshauge, 
& Ellis, 2001; Nicholls & Cheek, 2006; Ottosson, 2015; Noronen & 
Wikstrom-Grotell, 1999; Parry, 1995; Richardson, 1993; Tyni-Lenné, 
1989; Wikström-Grotell, Broberg, Ahonen, & Eriksson, 2013). In the 
last 15 years, there has even been interest from scholars outside of 
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the profession, who have begun to examine the profession’s prac-
tices, boundaries, history and competitive tensions (Abrams, 2014; 
Carden-Coyne, 2008; Dew, 2003; Fournier, 2002; Linker, 2005).
What this emerging literature reveals is that, until recently, the 
physiotherapy profession has left its culture, identity and fundamental 
principles largely unexamined. Moreover, this disregard inheres in the 
profession’s practices. The profession’s fundamentally unquestioned 
need to legitimise itself as “scientific” by adhering to the notion of the 
body-as-machine (Nicholls & Gibson, 2010), has allowed it to side-
line the many “other” ways people experience and engage with health 
and wellbeing (Nicholls et al., 2016). The myriad cultural, economic, 
existential, geographical, historical, philosophical, political, social 
and spiritual dimensions of health and healthcare have been largely 
bypassed by physiotherapy (Setchell, Nicholls, & Gibson, 2017). The 
result may be that the profession has achieved greater professional 
security and clarity of purpose, but it has also resulted in a profession 
that lacks the tools to respond to the changing economy of healthcare 
in the 21st century (Nicholls & Larmer, 2005). Moreover the enduring 
emphasis on bioscientific principles and “evidenced-based practice” 
sustains care approaches that may at best only partially meet the needs 
of the people physiotherapists are meant to serve, and may even be 
harmful.
Physiotherapy is undergoing a relatively rapid period of transition 
towards examining and addressing some of the blind spots of the past. 
A widening circle of physiotherapists are feeding ideas from sociology, 
philosophy, and theory into their curricula, daily practices, research 
and scholarship. This book is an expression and extension of that 
growing awareness. Imagined and produced by a group from within 
the Critical Physiotherapy Network (CPN) – an organization of over 
600 members in more than 40 countries – the book reflects some of the 
diversity of interests and approaches now being explored by physiother-
apists. Moreover, it connects physiotherapists with a wider, established 
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19
community of critical scholars in fields like disability and gender stud-
ies, physical culture, critical race theory, political science and cultural 
studies to ask questions about how, for example, disability, health, 
wellness, identity, social justice, and diversity are understood and 
addressed within physiotherapy and healthcare more broadly. Since its 
inception in 2014, the CPN (www.criticalphysio.net) has sought to be 
a “positive force for an otherwise physiotherapy”. Its objectives include:
•  Actively exploring the world beyond the current boundaries of 
physiotherapy practice and thought
•  Challenging physiotherapy to critically examine its position on 
alterity and otherness, abnormality, deviance, difference and 
disability
•  Developing a culture and appreciation for the exploration of all 
views that deviate from conventional thought and practice in 
physiotherapy.
This book echoes and extends the objectives of the CPN in actively 
embracing ideas that promote thinking against the grain. It can 
be read as a sustained argument to challenge physiotherapists and 
others to embrace a plurality of ideas, practices, objects, systems 
and structures that challenge contemporary physiotherapy. The 
book aims to promote another key objective of the CPN: to support 
critically-informed thinking through engagement with ideas from 
diverse disciplines uncommon in mainstream physiotherapy.
Critically-informed thinking (and doing)
Each chapter in the book is an application of critical thinking to 
an aspect of physiotherapy practice, research, and/or education. 
Critical thinking has its origins in the critical theories that first 
emerged in early 20th century Germany as part of the Frankfurt 
School (Agger, 2006). In contemporary usage, “critical” refers to 
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any approach which inquires “against the grain”, “makes the famil-
iar strange” or imagines how “things could be otherwise”. It does 
not, however, encompass any and all forms of critique (a common 
misperception). Rather research and practice in the critical tra-
dition are explicitly aimed at understanding how different forms 
of power operate, exposing both helpful and harmful effects, and 
looking to possibilities to address harms and injustices (Kincheloe, 
McLaren, & Steinberg, 2011). Critical approaches are thus inher-
ently emancipatory, but can be understood as a continuum of 
approaches, each of which varies significantly in how it under-
stands and approaches this goal. On one end of this continuum 
are materialist/Marxist approaches and anti-oppression traditions, 
while at the other end are the relational approaches inherent in 
poststructuralism and posthumanism. This range of traditions is 
evident across the different chapters of the book. The poles are not 
fixed and between them is a wealth of established and emerging 
methodologies and theories. Nevertheless, the common element 
remains: critical approaches are concerned with the operation of 
power.
All of the chapters in the book examine the role of power in 
shaping how health phenomena are understood and addressed. 
Importantly, in critical work, power is understood as having many 
forms. Citing Lukes (1974), Eakin and colleagues (1994) discuss 
three dimensions of power. The first of these is overt power, that 
is, the power that one group holds over another, often under-
stood in terms of power imbalances, hierarchies, or dynamics. 
This is the most obvious and nameable kind of power. It includes 
the power the state holds over its citizenry and the obvious ways 
that dominant groups oppress and marginalize other groups in 
particular times and places. Examples include oppressive govern-
ment regimes and laws prohibiting homosexuality or certain reli-
gious practices. The second dimension of power is less overt and 
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more subtle wherein the operation of power is recognized but 
remains unaddressed. Systemic racism that is inherent in hiring 
practices is an example. An organization or society may recognize 
that these inequities  exist, but the reasons for that inequity may 
be  explained away, or diffused, through negotiation or co-optation 
(Eakin et al., 1994).
The third dimension of power is covert. Covert forms of power 
are those deeply entrenched and pervasive ideas about the world 
and how to understand it. In other words, covert power takes 
the form of assumptions regarding what is “implicitly” true 
and therefore remains largely unexamined. This power is very 
different from the kind of power that individuals and groups 
wield over others. Rather it has invaded our collective psyches, 
embodied in our everyday practices as “obvious”, “natural”, or 
“just the way things are”. Enacting these truths may or may not 
be problematic, but as Foucault (1983) famously said, it is “not 
that everything is bad, but that  everything is danger ous”. The 
danger comes in unexamined assumptions. We cannot assess 
the potentially negative or positive effects an idea exerts without 
questioning the putative truths contained within that idea. Thus, 
much critical work focuses on examining covert forms of power, 
their various hidden and/or unintended effects and the possibili-
ties for thinking and doing differently. Exposing and addressing 
the operation of covert forms of power in physiotherapy is a cen-
tral aim of this book.
The exposure of taken-for-granted truths and how they oper-
ate can be a catalyst for radical change in physiotherapy. There 
are many examples of societal shifts that have begun because of 
small groups of people challenging ingrained assumptions. Most 
of these movements are ongoing - always considering how things 
might be otherwise. This openness to change is also a hallmark of 
criticality – it is comfortable with, even perhaps insists on, doubt. 
gibson, nicholls , setchell and groven
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Said differently, a critical stance requires a sustained concern about 
the dangers of complacency, remaining dynamic and never settled. 
As an example, the status of women as inferior to men was histori-
cally attributed to biological differences. This long held assumption 
has been largely abandoned in many societies but persists in oth-
ers. Critical feminist work at one end of the criticality continuum 
looks to expose how and why these assumptions persevere and the 
material effects on women (a critical materialist approach, e.g., 
Millet, 1970). Poststructural strains of critical work, at the other 
end of the continuum, may look even deeper into the separation 
of people into two genders, question the logics of these categoriza-
tions and/or problematize notions of biological essentialism (e.g., 
Butler, 2011). While, as the example indicates, there exists a rich 
diversity of critical approaches and theories, all share in common 
a commitment to making the familiar strange towards opening up 
possibilities for change.
What does this mean for physiotherapy? Critical work has been 
gaining momentum in healthcare and research over the last two 
decades, and this in turn has influenced an emergent group of phys-
iotherapy scholars, many of whom have authored chapters in this 
compilation. Critical physiotherapists have critiqued (or “problem-
atized”) a range of assumptions and practices that pervade health-
care and physiotherapy including, for example, how we understand 
and address movement (Bjorbækmo, 2010; Wikstrom-Grotell & 
Eriksson, 2012), disability (Gibson, 2006), weight stigma (Groven 
& Engelsrud, 2016; Rugseth & Standal ,2015; Setchell,  Watson, 
Gard, & Jones, 2016), the body (Hay, Connelly, & Kinsella, 2016; 
Jorgenson, 2000; Nicholls & Gibson, 2010; Setchell et al., 2017), 
practices of touch (Bjorbækmo & Mengshoel, 2016; Nicholls & 
Holmes, 2012), communication (Parry, 2004), and ethical rea-
soning (Edwards & Delaney, 2008). There are critical histories 
of physiotherapy (Nicholls, 2017; Ottosson, 2015; Owen, 2014), 
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critical pedagogies (Rowe, Bozalek, & Frantz, 2013; Trede, Higgs, 
Jones, & Edwards, 2003), and critical explorations of gender (Dahl-
Michelsen, 2014; Hammond, 2009; Sudmann, 2009) and culture 
(Ihle & Sudmann, 2014; Nixon et al., 2015). This book builds on 
this emerging corpus of critical scholarship to explore the possibili-
ties inherent in new ways of thinking, knowing, teaching, research-
ing and doing physiotherapy.
Overview of chapters
Planning a chapter order for this collection was an interesting 
project in itself. We could have randomly organized chapters, 
or grouped those with similar philosophical underpinnings, 
topic areas, or other analogous features. We decided to orga-
nize the chapters in a malleable way, following in the footsteps 
of authors such as Marg Sellers (2013) who take a philosophi-
cal approach to book structuring. Sellers drew on the work of 
postmodern philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
(1987) to organize her book on young children’s interrelation-
ships with education curriculum development. Drawing inspi-
ration from her, we invite the reader to engage with the book 
using a number of possible pathways depending on interests. 
The book is ordered according to what Deleuze and Guattari 
term “plateaus”, or areas of intensity and commonality, with 
the chapters grouped into four such plateaus including theory 
(critical openings), practice (practicing differently), pedagogy 
(rethinking education) and research (researching practices). Like 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of plateaus as dynamic 
and without rigidly defined internal structurings, each grouping 
can be considered unbounded. Almost any chapter could have 
been allocated to any plateau – certainly they all have theoreti-
cal components and pertain to practice. In grouping them as we 
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have, we provide only one of many possible pathways through 
the book. Following a brief overview of chapters as presented in 
these plateaus, we suggest two other possible pathways.
The first plateau, Critical openings, contains four chapters that 
engage with social theory and philosophy to challenge some of the 
fundamental assumptions underlying physiotherapy thinking and 
practice. It begins with Barbara Gibson’s chapter that draws on 
critical and postmodern theories to offer an “ethics of doubt” that 
seeks to dismantle binaries such as normal/abnormal and health/
illness in physiotherapy, and works against adherence to univer-
sal rules promulgated in traditional bioethics. Anna Ilona Rajala’s 
chapter which follows also focuses on physiotherapy ethics. She 
begins with a provocative question: ”Ethics, morals, theory. Who 
cares, right?”. Rajala works from the ideas of critical theorist 
Theodor Adorno to discuss how, far from being an irrelevant intel-
lectual triviality, moral theories are an important practice – sug-
gesting that striving for morality in physiotherapy requires acting 
to consider the specific, individual and localised. Roger Kerry’s 
chapter shifts to analytical philosophy in considering the assump-
tions underlying causation in evidence based practice (EBP), a 
topic that is further addressed in a number of chapters through-
out the book. He argues that EBP’s Humean framings assume that 
cause can only be determined in particular, controlled conditions, 
and that problems arise when trying to apply this constrained 
framing in clinical decision-making. In the final chapter of this 
plateau, David Nicholls introduces the philosophies of “new mate-
rialism” to map out radical new possibilities for understanding 
and practicing physiotherapy. Nicholls suggests that new material-
ism provides a bold new vision for physiotherapy by challenging 
contemporary modernist assumptions including the separation of 
nature and culture, and the supremacy of “the human” over other 
animals and things.
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The Practicing differently plateau showcases critical writings 
that offer insights into how physiotherapists practice and how 
“things could be otherwise”. In the opening chapter, Blaise Doran 
and Jenny Setchell draw on their experiences working in the per-
forming arts to demonstrate the applications of creative perfor-
mance theories and techniques to the doing of physiotherapy. They 
blend Keith Johnstone’s “impro” theatre techniques with Judith 
Butler’s theories of performativity to discuss potential problems 
with the “archetypal physiotherapist” in clinical interactions. 
Following this is another chapter from Setchell, who together 
with Ukachukwu Abaragou, interrogates the dearth of attention 
in physiotherapy to culture and politics. Drawing on post-struc-
turalism, they explore how sociopolitical forces organize health 
practices and people’s experiences of health, including stigma and 
discrimination. Touch is another theme explored across the book, 
and in Chapter 7, Fiona Moffatt and Roger Kerry work to recon-
ceptualize how touch is understood, researched, and addressed 
in physiotherapy practice. Finally, Tobba Therkildsen Sudmann 
(2009) takes readers on a critical hermeneutic exploration of hip-
potherapy; highlighting the embodied, affective, social, and polit-
ical connections between horses, riders and physiotherapists.
Rethinking education shifts the focus to pedagogy, with each of 
the three chapters in this plateau scrutinizing physiotherapy edu-
cation through a distinctively critical lens. Karen Yoshida explores 
Collins’, and bell hooks’1 Afro-centric feminist epistemology to 
argue for resistance of masculinist, Euro-centric approaches to 
knowledge generation through active dialogue that emphasizes 
connectiveness to others. Subsequently, Tone Dahl-Michelsen 
and Karen Synne Groven draw from the new materialism of 
Karen Barad to reconsider EBP as an entanglement between 
1  bell hooks does not capitalize her name
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different types of knowledge that are never fixed but instead are 
always “becoming”. In complicating how knowledge is produced, 
their work provides fresh insights into how to assist students in 
working with the complexities of practice. In the plateau’s final 
chapter, Michael Rowe draws from the critical pedagogies of Paolo 
Freire and Henry Giroux to argue for a move away from linear, 
top-down approaches to learning and teaching. Using the example 
of digital technologies, he reasons that the thoughtful facilitation 
of personal learning networks enables creative inquiry, prepar-
ing students to engage with the complex and networked nature of 
contemporary life.
The final plateau, Researching practices, highlights critical 
empirical work across a spectrum of substantive issues to provide 
nuanced insights into how physiotherapists might practice differ-
ently. First, Wenche Bjorbækmo and Jay Shaw present an obser-
vational study of clinical care in which they draw on the work 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to demonstrate how physiotherapists 
manage apparently contradictory needs for both standardization 
and individualization. In considering the embodied nature of 
practice, they further extend the problematization of EBP found in 
earlier chapters. Amy Hiller and Claire Delany’s chapter also looks 
closely at physiotherapy-client interactions, and returns to the 
theme of touch. The authors use data from video-recorded phys-
iotherapy sessions to discuss how, despite common rhetoric, most 
interactions are professional-centred rather than client- centred. 
Within these encounters, they describe moments of disruption 
enacted through non-verbal communication such as touch. Next, 
Karen Synne Groven, Nicole Glenn and Jenny Setchell use Luna 
Dolezal’s phenomenology of shame and a post-structuralist read-
ing of fatness to analyze the unspoken problematic consequences 
of weight and fitness testing in research with adolescents involved 
in a weight loss program. This final plateau concludes with Birgitte 
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Ahlsen and Kari Nyheim Solbrække’s chapter outlining research 
conducted with men who have chronic muscle pain. They dis-
cuss how narrative interviews and a sensitivity to gender norms 
can help facilitate a better understanding of how people construct 
their illness stories, and conclude with a call for more individual-
ized care.
As we noted above, there are multiple alternative pathways 
through this book. No doubt readers will find their own pathways, 
but in Figure 1 we offer two other possibilities.
Figure 1:  Alternative pathways for reading the book
A) Chapters grouped by substantive topic
Topic Chapters
Evidence Based Practice 3, 6, 10, 12
Ethics 1, 2
Disability 1, 9
Touch 7, 13
Obesity 6, 14
Performing arts 5, 8
Sociocultural context 4, 6, 8, 9, 14
B) Chapters grouped by philosophical approach
Philosophical approach Chapters
Poststructuralism 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 14
New Materialism 4, 10
Phenomenology 7, 12, 14
‘Classic’ critical theories (Adorno, Gadamer, Friere) 2, 8, 11
Analytical philosophy 3, 7
Symbolic interactionism 6
Narrative theory 13
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CHAPTER 1
Post-critical physiotherapy 
ethics: A commitment to 
openness
Barbara E. Gibson | Department of Physical Therapy, University 
of Toronto / Bloorview Research Institute, Holland Bloorview Kids 
Rehabilitation Hospital
Abstract
This chapter sketches out the parameters for a (post-) critical  physiotherapy 
ethics that reframes moral practice in terms of a  commitment to open-
ness. Dominant forms of contemporary bioethics tend to universalize 
the subject as a bearer of rights devoid of history, particularity, rela-
tionships, or social location. In the chapter, I build from critical and 
postmodern theories to examine ethical moments of radical openness 
towards disassembling habits of thought in physiotherapy. An open 
approach is not an ethics of adherence to universal rules or princi-
ples, but rather one that seeks to challenge ingrained norms, avoid-
ing stasis and opening up new possibilities for practice by breaking 
down binary categories such as normal/abnormal, health/illness and 
self/other. My intent is not to provide a prescriptive set of rules for 
determining action, but to outline a method of analysis that can be 
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employed to understand the multiple effects of physiotherapy prac-
tices some of which are unintended, potentially harmful and largely 
obscured from view. The chapter includes a practice-based applica-
tion to a case in children’s rehabilitation.
Introduction
Consistent with the aims of this book, my intent in this chapter is 
to outline a critical approach to physiotherapy ethics. However, it 
would perhaps be more accurate to state that my task is to explicate 
how any critical work is concerned with ethics. Physiotherapists, 
like most health professionals, are trained in a narrow version of 
bioethics that emphasizes juridical rules and top down applica-
tion of principles. This training may obscure the link between 
criticality and ethics. Criticality is by its definition emancipa-
tory, dedicated to surfacing “the development and continuation 
of inequalities in society, especially for those members of society 
with particular social characteristics, including socio-economic 
status, gender, sexual orientation, cultural background and dis-
ability” (Calhoun, 1995). Thus, doing critical work is also doing 
the work of ethics (or more precisely, normative ethics) in that it 
seeks to understand and redress systemic harms perpetrated in 
contemporary life. The ethics of openness I propose draws from 
postmodern strands of critical work (“post-critical”) to illumi-
nate some of the most entrenched ideas in physiotherapy towards 
building moral practices.
Ethics is concerned with questions of how people ought to act. It 
is not limited to specific acts and defined moral codes, but encom-
passes all actions, practices, ideas, and systems that may be harm-
ful or helpful in various ways. It asks questions like: How should 
people act? What do people think is right? How do we take moral 
knowledge and put it into practice? And what does “right” even 
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mean? (Mastin, 2008). Critical ethics focuses these questions in 
particular ways, asking:
•  What do people take for granted as right or true?
•  How did they come to think this way?
•  What are the unintended or hidden effects of current dominant 
modes of thinking and acting?
•  What alternatives are available and what are the possible effects 
of implementing these?
In what follows, I sketch out the parameters of a post-critical “ethics 
of openness” for physiotherapy. First, I briefly review the dominant 
approaches to bioethics and why these are increasingly inade-
quate for informing practice. I then review some key parameters 
of post-critical theory, incorporating an example from children’s 
rehabilitation, to outline the implications for an open approach to 
physiotherapy ethics.
Mainstream bioethics
Mainstream bioethics1 is grounded in dominant traditions of lib-
eral humanism which emphasizes autonomy, independence and 
the rational application of abstract rules and principles. Consistent 
with this conceptual mooring is an emphasis on particular kinds 
of problems, many of which revolve around issues of choice and 
consent, access to treatment, fair processes and rational decision-
making (Shildrick, 2005). Addressing ethical problems is achieved 
through rational deliberation of autonomous individuals who draw 
on principles or precedents to produce logical, objectively support-
able actions (Murray & Holmes, 2009).
1 Bioethics is a sub-field of ethics oriented to the examination of ethical issues in 
health care, health science/research, and health policy
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The most dominant ethical approaches used in healthcare 
 training and practice rely on some version of consequentialism to 
putatively tabulate a balance sheet of “objective” risks and benefits 
to determine the best course of action. The weighing of options is 
guided by values and principles, most commonly the “Georgetown 
mantra” of Autonomy, Beneficence, Non-maleficence, and Justice 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2013). The teaching and application of 
these frameworks usually takes the form of a review of facts, an 
assessment of how the principles apply, and deductive processes 
and debates directed at choosing what to do (see for example: 
Swisher, Arslanian & Davis, 2005; Enck, 2014; McDonald, Rodney 
& Starzomski, 2001). There is nothing inherently wrong with these 
frameworks that I have used in my own teaching to help students 
organize their thoughts and arguments. At a minimum, these 
approaches help to illuminate the ethical dimensions of an issue 
and mitigate over-reliance on regulation and law. Nevertheless, as I 
explore below, these approaches have limited utility in identifying 
and addressing the most deeply entrenched and pervasive social 
problems that are taken for granted as “just the way things are”.
Mainstream bioethics is not monolithic, however, and there are 
some alternatives to the rationalist project outlined above. Most 
notably, virtue ethics and its expression in narrative approaches to 
healthcare ethics are gaining some traction in professional educa-
tion (Goodrich, Jean, Irvine & Boccher-Lattimore, 2005; Kinsella & 
Pitman, 2012). Virtue ethics as an approach has its basis in the vir-
tuous traits that make up an individual’s character and is grounded 
in notions of practical wisdom or phronesis (Kinsella & Pitman, 
2012). In healthcare, narrative approaches extend this tradition 
by drawing on patient stories to stimulate professional reflection 
and learning. They thus differ from more common approaches that 
assume a relatively context-free application of universally derived 
principles exercised by rational agents. Murray and Holmes (2009) 
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note, however, that virtue ethics is rarely taken seriously in clinical 
environments.
Rationalistic approaches to bioethics are consistent with con-
temporary liberal humanism that has its roots in 17th century 
enlightenment philosophy. Rene Descartes’ now famous declara-
tion “I think therefore I am” separated mind and body into two 
distinct substances, each with a different essential nature (Mehta 
2011). The body was viewed as a physical material object, while the 
mind was positioned as the locus of knowledge. This separation of 
a thinking-mind from a sensate-body grounds the rational autono-
mous subject of modern medicine and bioethics.
Principlism provides the most compelling example of the domi-
nance of Enlightenment reasoning in bioethics. Originally pro-
posed by Beauchamp and Childress in 1985, and now the subject 
of seven editions of the Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Beauchamp 
& Childress, 2013), principlism espouses that all persons share 
a common morality that derives from certain transhistorical 
and transcultural principles that are putatively immanent across 
humankind. A stable, individuated, autonomous subject - disem-
bodied and devoid of history, culture or context – is presumed 
to engage in logico-deductive processes in applying principles to 
produce ethical judgements. This tendency to universalize subjects 
both as moral agents and as objects of power has been criticized 
for reflecting neoliberal assumptions of individualism and future-
oriented decision-making that are foreign to many cultures and 
groups (Kelly, 2003). Although there has been a shift to recogniz-
ing notions of “interdependence” in mainstream bioethics includ-
ing principlism (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013), the valorisation of 
autonomy and individualism persists.
Mainstream bioethics has been the subject of criticism on sev-
eral fronts from diverse disciplines. The most sustained and influ-
ential critique of these comes from feminist scholars who have long 
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noted bioethics’ reluctance to engage with issues of power and priv-
ilege. Power-focused ethical work, they suggest, exposes actions 
and practices that perpetuate pervasive patterns of marginalization 
and oppression. Such an ethics views situated relations and hierar-
chies as integral to the understanding of any moral context, raising 
questions about the social basis for decisions at all levels (Sherwin, 
1998; 2008). Critical strands of feminist ethics are concerned with 
how oppressive social arrangements become internalized by indi-
viduals or groups and misrecognized as “natural”. Ethical delibera-
tion is concerned with illuminating the forces of oppression that act 
on persons and by doing so contributing to social change. Sherwin 
(2008) uses the example of prenatal testing, suggesting that the 
traditional bioethical focus on consent (competence, disclosure, 
understanding, and voluntariness) is silent regarding the broader 
political question of why a woman may want to avoid the birth of 
a child with a disability. Such an expanded ethics would not only 
attend to the requirements of consent, but also consider, for exam-
ple, the social assumptions regarding disability and quality of life 
that mediate how choices are constructed and weighed. Moreover, 
feminist and other forms of critical bioethics emphasize the politi-
cal and historical situatedness of problems and people (Kelly, 
2003). They acknowledge that the particulars of gender, race, and 
disability, for example, are not neutral in bioethical deliberation, 
but shape how problems are constructed and addressed, which 
problems receive attention and by whom (Kelly, 2003).
Emergent postmodern strands of critical bioethics extend 
power-focused feminist critiques by looking beyond the material 
organization of power hierarchies toward problematizing the epis-
temological assumptions that ground medicine and liberal human-
ism more broadly. Until relatively recently, most critical approaches 
to bioethics have adopted primarily historical-materialist views of 
power expressed in identity politics. As Shildrick (2005) notes, 
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this ethics of distinction persists in presupposing an independent 
subject as a bearer of individual (or group) rights. Rights are held 
by the body-contained-self protecting it from incursion from the 
outside, marking its independence from others and emphasiz-
ing its separation and distinct interests. The divisions of people 
by gender, race, disability and other identity categories reproduce 
this separation. Postmodernism challenges these divisions by pos-
iting irreducible differences and connections amongst all persons 
(Gibson, 2006; Price & Shildrick, 1998; Shildrick, 2000). A radical 
postmodern ethic thus reconfigures the relationship between self 
and other in terms of shared vulnerabilities, a becoming-with-oth-
ers where categorizations and bodily boundaries are blurred. This 
blurring of subjectivities is a radical departure from liberal human-
ism and its conciliatory notions of “interdependence” that creates a 
space for different ways of understanding and approaching bioethi-
cal challenges and responsibilities.
It is here that I situate my discussion of a post-critical ethics of 
openness for physiotherapy. The ethical approach I sketch out in the 
remainder of this chapter is largely based on the work of Margrit 
Shildrick and her “post-conventional” critique of mainstream bio-
ethics (Shildrick, 1997; 2005). I have written about this elsewhere, 
most notably in my book Rehabilitation: a post-critical approach 
(2016). In the remainder of this chapter, my goal is to explicitly 
apply these ideas to physiotherapy, towards dissembling habits of 
thought and providing a methodology for identifying the hidden, 
less obvious, sources of harm perpetrated in quotidian practices. 
In so doing, I re-examine the “good” that physiotherapy can offer.
An ethics of openness
The ethics of openness I describe draws from both postmodern and 
critical theories and their shared critiques of the dominance of the 
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Enlightenment philosophy in contemporary life (Agger, 1991). The 
rational scientific project is deeply ingrained in the liberal human-
ism of western societies and finds expression in the health sciences, 
including physiotherapy, which have relegated other modes of 
understanding to the margins (Gibson, 2016b). Biomedical sci-
ences assume a positivist epistemology (way of knowing), wherein 
a stable reality can be discovered through scientific observation 
and hypothetico-deductive reasoning. Said differently, phenomena 
such as health, disability, or quality of life are assumed to pre-exist 
their discovery and it is the task of science to reveal their objective 
properties (Mehta, 2011).
Post-critical approaches reject the notion of stable objective 
truths and instead assert that all knowledge is perspectival and 
relational. Simply put, knowledge is produced by people rather 
than existing “out there” waiting to be discovered. It is thus always 
subject to historical, cultural, political and other contextual con-
tingencies that influence how the world is interpreted. “Disability”, 
for example, is one way of understanding and labelling particular 
kinds of observed human characteristics, but the kinds of differ-
ences that are made relevant, and the category itself, are historically 
produced human constructions that are always open to revision. 
Moreover, post-critical approaches are concerned with how power 
shapes knowledge, that is, what (and whose) interpretations persist 
and why. Power is not limited to an examination of the power one 
group exerts over another (as with power-focused feminist eth-
ics), but includes the hidden, less obvious ways that the taken-for-
granted goes unexamined and the ensuing consequences (Eakin, 
Robertson, Poland, Coburn, & Edwards, 1996).
So far, I have identified a number of post-critical ideas that have 
relevance for a reconsidered physiotherapy ethics: an examina-
tion of power in terms of the taken-for-granted, a critique of the 
separation of mind/body and other dualisms, and a relational 
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epistemology that acknowledges the constructed nature of knowl-
edge. Collectively these ideas suggest that a post-critical bioethics is 
less concerned with adherence to universal rules or principles, but 
rather continually challenging ingrained norms and assumptions 
towards opening up new possibilities for practice (Shildrick, 1997). 
Such an approach can be mobilized to scrutinize unreflective assump-
tions that organize physiotherapy practices, not necessarily to discard 
them, but to appreciate more fully the range of their effects towards a 
deeper ethical engagement.
An ethics of openness is the normative expression of a post-
critical epistemology, providing a methodology for identifying, 
analysing and addressing the ethical dimensions of physiotherapy 
practice. An open approach extends the range of “practice dilem-
mas” beyond individual patient-practitioner encounters to ask 
anew, What are we (physiotherapists) doing and why? In so doing, 
physiotherapists can develop an increased sensitivity to the mul-
tiple hidden effects of practice and their unintended harms. For 
example, all of the ways that health practitioners assess, label and 
treat bodily impairments contribute to sustaining ideas that dis-
abled people’s bodies are problems that need to be fixed (Gibson, 
2014; 2016a). While physiotherapy may be helpful in many ways 
that disabled people welcome, it also has this unintended effect that 
is rarely acknowledged. Physiotherapy ethics is traditionally more 
concerned with discussing risks and benefits of treatment, not with 
these broader harms that reflect and extend how disability and dis-
abled people are viewed in society. A post-critical physiotherapy 
ethics thus aligns with postmodern approaches to disability studies 
in questioning how disability is understood and with what effects 
(Stiker, 1999; Shildrick, 2000; Goodley, Lawthorn & Runswick 
Cole, 2014; Gibson 2016c).
An ethics of openness is one of continually questioning the 
most every day, ingrained, accepted and “evidenced-based” 
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physiotherapy practices. Openness is about doubt, that is, doubting 
the unassailability of the accepted truths of physiotherapy and 
health care. Ingrained ideas, practices and principles are never 
settled but always open to revision. Moreover, it is perhaps those 
practices that appear devoid of ethical content that require the clos-
est scrutiny. An ethics of openness, like all critical work, requires 
ongoing commitment to thinking against the grain.
Quinn and the trampoline
An example helps to elucidate how an ethics of openness can be 
mobilized in physiotherapy practice. In a recent Canadian study in 
a children’s rehabilitation hospital (Setchell, Abrams, Thille, Mistry 
& Gibson, 2017) we conducted observations of outpatient clinical 
encounters between health professionals, children with muscular 
dystrophy and their parents. In the following excerpt from the data, 
a physiotherapist (QuinnPT) and a parent (Mom) are discussing 
the family’s recent purchase of a trampoline for their eight year-old 
son (Cameron):
QuinnPT started with, “Okay, here’s the thing,” and Mom immediately 
made a face like she didn’t want to hear anything bad about the tram-
poline. QuinnPT talked about how Cameron’s ankles had rotated a 
bit. Mom jumped in and said that he wears his shoes, which provide 
support. QuinnPT said, “Not really support for his ankles.” Mom said 
she did not want to deny him the trampoline because “he really loves 
it!” QuinnPT nodded, but then began to list some of the things she was 
concerned about such as the pressure on his ankles and compression 
fractures. She added that she appreciates that he liked it, but was very 
concerned about compression fractures. Mom looked a bit upset about 
this as she looked over at Cameron, who was playing with his book. 
QuinnPT then added with a sympathetic tone, “It’s not an activity 
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I’d recommend, but it’s up to you three (the family), and I appreciate 
where you’re coming from.” Mom nodded but she didn’t look happy. 
QuinnPT then changed the subject…
The ethics of this scenario may not be immediately apparent, 
and/ or the “right thing” for the physiotherapist to do may seem 
relatively straightforward (even if challenging to execute). From a 
traditional bioethics approach, we could check off all the elements 
of a “valid” approach to client/family-centred decision making:
•  Capacity: The young child is viewed as incapable of indepen-
dent decision making, thus Quinn engages the parent as the 
substitute decision maker who is charged with determining 
what actions are in his best interests.
•  Disclosure and Understanding: Quinn has acknowledged 
Mom’s position but takes steps to ensure she is aware of the 
risks. Quinn educates Mom to ensure that she appreciates the 
potential consequences.
•  Voluntariness: Quinn has assured Mom that the final decision 
rests with the family. She does not insist that they give up the 
trampoline.
Within traditional bioethics, we could view this as an issue of bal-
ancing an avoidance of harms (non-maleficence) with respecting 
the autonomous choices of the family. There may still be issues to 
quibble with, however, even from a traditional bioethics stand-
point. For example, a frequent debate surrounds questions of if 
and how to engage children towards supporting their “emerging 
autonomy”. Moreover, more is going on in the example than an arid 
application of principles and rules, as is evident in Quinn’s tone of 
sympathy and her affirmation that she appreciates where the family 
is “coming from”. It is often challenging when practitioners disagree 
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with patients and feel the weight of responsibility when advice is 
not followed. Ethical deliberation is thus often focused on debating 
the appropriate degree of persuasion and avoidance of “paternal-
ism”. Approaching the example post-critically, however, reveals a 
different set of ethical questions.
I said above that an ethics of openness is an ethics of doubt. 
We can apply this thinking in the case at hand to examine what is 
taken for granted by the physiotherapist in terms of what is best for 
Cameron, and her assumed responsibilities towards him and his 
family. The excerpt provides a striking example of competing pro-
fessional and personal logics (Mol, 2008). The physiotherapist con-
structs the trampoline as an object of risk around which a decision 
must be made. She weighs the harms and benefits according to the 
logics embedded in her profession, which include her responsibil-
ity to minimize health and safety risks. The logics of physiotherapy 
invariably will see fun as secondary to maintaining ankle align-
ment and reducing fracture risks. However, Mom, and presumably 
Cameron, do not approach the trampoline according to these same 
logics. While they likely share some of Quinn’s concern for safety, 
for them the trampoline engenders pleasure, opening a space 
wherein Cameron becomes playing-child rather than diseased-
child. To further delineate this distinction and what it means for a 
physiotherapy ethics of openness, I need to briefly sketch out the 
postmodern notion of becoming.
Becoming
The critique of the separation of mind and body takes its most radi-
cal turn in the postmodern rejection of the individuation of sub-
jects. Deleuze and Guattari (1983; 1987) re-imagine the subject as 
a continual “becoming” neither encased by skin and organs nor 
defined by static categories such as sick/well, disabled/able-bodied, 
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male/female, gay/straight or even person/thing (Massumi, 1992). 
Becoming is active. A temporarily produced subject is, in the next 
moment, broken down and reconfigured to become anew (Gibson, 
2006). Deleuze and Guatarri reimagine the static individual of 
fixed identity in terms of assemblages that can be thought of as 
temporary collections of heterogeneous human and non-human 
elements that might include bodies, objects, ideas, animals, places 
etc. ad infinitum. Becoming-assemblages are never settled and thus 
defy categorization. Instead of a concern with what things “are” or 
are not there is an appreciation of movement, of a never settled 
“AND” that is “neither one thing nor the other, it is always between 
two things” (Deleuze, 1995). Becoming thus resists categorizations 
embedded in, for example, contemporary healthcare and physio-
therapy, and asks us to consider how things might be otherwise.
Returning to the example, the notion of becoming can be mobi-
lized to recognize and reconfigure the ethics of the encounter. 
“Cameron” is constructed in many ways according to different log-
ics and commitments. None of these are more real or true than 
any others are, yet they incite very different actions. The Cameron 
of traditional bioethics is a rights-bearing individual with (emerg-
ing) autonomy. As a child (another identity category), he is deemed 
incapable of independent decision-making, thus an autonomous 
adult (Mom) is granted decisional authority. The child and adult 
are individuated – the adult of bioethics is the (singular) substitute 
decision maker. There is no collective assemblage here. Regardless 
of whom is consulted, some-one must decide. A substitute sover-
eign subject must be designated when the child-patient is incapable 
of independent, rational choice.
The Cameron of physiotherapy is a set of clinical symptoms, facts 
and problems to be addressed (muscular dystrophy-Cameron). As 
with traditional bioethics, he is not devoid of context or relationships; 
it is recognized that he is part of a family with unique circumstances 
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and preferences. Nevertheless, these are contingencies that inform 
decision making without altering the fundamental logics of clini-
cal care. Physiotherapy constructs its object as one of (existing or 
potential) physical deficiencies addressed through adherence to a 
regime of specific actions (exercises, splints) and avoidances (tram-
poline). The imperatives of client and family-centred care guard 
against the imposition of professional power, but leave intact the 
individuated subject who is compelled to choose (Mol, 2008). 
Moreover, while in theory all choices of a capable decision maker 
are meant to be respected and upheld, in practice choices that do 
not conform to the logics of physiotherapy are heavily scrutinized. 
Mom’s emphatic declaration that “he really loves it!” is an unaccept-
able rationale when the physiotherapist weighs it against the pos-
sible physical dangers presented. “Loving it” can never be a good 
enough reason within the algorithms of ethico-clinical decision-
making. The response, deeply embedded in professional logics, is 
to assume the parent does not fully understand, that the thing to 
do is “educate” (convince/enlighten). The non-compliant parent 
produces a deep anxiety for the physiotherapist who is unable to 
persuade her do what is right. Quinn declares in frustration– “it’s 
up to you” whilst making it clear that she disapproves. Mom is 
positioned as the “bad-parent” who is putting her child at risk.
Considered through a post-critical ethics of openness, becoming-
cameron is a multiple, co-existing and ever-changing AND. I have 
switched to a lower case “c” in cameron’s name to signal the fluid-
ity of becoming. He is patient-with-muscular dystrophy but also a 
boy-jumping-gleefully, and many other becoming-camerons. The 
assembling of clinic-physiotherapist-mom-disease-risks produces 
one configuration that can be contrasted to the cameron of tram-
poline-home-family-body sensations-pleasure. “Cameron” is both 
and neither of these constructions, a singular multiplicity that is 
always in flux, defying categorizations of child, muscular dystrophy, 
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symptoms, function, prognosis, autonomous, incapable, vulnerable, 
sick, well, disabled, etc. And, of course, the same approach opens up 
how we understand “physiotherapist”, “mom”, and the open assem-
blages of other material and affective elements that come together 
to collectively “do physiotherapy”, “do family”, “do cameron”.
In the face of such porous and unstable relations, the question 
arises of how ethics is even possible. If all is open and shifting, 
where is the ethical responsibility? Shildrick (2005) suggests that 
the consequentialist calculus of traditional bioethics is “no more 
than an exercise in management” largely devoid of ethical content 
(p. 12). Rather the task of ethics, she asserts, is to think beyond 
the boundaries of the familiar. Doing ethics then is a critical exer-
cise in questioning predetermined categories, principles and log-
ics whether these are those of traditional bioethics or those of 
physiotherapy/healthcare. The ethical moment is the moment of 
doubt (aporia), where the old rules may no longer apply and dif-
ferent categories and ways of knowing emerge. Doubt does not 
preclude action. Shildrick (2005) draws on Derrida’s notion of the 
undecidable as signalling a responsive and responsible ethics:
(Derrida’s) argument is that in the face of complex and incommensu-
rable demands that suggest at best a multiplicity of competing ways 
forward, the imposition of one set of moral principles rather than 
another simply sidesteps the need for ethical decision. Rather than an 
effort to engage with the undecidable, the resort to preexisting rules 
or laws represents a retreat to the security of the known, not a real 
encounter with the ethical issues in hand. (p. 11)
A “real encounter” is one where existing modes of thought are “made 
strange” - an act of thinking for oneself. This is more challenging 
than it might seem. Nevertheless, it is the essence of criticality: 
questioning deeply held assumptions, principles, tenets and truths 
that are seldom reflected upon but which govern daily action.
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In the study, the clinical team and researchers discussed what had 
transpired in the Quinn encounter. The clinicians suggested that the 
prohibition against jumping was primarily related to the risk of mus-
cle breakdown/myoglobinuria associated with Cameron’s medica-
tion. They stated that because of these risks “there really is no choice”. 
Here was the moment of certainty, of rote application of biomedical 
logics of risk/benefit without doubt or questioning. There was “no 
choice” and therefore no ethical conundrum. According to the bio-
medical logics of healthcare, these risks automatically overrode con-
siderations of pleasure. “He just loves it!” is not a sufficient rationale. 
The team did not see an ethical responsibility to doubt or temper this 
certainty; instead, they were confronted with an uncomfortable duty 
to “educate” the family towards getting rid of the dangerous trampo-
line. Yet, once these modes of thinking were laid bare through our 
discussions, while the team may not have immediately changed their 
practices, they decided quite easily that there were other ways of see-
ing the situation, other possible camerons to consider. This realiza-
tion did not provide a prescription of what to do, but opened up the 
conversation to admit other constellations of cameron/family/mus-
cular dystrophy/pleasure that may be enacted or blocked through 
clinical practices. Ways that extend beyond “It’s not an activity I’d 
recommend, but it’s up to you”.
Conclusion as opening
A commitment to openness in physiotherapy requires a radical 
shift in habits of thought. Appreciating that most everyday prac-
tices of assessment, treatment, and education are imbued with 
ethical import requires physiotherapists to adopt a position of con-
tinual doubt. Setting aside the certainty of what patients need is 
aided by reconsidering “patients” in terms of multiple becomings 
(Setchell, Nicholls & Gibson, 2017). Instead of reasoning through 
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a set of objective problems, risks, and “contextual factors”, an open 
approach expands the moral imagination to consider irreduc-
ible and shifting connections and possibilities. Pleasure and risk, 
for example, are considered alongside each other, not in order to 
choose but to enable: to free up new creative possibilities that might 
not have been previously imagined. What could physiotherapy 
achieve in considering the becoming patient, in questioning how 
practices (re)produce the body-at-risk to the exclusion of other 
modes of doing and being? What compromises or affective appre-
ciations might emerge? Such an ethics shifts and expands the logics 
of practices to embrace undecidability and thinking for oneself.
While an ethics of openness does not provide a framework for 
approaching ethical practice, it does provide a guiding question: 
What are you doing when you are doing what you are doing? (Gibson, 
2016a). In other words, what are the effects of what you are doing - 
considered in the broadest possible terms? What are considered good 
outcomes and why? In pursuing preferred outcomes, what other 
effects are produced and what other possibilities are rendered impos-
sible, for this patient and others? Here is the essence of criticality 
that I opened with at the beginning of the chapter. Providing ethical 
physiotherapy care, in the many senses of the term, is a tremendous 
task characterized by constant twists, turns, problems, frictions and 
complications that are never settled or straightforward. Doubt is dif-
ficult for professionals who are trained to be experts, whose job it is 
to know things, to have answers, to educate patients (Gibson, 2016a). 
Asking, “what are we doing”, however, is essential in avoiding com-
placency in our collective commitments to provide ethical care.
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CHAPTER 2
What can critical theory 
do for the moral practice of 
physiotherapy?
Anna Ilona Rajala | University of Brighton, School of Humanities, 
Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics
Abstract
Physiotherapy is undeniably a concrete practice. What then do 
 theoretical considerations on moral matters have to do with it? 
 Drawing on Max Horkheimer’s distinction between critical and 
traditional theory, I suggest that once the meaning of moral theory 
is recast as critical theory, in contrast to a mere framework of ethi-
cal codes and rules, a deeper significance of theory for 21st-century 
physiotherapy practice can be drawn out. Critical theory, a practice 
of critique and resistance to improve human existence, has clear 
significance for physiotherapy. Drawing on the critical philosophy 
of Theodor W. Adorno, this chapter describes some of the aspects of 
the kind of critical moral theory that is relevant for physiotherapy 
today: it demands consideration of real contexts and people, it seeks 
to disrupt the “business as usual” of the field, and aims to remain 
open to maintain its relevance and critical purchase. To achieve the 
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objective of critical theory in physiotherapy, it needs to be under-
stood as an ongoing struggle rather than immediate solution. Thus, 
rather than merely agreeing on some ethical rules, critical theory 
needs to analyse and resist whatever might restrict morality in 
practice.
Introduction
Ethics, morals, theory. Who cares, right? After all, physiotherapy 
is a material practice that deals with concrete and often imme-
diate physical problems. So far in its history, physiotherapy 
has benefited from adopting the scientific reductionist view of 
the body, function, movement and health that is characteris-
tic of biomedicine (Nicholls, 2018). Does moral theory – that 
is, theoretical considerations on moral and ethical1 matters – 
have anything to do with the “hard science” of physiotherapy? 
What, if anything, can moral theory do for 21st-century phys-
iotherapy? The purpose of this chapter is to offer some answers 
to these questions and to contribute to theoretical literature on 
rehabilitation.
In applied ethics, such as physiotherapy ethics, “theory” is usually 
taken to refer to the plethora of classical and contemporary ethical 
theories that seek to determine the grounds for arguing what is 
1 Ethics and morals can be roughly distinguished by their etymology: “morals” 
comes from the Latin mores for the characteristic customs and conventions of 
a society or community and ethics from the Greek ethos for nature, disposition 
and customs implying a more personal set of standards (which have to be socially 
accepted because the idea of an individual private ethics is absurd). The terms are 
often used interchangeably (e.g. ethics vs. moral philosophy) and also contrary to 
their etymological distinction (e.g. in Scott’s 1998 textbook, morals have religious 
connotations and are therefore considered more personal than the authority or 
study of ethics). There is also obviously an overlap between personal and social, 
which is why drawing a line between them is at best superficial. All etymological 
definitions in this chapter follow the Oxford English Dictionary, retrieved on 10 
September 2017 from http://www.oed.com/.
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right and wrong, or good and bad, in the actions and persons of 
human beings (e.g. in Scott, 1998; Sim, 1997; Gabard & Martin, 
2011). Whether acting out of duty or according to ethical princi-
ples (deontology and principlism), whether paying less attention 
to the needs of some patients to benefit many as the putative best 
outcome (utilitarianism, or consequentialism), or whether dis-
posed to having excellent moral character and practical wisdom 
to act virtuously in clinical practice (virtue ethics) – each approach 
yields different perspectives and justifications for practice. This is 
all very well. However, to think critically about moral theory for 
physiotherapy today is neither to settle disputes between differ-
ent theories nor to decide which one to endorse. As I argue in the 
first part of this chapter, the commercialization and rationalization 
of social life that began to take form in the advent of the age of 
Enlightenment in Western Europe destroys the grounds for tak-
ing any conception of morality seriously (Poole, 1991).2 What was 
once the moral jurisdiction of the church and state has increasingly 
become a matter of personal preference: one could, in principle, 
argue a case for virtue ethics today and utilitarianism tomorrow, 
and all readers have to do is to choose which theory suits them 
and their presuppositions better. The problem is that no matter 
how well any approach is justified, or which codes of ethics are 
followed, there is still unfathomable injustice and suffering in the 
world. This is not to suggest universalism, relativism, foundation-
alism or an anti-theory approach, as all such binary extremes are 
equally unhelpful. Nor is it to say that classical moral philosophy 
or professional ethical codes ought to be abandoned. It is merely to 
2 “Modernity” is used to describe this process. It is contested whether we have tran-
sitioned into something else through the critique of modernity (stemming from 
e.g. Nietzsche, Weber and postmodern philosophy). The rational scientific project 
of modernity, however, continues to have a hold on social and moral life, as well as 
on health sciences (e.g. Gibson, 2016).
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say that in order to address the crisis of morality, it is time to move 
beyond understanding moral theory as the plethora of approaches 
that might enter the marketplace of physiotherapy ethics. Thus, 
drawing on the critical theorist Max Horkheimer, I suggest that 
physiotherapy ethics today calls for critical theory: the engagement 
in critical and reasoned reflection on moral philosophy and ethical 
codes, as well as on the moral context of practice, rather than an 
agreement on a moral framework for physiotherapy – as if, merely 
to do so, it would guarantee moral practice.
In the second part of this chapter, I argue that the objective of 
morality – the struggle against injustice and suffering – requires 
that the actual and particular, rather than abstract universal 
norms, become the centrepiece of ethics. I then examine the puta-
tive gap between theory and practice. To address the challenges 
of contemporary healthcare, as Nicholls (2018) argues, physio-
therapy needs to move beyond the biomedical paradigm that has 
underpinned it. This also implies that physiotherapy, as a material 
practice, ought to be understood as more than a mere economic 
exchange of services, technical knowledge and skills: it involves 
working on, with, for, around and through bodies that encoun-
ter, interact with and touch each other, move and are moved 
physically, psychologically, socially, culturally, biopolitically and 
emotionally. In short, physiotherapy is undeniably what has been 
called body work (see e.g. Twigg, 2006) in sociology. I argue that 
critical moral theory is indeed needed in physiotherapy today, 
not despite the innate materiality of body work, but because of 
it: physiotherapy is a material practice but it is also inescapably 
social and therefore a moral practice. To approach the question 
of moral theory and practice in a manner that is attentive to the 
people and practices that are invisible in the marketplace of care – 
those that the innate materiality of physiotherapy makes visible – 
theory’s practicality cannot simply be about whether it is practical 
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or not. For “theory” is not one unified practice. Rather, one has to 
ask what kind of theory, if any, might serve physiotherapy today, 
both its explicit and hidden realities? What are the demands for its 
practicality in this context?
Finally, drawing on the work of Horkheimer’s close colleague, 
Theodor W. Adorno, I argue that theoretical critical inquiry that is 
directed towards the material and ideological realities of healthcare 
is already in itself a practice. Understood through the etymology 
of the Greek theoria, theory is a practice of contemplation, obser-
vation, speculation, seeing and a looking at. It is to be a spectator, 
to see both in the sense of apprehension and comprehension. The 
etymology links theory with thought which is not a copy of reality 
or its passive recipient but, as Benedetto Croce (2000, p. 32) puts it, 
it is “as active as action”. The practice of theory as critical thought 
seeks understanding of the mode of our social life in modernity and, 
more explicitly since Marx, as I explain below, its transformation 
through critique. Herein lies the value of critical theory for physio-
therapy: when it criticises and resists3 whatever in the actual mate-
rial and ideological context might obstruct moral physiotherapy 
practice – wherever and however morality finds meaning and 
expression in the context of modernity – theory becomes a practice 
that is moral because it is also political. As Adorno 2000, p. 176) 
writes: “the quest for the good life is the quest for the right form of 
politics, if indeed such a right form of politics lay within the realm 
of what can be achieved today”.
Even if radical social transformation and politics to achieve it 
are uncertain, critique and resistance are means that are available – 
at least for some. However, it is unreasonable to expect that cri-
tique will immediately solve all problems. Such impatience towards 
3 Wherever there is critique, there is also resistance, because they necessitate each 
other (Hoy, 2004).
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theory, as Adorno (2000, p. 4; 1998, p. 293) argues, restricts its 
openness and thus its “power of resistance”. What critical theory 
can do is develop the moral and political maturity of practitioners, 
educators and researchers. It aims at empowering them to disrupt 
the conditions for practice that are today often less than favourable. 
These less-than-favourable conditions may be the result of, for 
example, a lack of time, communication, collegiality, solidarity, 
leadership or resources. The relevance of this chapter for physio-
therapy is, then, to develop an understanding of moral agency in 
modernity, one that gives voice to theoretically rigorous critical 
moral practice that is attentive to real people and contexts, rather 
than fixed ethical frameworks that guide from above.
Modernity and moral theory
To see why the understanding of “theory” as the array of approaches 
to moral matters is insufficient, we need to look at the processes 
that shape social and ethical experience in modern life.4 It is by no 
means a new or radical claim that modernity itself – its disenchant-
ing forces of secularisation, consumerism and science – under-
mines the meaning of morality (see Bennett, 2009). Modernity is a 
temporal notion but more importantly, it refers to the inescapable 
mode of social experience that is dominated by processes of ratio-
nalization and commercialization (Osborne, 1992; Poole, 1991). 
These processes of modernity, as Bernstein (2001, p. 420) argues, 
enclose ethical experience “on all sides in rationalized institutional 
4 The concept of experience has a long history in philosophy – Martin Jay (2005) 
traces it insightfully – that often carries more complex meaning compared to every-
day language. In this chapter, experience refers to the Hegelian sense of Erfahrung, 
i.e. the dialectical process between subject and object, which cumulatively shapes 
consciousness, understanding and knowledge. Importantly, the concept of experi-
ence also contains the reference to Benjamin and Adorno whose concern is the 
question of the decay and possibility of Erfahrung in modernity.
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structures and social practices”. This undermines everything non-
factual, as well as the motivation to pursue anything non-factual, 
including moral ideals and values. In short, what passes for moral-
ity is hollowed out by positivism. Morality in modernity is, there-
fore, only fugitive and a matter of subjective belief and preference 
(Bernstein, 2001; MacIntyre, 1985; Poole, 1991). If there remains 
such a thing as a modernist ethical experience at all, Bernstein 
(2001, p. 420) writes, then it is “the experience of the promise of a 
form of life escaping [such] nihilism”.
The problem of modernity illuminates the need to rethink the 
meaning and function of moral theory, more specifically, the need 
to move towards critical theory. In his seminal 1937 essay on the dis-
tinction between traditional and critical theory, Horkheimer (1973; 
see also Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002) argues that traditional theory 
follows the Enlightenment ideal of science and thought (of which 
positivism is a continuation) which holds rationalistic, mathemati-
cal and mechanistic thought in the highest value. Traditional 
theory, he argues, seeks to be a universal system of facts and con-
ceptual determinations in which every proposition can be derived 
from and subsumed under its concepts without friction or contra-
dictions. This description of traditional theory epitomizes what 
modernity’s “imprint of meaninglessness” means for Max Weber 
(1991, p. 139): namely, that “there are no mysterious, incalculable 
forces that come into play, but rather ... one can, … in principle, 
master all things [including morality] by calculation.” The prime 
example of this in healthcare ethics is the consequentialist frame-
work of four principles (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013), in which 
ethical considerations exist in reference to four putatively univer-
sal norms: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and 
justice. Traditional theories, such as the four principles framework, 
attempt to find grounding for ethics in universal principles and 
positivistic ideals but, paradoxically, by doing so they also destroy 
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the grounding because ethical experience ultimately transcends 
positivistic “facts” conceptual definitions and calculation.
Rather than suggesting an ethical tool or a specific theory to 
address the problem of modernity, Poole (1991) argues a case in 
favour of critical theory and maintains that the task of moral phi-
losophy today is to criticise existing social life and its practices 
to direct change. Critical theory, Horkheimer (1973) argues, is a 
mode of inquiry concerned with the prevailing social totality and 
its injustices, and it seeks radical improvement of the conditions 
of human existence. Importantly, according to him, because of its 
object of critique – the contemporary situation of a historically 
changing society – neither the practice to achieve its emancipatory 
goals nor its exact theoretical structure can be fixed. According 
to Horkheimer, critical theory is in evolution as long as there are 
injustices that call for radical social transformation.
Edwards and colleagues (2011, pp. 1643–1644) argue that the 
ethical codes that often underpin physiotherapy ethics have broad-
ened from a concern for individual patients’ well-being towards the 
inclusion of social and global matters. This “represents a matura-
tion of the physical therapy profession’s sense of moral agency ... 
[that] extends beyond the treatment encounter between individual 
therapists and patient and into those broader social and ethical 
issues that are increasingly recognized as shaping and determining 
health.” The broadened perspective, which for Edwards and col-
leagues calls into question concepts about both current practices 
and foundational theory, represents a moving away from tradi-
tional theory. If this is right, and if the move is towards anything like 
critical theory, then the nature of moral theory as something that 
prescribes norms from above ought also to be called into question. 
Because critical theory is always in evolution, it necessarily ques-
tions the concept of normativity understood as the ability to spell 
out a definitive alternative to whatever is under critique. Critical 
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theory can make normative claims, and often does. However, fixing 
it in a way that canonises it as an infallible replacement for what-
ever is under critique misses the complexity of social structures 
and practices – and it is exactly this complexity that calls for criti-
cal rather than traditional theory in the first place. This also applies 
to making critical theory into a precise tool. Delany and colleagues 
(2010) formulate a model for physiotherapy ethics that moves 
towards critical morality by spelling out three steps: listen actively, 
think reflexively and reason critically. This exemplifies what criti-
cal moral practice might look like. The point of critical theory, 
however, is not to prescribe how to implement critical thinking. 
Instrumentalising critical theory runs the risk of restricting its 
openness, as by defining it, it would also define its limits. Rather, 
critical work needs, as Gibson (2016, p. 13) writes, “an ongoing 
commitment to thinking against the grain.”
The objective of morality
Even if critical theory cannot be fixed, the improvement of human 
existence is nonetheless the object of its practice. This object is not 
altogether unlike the “objectives of morality” in the four principles 
approach. Tom L. Beauchamp (2010, p. 176), one of its foremost 
advocates, argues that the objectives are such that promote “human 
flourishing by counteracting conditions that cause the quality of 
people’s lives to worsen.” This is difficult to disagree with. However, 
the moral urgency of global suffering calls for a more radical for-
mulation. Croce (2000, p. 50), for example, is more forthright: 
“Morality is nothing less than the struggle against evil; and if evil 
did not exist morality would not exist either.” Such objective is 
undeniably Herculean, even utopian, when conceived in terms of 
definitive outcomes rather than an ongoing struggle. Any positive 
social change requires taking steps though the “negative”: critique, 
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resistance and action towards what is “better” even if it is ambigu-
ous, transient, beyond conceptualisation and often out of reach.
Gordon Finlayson (2002) reformulates Adorno’s call for resis-
tance against the conditions of a life that is “false” and fittingly calls 
it the ethics of resistance. According to Finlayson (2002, pp. 6–8), 
the ethics of resistance requires political maturity that “prevents 
conscience from ossifying into moralistic righteousness”, as well as 
humility and affection, that is, the capacity to be moved. This point 
has also been made in ethics of care regarding shifting the focus of 
ethics from depersonalised, distanced, impartial and generalising 
rationality towards the inclusion of “virtues associated with care, 
such as compassion, attentiveness, empathy and attention to detail” 
(Sevenhuijsen, 1998, p. 5; see also Tronto, 1993). In other words, 
moral theory and practice need to pay attention to what is too often 
considered irrelevant or secondary in the search for normative uni-
versals: particularity, people, bodies, context, affect, feelings, emo-
tions, power relationships and suffering.
Kate Schick (2009) argues that Adorno’s attention to particular 
suffering challenges and disrupts the abstraction, instrumentalism 
and universalism of modernity. Owen Hulatt (2014) also inter-
prets the theme of suffering in Adorno’s thinking. He argues that it 
constitutes a somatic impulse that must have both normative and 
moral content.5 An observer of suffering, as Hannah Arendt (1990) 
points out, does not of course share the suffering in a somatic sense. 
The “somatic impulse” is rather the reaction, the embodied affect – 
disgust, shame, sadness, shudder or anger – in the face of suffering 
which motivates moral action, critique and resistance. Being a wit-
ness to suffering may of course fail to move and motivate. Such fail-
ure constitutes, however, nothing less than one of the most pressing 
questions for both moral theory and practice.
5 I disagree with Hulatt that Adorno claims suffering to be normative. However, for 
the purposes of healthcare ethics, his interpretation is useful.
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In other words, if we are to take Beauchamp and Childress’ 
objective of morality seriously, practice cannot place its trust in 
moral principles detached from the particularity of human experi-
ence and, to put it provocatively, sit back to witness morality hap-
pen. Defining principles and codes of ethical conduct does not 
yet guarantee moral and ethical practice. Rather, as Joan Tronto 
(1993) argues, for moral arguments to be taken seriously, they need 
to be understood in their political context and the inherent power 
relationships within both moral situations and moral theories. 
Therefore, rather than merely justifying norms that constitute the 
ideal moral practice for physiotherapy, critical moral theory starts 
with what the objective of morality requires: challenging the pre-
vailing practices and conditions that cause people’s lives to worsen, 
for example, due to exploitation, injustice, inequality, poverty, 
exclusion, silencing, discrimination, or the neo-liberal consensus 
and its demand for exchange-value over just healthcare provision.
Towards a materialist view of morality
During the past few decades, empirical research in healthcare eth-
ics has increased to the extent that it is no exaggeration to speak of 
the “empirical turn” (Borry, Schotsmans & Dietrickx, 2005). It has 
also been suggested, with due critical interrogations (Loughlin, 
2006), that ethical decision-making should be “evidence-based” 
(Borry, Schotsmans & Dietrickx, 2006). This new paradigm of 
empirical moral inquiry has challenged the prospects of contri-
butions from the standard classical theories, such as utilitarian-
ism and deontology, with the added option of the four principles 
approach. At the same time, however, and in line with the prob-
lem of modernity and the appeal of traditional theory, the value 
of philosophical and theoretical inquiry in a more general sense 
has also become suspect.
anna i lona r a jal a
66
The question that reveals the relationship between theory and prac-
tice is often framed in terms of utility: is moral theory of any use 
for practical research and clinical practice? Should moral theory 
inform them, or vice versa? If these questions are asked in utilitar-
ian terms, the answers tend to favour utilitarian approaches.6 The 
conditions of healthcare today demand utility, both in evidence-
base and cost-effectiveness that militate against non-utilitarian 
theoretical and philosophical considerations, both materially 
and intellectually, simply because “evidence” and “effectiveness” 
too readily come to be understood merely on an empirical basis. 
Consequently, other approaches to ethics become marginalised, 
especially those that challenge modernity, that transgress the for-
malism and abstracted simplification of traditional normative 
theories and that are impossible to translate into the language of 
utility – especially in terms of the markets (Diamond, 1992; Rajala, 
2016). These marginalised approaches also include those that draw 
upon the everyday material realities of care as body work that often 
deal with what is already rejected7 and hidden: disability, differ-
ence, old age, death, the boundless leaky body, its waste and flu-
ids, and touch that often involves intimate areas (e.g. Lawler, 1991; 
Shildrick, 1997; Twigg, 2006).
Physiotherapy, just like care work, is utterly material and con-
crete. The unavoidable mutuality of touching and moving bodies, 
the involvement of leakage and waste, and neediness and depen-
dence, are necessary and natural parts of both caregiving and care 
6 E.g. Monteverde (2014) frames his questionnaire in terms of practicality of appli-
cation. The results favour consequentialism and principlism that are both utilitar-
ian approaches.
7 The rejection is not merely a consequence of the rational scientific processes; what 
is rejected reminds us of our own limits and, ultimately, the limit of life. This abject 
is, as Julia Kristeva (1982, p. 4) argues, something rejected but something that one 
does not part from: it is uncanny, it disrupts identity, system and order, and disre-
spects borders, position and rules.
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receiving (Tedre, 2004), but often also physiotherapy practices to 
different degrees. Moral theory that pursues an understanding of 
physiotherapy cannot afford to ignore this. On the contrary, the 
necessities of the body should be the basis recognition of both care-
givers and those who are cared for (Rajala, 2016). Attention to the 
body, as some recent critical research in physiotherapy shows (e.g. 
Gibson, 2016; Nicholls & Holmes, 2012), disrupts and resists the 
detachment of traditional moral theory as well as the misleading 
“certainties” and reductionism of an evidence-based approach. In 
other words, a material practice requires a materialist ethics that 
considers actual people with bodies acting in physical spaces, times 
and context, but without reverting to traditional theory and its 
positivism that excludes all matters in life that cannot be directly 
verified by empirical evidence.
Critique and resistance in Adorno’s 
philosophy
It might seem odd that I treat Adorno as the theorist of philoso-
phy and resistance par excellence, given his infamous quarrels with 
the German political student movement (see e.g. Jeffries, 2016, pp. 
341–350) and his oft-quoted aphorism that there is “no right life in 
the wrong one” (Adorno, 2005, p. 39). After all, these have earned 
him – however unfairly – the reputation of a political defeatist and 
a moral pessimist. I turn to Adorno because I share some of this 
“pessimism”: it is self-deceiving to think that political resistance 
without the critical input of theory, the meticulous pointing out of the 
wrong and false in the world, could achieve a “better” world where 
neither resistance nor critique are any longer needed. However, I 
also share the utopian hope – the point of contemplation for criti-
cal theory and the reason why Adorno is not simply a defeatist and 
a pessimist – that even if a right kind of society is difficult to portray 
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explicitly, its possibility is at least conceivable. There is thus an 
alternative to the conformity with the status quo. As Adorno (1998, 
p. 288) writes, “the false, once determinately known and precisely 
expressed, is already an index of what is right and better.”
To understand the context of Adorno’s argument about theory 
and practice, we have to start with Marx’s famous eleventh thesis 
on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, 
in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1975, p. 423). Here 
Marx posits the practical changing of the world above its mere 
theoretical diagnosis. Adorno (1973, p. 3) argues, in reply to the 
primacy of practice especially in 20th-century Marxism, and as a 
critique of state socialism, that because the moment to realise the 
revolutionary social change was missed, philosophy as the critique 
of the status quo is still very much needed. The prevailing evil and 
suffering in the world necessitates, he argues, that the thought that 
cannot be realised is not simply discarded. What Adorno means 
is that to understand why the opportunity was missed, political 
practice needs theory that explores the societal and political real-
ity and its dynamic, so that political practice remains self-critical 
and serves its purpose to produce “a rational and politically mature 
humanity” (Adorno, 1998, p. 14). If, Adorno (1998, p. 265) warns, 
theory is simply subjugated to practice, the truth content of theory 
is dissolved, because theory becomes unavoidably limited by its 
sole purpose being to serve practice. In fact, and this is Adorno’s 
point about political resignation, the “utopian moment in thinking 
is stronger the less it … objectifies itself into a utopia and hence 
sabotages its realization” (Adorno, 1998, p. 292).
Nevertheless, Adorno remains concerned for action – not least 
inasmuch as he regards theorisation as itself active; as practical. 
Despite his repudiation of direct political action without theoreti-
cal interpretation, the Kantian question of “What shall we do?” 
is for Adorno still the crucial one for moral philosophy and for 
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philosophy in general.8 Such practicality, as it was for Aristotle 
and for Kant, is in fact precisely what moral philosophy deals with. 
However, Adorno sees a problem in that practicality is used to refer 
to mere problem solving. Rather, his focus is on theory as prac-
tice, which has its roots in the philosophical origins and meaning 
of the Greek word praxis, referring to acting and doing. Theory, on 
the other hand, does not refer to the smorgasbord of competing 
theories and approaches that philosophy has produced throughout 
its history. According to Adorno (2000, p. 3), theory refers to the 
theoretical analyses – the practice of theory – that are essentially 
critical in nature. Theory, Adorno argues, is akin to the practice 
of prudent thinking, which is not the mere forming of concepts, 
or of making judgements correctly; rather, it is at the same time 
the ability to direct itself outside itself – to the object outside the 
subject, or the material and ideological reality. Therefore, think-
ing is not mere subjective activity. Granted, it cannot be imagined 
without the subject. It is essentially, however, a dialectical process 
between the thinking subject and its object in which they mediate 
each other mutually (Adorno, 1973). Such thinking is, for Adorno 
(1998, 11; 109; 254; 261), inherently practical.
Because thinking is not merely subjective, it must have some 
effect outside itself. To effect social change, however, it needs to 
stay open and critical (cf. Gibson, 2016). Thought that merely 
recites what is accepted without reflecting upon it, Adorno 
(1998, pp. 122; 264) argues, brings thought to a standstill: 
it cannot be called thinking proper. On the contrary, he argues 
further, thinking that approaches its object openly and that is 
based on progressive knowledge is also free towards its objects 
in the sense that it refuses to have rules prescribed to it by some 
external authority (Adorno, 1998, p. 13). Social change needs 
8 Adorno is not Kantian and whether he has a specific “ethics” beyond morally moti-
vated critique is highly contestable. 
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such a critical form of thought according to Adorno: for it does 
not take mere applicability as the criterion of knowledge, main-
taining the existing conditions, but rather negates whatever is pre-
scribed to it and so exercises resistance by refusing to take part in 
the wrong state of things (Adorno, 1998, pp. 259; 292; Adorno, 
2000, p. 7). Such thinking is the “force of resistance” (Adorno, 
1998, p. 293). Within thinking, then, lies the key to the relation-
ship between theory and practice that, as Adorno (1998, p. 261) 
argues, “neither divides the two such that theory becomes power-
less and praxis becomes arbitrary…” Rather, because thinking is 
an activity, and therefore there is no such thing as pure thinking, 
theory as critical thinking – as critical theory – is already in itself 
a form of practice (Adorno, 1998, p. 261).
Critical theory as resistance in 
physiotherapy
The implications of critical theory for moral theory in physiother-
apy are far-reaching. It shifts the focus towards the existing material 
and ideological conditions that mediate acting subjects, think-
ing, morality and knowledge. Moreover, because it is a practice 
that concerns social change, it is a political practice that is moral 
because, while it is political, it also disrupts political hegemony. 
Critical theory, therefore, transgresses the boundary between the 
political and the moral (see Tronto, 1993). The task for such moral 
theory is also to resist whatever might obstruct moral and ethical 
action in practice, to become an ethics of resistance. Traditional 
moral theory with fixed norms runs the risk of becoming limited 
by its own content. In contrast, acting ethically, and even according 
to moral norms, requires creativity and openness that is achieved 
by such open-ended critique and resistance that Adorno describes 
(cf. Gibson, 2016).
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Although the physiotherapy profession has its own ethical 
dimensions (see Delany et al., 2010), it also shares a lot with bio-
ethics general.9 To illuminate the political role of bioethics, Lisa 
Parker (2007) argues that bioethics has a conservative role in con-
tributing to the processes of rational deliberative democracy but 
it should also be regarded as a form of activism. While bioethics 
often takes a stand on social justice, this is not yet, for Parker, what 
activism means. Social justice is rather “the business as usual of 
the field” and activism should be something that disrupts business 
as usual (Parker, 2007, p. 146). When practised well, even when 
participating in public deliberative processes, she argues, bioeth-
ics should serve as a corrective to the deficiencies of the delibera-
tive processes thus serving an activist role. As activism, bioethics 
seeks the inclusion of those who are traditionally excluded from 
deliberative democratic processes, and draws attention to struc-
tural injustices, inequalities, power relations, identity categories, 
binaries in thinking, and dominant conceptual frameworks for bio-
ethical discussion and consensus (Parker, 2007). Parker’s activism 
concretely complements what I have argued so far: that theory as 
practice should be disruptive, should point out what is hidden and 
rejected, and that it should seek to point out and critique systemic 
flaws in the conditions for morality.
Adorno (2000, p. 4) and Parker (2007, pp. 148–149) both point 
out a difference between critical theorising and activism: that 
theory, because it does not really “do” anything, is considered to 
fail to take a political stand. Adorno (1998, pp. 260; 292; 2000, 
p. 4) argues that this impatience, the demand that theory must 
produce its practically legitimating justification immediately, does 
not advance thought beyond itself but ties it down by the criteria 
of immediate effectiveness. Instead, the call for immediate effect 
9 Bioethics commonly refers to the study of the ethical implications of the advances 
of medical research and technology. 
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needs to be resisted, Adorno argues, in order to ruthlessly follow 
a theory through to see where it might lead, which is exactly what 
makes theory practical. What Adorno means is that political action 
requires a reasoned analysis of that situation; analysis that does not 
conform but may be able to point beyond the given constraints of 
the situation, social totality and immediately given “facts”. Such 
thinking, that does not conform to what is immediate becomes 
transformative, a practical productive force: “If thinking bears on 
anything of importance, then it initiates a practical impulse, no 
matter how hidden that impulse may remain to thinking” (Adorno, 
1998, p. 264).
Conclusions
I have argued that theory does indeed have something to do with 
physiotherapy. My main claim is that the kind of theory that finds 
meaning for 21st-century physiotherapy is critical theory. However, 
as with any open-ended approach, more questions arise than I have 
space to address. One of these questions, and perhaps the most dif-
ficult to answer, is this: Are critique and resistance privileges? Are 
they more readily available to those who already have a voice in the 
clinic, academia and politics? Are those in less powerful positions 
able to criticise and resist or can it cause them more harm? If so, 
is it enough that those who can criticise, do so by acting as their 
advocates? On the other hand, we might ask: Could the articulation 
of critique and resistance empower the powerless to find a voice? 
Another set of questions has to do with the agency of the physio-
therapist. Is it right to assume and indeed expect that all physio-
therapists are and should be interested in politico-moral agency? 
Is it not easier to resign critical thinking to the formal normative 
frameworks that have already been set out? If so, should they do 
so, if they simply do not have resources to engage with critique? 
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The challenge, then, is to bring critical thinking from the margins 
to the fore. My fear, however, as with any critical work that chal-
lenges conventions, is that I may be preaching to the converted.
What is critical theory for physiotherapy? The demands of criti-
cal theory, in order to have practical purchase, include creating 
awareness among the profession about ethics and morality as criti-
cal political notions that are attentive to the materiality of people, 
spaces and contexts. The aim of critical work is to help researchers, 
practitioners and students to identify those situations where cri-
tique and resistance improve the well-being of patients and, per-
haps controversially, also the therapist: a healthy working force is 
better for the patients, rather than being overwhelmed by condi-
tions that are less than favourable for best practice, for example due 
to “moral distress” (see Carpenter, 2010). This is not mere prob-
lem-solving. It is not the giving of an ethical seal of approval to 
certain clinical practice. Rather, this is a demand for a self-critical, 
and for other-critical, practice.
I am not against problem-solving or traditional normative ethics 
because both are of course useful. The latter can certainly provide 
a vocabulary, structure, arguments and shorthand about ethics. 
Neither are, however, exhaustive of moral practice; or of, as I would 
put it, critical practice. Furthermore, even traditional and formal 
theories need to be “kept alive” by exercising constant critical 
thinking towards them – it often moves on speculative level to find 
reasons and justifications but always arises from the material world 
we inhabit, but also tolerates the uncertainty that modernity finds 
intolerable – rather than thinking that once some ethical ground 
rules are in place, all is well. I acknowledge that traditional norma-
tive theories still have a place in healthcare and physiotherapy but 
my hope is that critical theory can challenge their claim to author-
ity. I hope that this will grant thinking a moment of freedom and 
the thinker an agency, so that thinking can indeed reach beyond 
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itself and initiate change. This cannot be done, however, without 
thought’s resistance to what is merely given. Moreover, it cannot 
be expected that any change will occur immediately rather than as 
a struggle. The point of critical theory as practice – the practice of 
critique and resistance, call it activism or the ethics of resistance – 
is to work towards radical social transformation but also to point 
outside the hegemonic discourses of modernity.
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CHAPTER 3
Reconceptualising 
causation in evidence-
based physiotherapy
Roger Kerry | Division of Physiotherapy and  Rehabilitation 
Sciences, University of Nottingham
Abstract
Physiotherapy practice is complex. Each interaction between 
a therapist and a person seeking care is unique. Physiotherapy 
research is aimed at providing knowledge, which can be used to 
inform clinical decision-making within such practice. Consid-
ering predicted therapeutic effectiveness, for example, research 
data should inform the process of deciding which intervention is 
most likely to have a causal effect on the health of the person. The 
growing engagement of physiotherapy practice with a framework 
of evidence-based practice strengthens the profession’s commit-
ment to an association between research and clinical decision-
making. It would be hoped then, that the sort of causal claims 
arising from research methods provide precisely the sort of infor-
mation needed for clinical practice, in all its complexity. This chap-
ter presents a thesis that questions the clinical relevance of causal 
claims arising from our prioritised research methods. It does this 
on ontological grounds. The chapter proposes that the nature of 
causation in evidence-based physiotherapy can be understood by 
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the way the evidence-based framework structures itself. It then 
problematises this in the perspective of the complex discipline of 
physiotherapy with an assertion that the identified Humean nature 
of causation fails to relate to the context-sensitivity and complexi-
ties of a truly person-centred healthcare domain. Solutions are 
signalled towards a dispositional reconceptualisation of causation 
that would provide a more robust ontological framework on which 
research methods and clinical practice could be based.
Introduction
When we express what we do with patients, it is in causal terms: 
“this could work for you”; “we can help you return to function”; “this 
treatment should be effective”, etc. These notions are increasingly 
influenced by a specific idea of what causation is. In an evidence-
based practice framework, causation is undeniably Humean1. That 
is, causal claims derive from constantly conjoined events (observa-
tional studies) and/or from counterfactual conditions (randomised 
controlled trials). This is problematic, not least because many 
1 This relates to a theory of causation given by Scottish philosopher David Hume 
(1711–1776). Hume’s influence on our understanding of EBM is discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter. However, for now, it helps to understand the basic idea 
of Humean causation, which is arguably the most significant idea of causation 
throughout the last few centuries. His idea is something which now seems des-
perately intuitive: causation is nothing more than a belief based on observations 
of two (or more) discrete events, such that event A is the cause of event B. His 
famous example is of two billiard balls: Ball A rolls and hits Ball B, and we say that 
the rolling of Ball A was a cause of the rolling of Ball B. This entails three ideas: i) 
that there is contiguity (the two events are spatiotemporally close); ii) there is tem-
poral priority (Ball A – the cause - always comes before Ball B – the effect); and iii) 
there is constant conjunction – if the experiment was repeated, we would notice the 
same observation to a degree when we come to believe that the rolling of Ball A is 
the cause of the rolling of Ball B. Critically, Hume claimed that there was nothing 
more to causation – no actual act, substance, or mechanism. Causation is simply 
one thing followed by another. The reader is directed to Mumford and Anjum 
(2013) for further accessible information on causal theories. 
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evidential elements are excluded from the causal story, for example 
mechanistic studies, and the patient. A Humean account of cau-
sation also paradoxically prohibits the core business of evidence-
based practice: for general causal claims from research to inform 
single instances of clinical decision-making. This chapter argues 
for reconceptualisation of causation whereby causes are complex, 
context-sensitive and seen as dispositions that only tend towards 
their effect. This has the advantage of being inclusive of multiple 
sources of information, as well as taking the patient as the starting 
point to understanding what “could work for you”. Thus, the core 
business of evidence-based physiotherapy is better satisfied.
The chapter presents an argument for why the traditional account 
of causation within evidence-based physiotherapy should be con-
sidered as a Humean notion. This is then problematised in relation 
to the central claim of evidence-based medicine (EBM)2, which is 
that “evidence from study designs higher up the hierarchy more 
reliably informs therapeutic decisions” (La Caze, 2008, p. 361).
The notion of causation is problematised in relation to evidence-
based medicine. That is, how do causal claims, established by the 
scientific research methods favoured by EBM, relate to individual 
instances of care, or indeed policy? In sum, the chapter argues that 
EBM presently conceptualises causation as a Humean idea, and 
that this is insufficient in respect of the core activity and claims of 
EBM. It then proposes a reconceptualisation of the nature of causa-
tion that addresses some of the fundamental challenges to the core 
activity of EBM. This is based on a theory of causal dispositionalism.
2 I will make no distinction between the tenets of Evidence-based Practice and 
Evidence-based Physiotherapy and Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) for the purpose 
of this arguments within this chapter. The scientific rationale and logical basis are 
the same in each framework. The vast majority of philosophical literature regard-
ing these themes refers to EBM, and as such, this extant literature will be used for 
the debate regarding EBP. 
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Why causation?
In health care, we are interested in knowing whether a therapeu-
tic health intervention works, that is, whether or not it causes 
a desired health effect. Thinking of causal relationships in this 
way signals what we understand of the processes that have gen-
erated sufficient knowledge to allow such a statement to be 
made. These processes have changed over time. Understanding 
what works was once a product of experience, or wisdom from 
a teacher perhaps. Modern health care sees these processes as 
insufficient and has adopted specific research methods to gen-
erate knowledge of causal relationships. Formal observation and 
recording of patient behaviour as a response to interventions 
grew into what we now know as clinical epidemiology. A segue 
of observational studies into multi-condition trials was seen as a 
significant advancement of cause-claiming research methodol-
ogies. Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) were introduced in 
the 1950s with claims of epistemological superiority over other 
methods. This claim continues today and is witnessed by explicit 
notions of evidential hierarchies and structures of what consti-
tutes quality of evidence and strength of recommendations for 
practice. Almost parallel to the development in research meth-
ods was the re-framing of clinical epidemiology as a formal 
framework of EBM3. This movement aimed to facilitate clini-
cal decision-making by making best use of the evidence avail-
able. The evidence in this sense was normatively suggested – as 
3 When I talk about “EBM”, I am talking about the post-1991 movement. The term 
and reconceptualised notion of “Evidence-based Medicine” was first formally intro-
duced in the field of medical epidemiology in 1991 (Guyatt, 1991). The term does 
actually appear sporadically throughout literature on medical statistics from the 
1930s up to the 1990s. However, for the purpose of this argument, I will consider 
Guyatt’s 1991 paper as the formalised introduction of the term.
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per Sackett’s4 much quoted definition – to be multiple-sourced 
knowledge relevant to the clinical question:
Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious 
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of indi-
vidual patients. The practice of evidence based medicine means inte-
grating individual clinical expertise with the best available external 
clinical evidence from systematic research (Sackett et al., 1996, p. 71).
Depending on the nature of the clinical question, “systematic 
research” would mean the best research for that particular ques-
tion purpose. Questions of causation (i.e. does this work?) would 
appeal to methods of causation – that is, RCTs, or ideally system-
atic reviews of RCTs. Thus, research methods are an inherent and 
immanent part of EBM, and findings from research should be used 
to directly inform clinical practice.
The majority of philosophical concerns in this area have been 
associated with epistemological issues of research methods. 
Causation is explained as a product of research methods, and phi-
losophy has aimed to understand the best methods for producing 
causal claims. The issue of observational epidemiological studies 
versus RCTs is often used as a demonstration of epistemological dif-
ferentiation, (for example, Vandenbroucke, 2008). Most commonly, 
conclusions appeal for continued commitment to the experimental 
type comparative studies exemplified by RCTs. Appreciation of the 
ability of statistical analyses to compare group means against each 
other is linked to beliefs about the method’s ability to differentiate 
correlation from causation. Observational studies can suffer from a 
4 David Sackett was a founder of the contemporary EBM movement. He was found-
ing chair of the first department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics in the 
world at McMaster University, Canada. During the early 1990s, he was a key mem-
ber of McMaster’s Evidence Based Medicine Working Group, a group that led the 
way in transitioning the seemingly stale notion of clinical epidemiology into a more 
“shop-floor” idea of evidence-based medicine. 
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lack of a comparable control group: a group so similar to the inter-
vention group save one factor that any inferences drawn must be 
considered coincidental, not causal. The ability of RCTs to create and 
control homogenous groups and manipulate interventions appeals 
to the scientist. If the groups are similar save one thing (the inter-
vention), and a between-group difference in outcome is observed, 
then it is argued that that difference must be due to the intervention. 
Causation – rather than some other association – can been claimed. 
Thus, when we state, “it works”, we are saying something about the 
epistemological qualities of the research methods embedded in this 
framework of EBM. Despite what has just been said, I will eventually 
claim that EBM can be satisfied with causal claims from certain types 
of observational studies too, and I contend that this in fact is the key 
to understanding the nature of causation in EBM, as it stands.
Constraining philosophical analysis to epistemological concerns 
entails significant limitations. “It works” may well say something about 
epistemology, but it might also say something about what we under-
stand of the nature of causation. Thus if we propose that epistemological 
concerns are of urgent priority to understanding best care, then onto-
logical concerns also need to share that priority. Here is an example: I 
say, “it works” because I have attended to outcomes of epistemologi-
cally superior research methods (for causation at least). This exposes 
my appreciation of how knowledge is generated. However, I am also 
saying that what I mean by causation is that it is something inherently 
related to those methods in its nature. For example, I might genuinely 
believe that a causal relationship did not exist before it was produced by 
the RCT, or whatever; or I might believe that the causal relationship did 
always exist but I did not know of it and it took the RCT to expose it; or 
I might say that I always strongly suspected a causal relationship but the 
findings of the RCT better justify my use of the intervention in some 
procedural sense. However viewed, what I am saying is that the nature 
of causation seems to be dependent on the research methods at hand.
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This then presents some problems. If evidential hierarchies are to 
be taken seriously, (i.e. evidence from study designs higher up the 
hierarchy more reliably informs therapeutic decisions), as is the nor-
mative stance, then causal ontology can be read from the hierarchy 
itself. That is, causation is something that is inherently related to the 
fact that groups are compared against each other, but not something 
that is part of “lower level” evidential sources. This is a clear position 
that exposes how health science understands causation. I will use this 
normative stance as the basis of the majority of the analysis to follow.
The normative stance alone is complex and challenging. 
However, the broad problem is exaggerated further by the descrip-
tive stance. In reality, causal claims are, made from multiple sources 
of evidence that may or may not include RCTs, for example, smok-
ing causes cancer. Nevertheless, there is a problem: health science 
states that causation should exclusively be the domain of certain 
types of studies, and causation is dependent on, and is charac-
terised by, that epistemology. However, causal claims are made 
otherwise. Therefore, what causation is cannot be sustained on 
epistemological grounds. Further, epidemiology does not have a 
“fall-back” epistemological position to widen the nature of cau-
sation. It is therefore necessary to include attention towards the 
most fundamental aspects of an activity if progress is to be made 
regarding both scientific and humanistic directions. The focus of 
this chapter shall now be on these ontological concerns.
A Humean account of causation for EBM
On causation, Hume stated:
[W]e may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and 
where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to 
the second. Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the 
second never had existed. (Hume, 1748, Sect 7, Part 1, Para 60).
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This should be read in two parts: first Hume states that a cause is 
a form of regularity: one object regularly followed by another. He 
then asserts a condition that the regularity should be confirmed by 
the fact that the second event did not occur when the first object 
did not exist. This aligns to a counterfactual condition. The coun-
terfactual account is developed by many, but perhaps David Lewis 
offers a comprehensive modern philosophical treatment of the 
conditional (Lewis, 1973a). In sum: “A γ→ C is nonvacuously true 
if and only if C holds at all the closest A worlds”5 (Lewis, 1973a, 
p. 561). Cartwright also represents counterfactual conditions in 
experimental-like trials by saying:
[I]f two groups have identical distributions, save one (T) and a 
probabilistic difference obtains (O occurs in “T” group only) then T is 
causally related to O (Cartwright, 2007, p. 46).
Accordingly, the counterfactual state (control or comparison 
group) is in fact the truthmaker of causation: that is the proposi-
tion cannot be true in itself – it is the counterfactual that is making 
it true. We can observe a series of events following each other, but 
we only read causation into the observation if the same regularity 
is absent in another condition. Causation in health science is then 
in some part counterfactually dependent. This is a secure posi-
tion if elements below RCTs are to be considered non-evidentiary. 
However, as suggested, this seems not to be a favoured position 
and evidential claims for causation do exist in relation to non-
controlled (non-counterfactual) observational studies. Therefore, 
if the rules of evidence differentiate controlled methods as being 
5 Lewis uses the symbol “γ →” as the counterfactual operator. For Lewis then: “Given 
any two propositions A and C, we have their counterfactual A γ → C: the proposition 
that if A were true, then C would also be true. The operation γ → is defined by a rule 
of truth, as follows. A γ → C is true (at a world w) iff either (1) there are no possible 
A-worlds (in which case A γ → C is vacuous), or (2) some A-world where C holds is 
closer (to w) than is any A-world where C does not hold” [emphasis added] (Lewis, 
1973a, p. 560). 
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constitutive of causation due to their structural characteristics, 
but causal claims still arise from non-controlled methods, then 
counterfactual dependency cannot be a sufficient account for the 
theory of causation in healthcare nor any science.
The structure and function of observational studies requires 
some expansion if the essence of causation is to be considered 
further. For the purpose of this step, observational studies will be 
thought of simply as that collection of methodologies embedded in 
the tradition of epidemiology, in which the intention is to investigate 
associations between determinants of health and health outcomes. 
They do this by observing large groups of patients in various ways. 
The differentiating characteristics of observational studies from 
RCTs are that “investigators neither allocate patients to receive an 
intervention, [nor] administer an intervention” (Howick, 2011, 
p. 40). As such, observational studies suffer from nearly intractable 
problems of “confounding by indication’’ (Vandenbroucke, 2008, 
p. e67), or as Howick summarises:
The main problems with observational studies are that they suffer 
from (i) self-selection bias…(ii) allocation bias, and (iii) performance 
bias (Howick, 2011, p. 40).
For the purpose of searching for their causally evidential basis, 
then, we can surmise that although observational studies do indeed 
follow-up and identify patterns of association in large groups of 
people over time, controlling for confounding and systematic 
biases are absent. The closest possible A world does not exist. How 
then can we read causation into these elements given the counter-
factual condition asserted by Hume? In fact, Hume allowed that 
causation could be wholly represented in fact by adherence to three 
criteria: temporal priority, contiguity, and constant conjunction:
Every object like the cause, produces always some object like the effect. 
Beyond these three circumstances of contiguity, priority, and  constant 
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conjunction, I can discover nothing in the cause. (David Hume, 
1740, Para 9).
Thus, if an observational study can demonstrate that the cause 
always precedes the effect (a precedes b in time), that the effect 
is consistently close to the cause (a and b are spatiotemporally 
contiguous), and that the association is repeatedly and constantly 
observed (events like a are invariably followed by events like b), 
we can in fact still claim causation in a Humean sense (a causes b), 
but not counterfactually. Indeed, this is the position of GRADE6 
regarding the potential for “upgrading” observational studies to the 
status of RCTs (Guyatt et al., 2011). This regularity view of cau-
sation offers a better philosophical stance for supporting causal 
claims from observational studies, in the sense of capturing how 
evidential frameworks view causation. The regularities view is still 
embedded with a counterfactual make-up: trials simply compare 
the difference between two or more regularly occurring events. In 
this sense, the counterfactual condition can thus be seen as some 
sort of “add-on” to strengthen a belief in the observer’s impression 
of the comparative rates of events. However, that the truthmaker to 
a causal claim is the counterfactual group is an unstable position to 
hold. It is clear that the causes we are interested in are actually in 
the factual group (the intervention group, say).
Let us consider a further dimension to understanding what cau-
sation might be here. This relates to EBM’s de-emphasis of evidence 
from mechanistic science and mechanistic reasoning7. This, I say, 
further supports the notion of causation in EBM being considered 
6 Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluations Work-
ing Group
7 These terms express a concept that relates to the scientific activity and associated 
inferences of understanding and explaining how parts of a system relate to each 
other. The conflation of “scientific activity” and “associated inferences” is purpose-
ful and facilitates clarity. In this case then, what I mean by mechanisms seems simi-
lar to what others mean by it, for example (Clarke et al.,  2014).
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as something Humean. Take On the idea of a necessary connexion 
from Hume’s Enquiry:
The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. 
This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no 
sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: con-
sequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and 
effect, any thing [sic] which can suggest the idea of power or nec-
essary connexion [emphasis added] (Hume, 1748, Sect 7, Part 1, 
Para 50)
So, Humeans have a strict interpretation of this. Briefly, for the 
present purpose, we can use Lewis’ Neo-Humean Supervenience 
thesis as a helpful example of such Humeanism:
[A]ll there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular 
fact, just one little thing and then another. ... We have geometry: a sys-
tem of external relations of spatiotemporal distances between points. 
Maybe points of space-time itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or 
aether (sic) or fields, maybe both. And at those points we have local 
qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties that need nothing big-
ger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an 
arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference with-
out difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes 
on that [emphasis added] (Lewis, 1986, p. IX)
Thus, the world here is simply a vast collection of local matters 
of facts with all else supervening on the mosaic of facts. The facts 
themselves, however, are “devoid of any intrinsic nomic, causal, or 
modal character” (Jacobs, 2011, p. 81). In these terms then, EBM 
seems to have no concern with understanding causes as anything 
more than regularities of facts. That is, there is nothing internal to 
the causal process that relates to a cause producing an effect, for 
example, some sort of real force or compulsion. Causation is just 
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one thing followed regularly by another. EBM seems not to claim 
that causation is itself observable in either RCTs or observational 
studies. It is only the regularitiy of one event being followed by 
another that is observable.
Although Humeans (and EBM) might be happy with this stance 
as a complete account of causation, health science and healthcare 
practice might not be. Health science in one sense seems rich with 
a history of informative science ranging from laboratory studies 
through to large scale clinical trials. Further, healthcare itself is con-
structed of clinical experiences, patient values and social contexts. 
Indeed all of these elements are explicitly embraced and showcased 
in EBM’s manifesto. If a Humean stance is to be taken, then what 
is there to be said of the other discounted knowledge, experiences, 
patient input, and contexts? The EBM framework determines that 
clinical decisions – entailing causal intentions – should integrate as 
much of this knowledge as possible. A Humean commitment seems 
not to allow such background conditions a role in the understanding 
of a precise nature of causation in health care, thus an ontological 
tension seems to exist. This tension exists in at least two places: First, 
tension within the research methods themselves. Although broadly 
Humean, there are some difficulties in understanding how compara-
tive trials (counterfactual dependency) relate to a difference making 
theory of causation, whilst observational studies relate more closely 
to a pure regularities view of causation. Even within a Humean world, 
it is therefore difficult to understand what causation is. If we do not 
understand what causation is, then how do we know we have found 
it? This makes it troublesome to understand how observed facts can 
remain stable through their transition to spatiotemporally removed 
environments. What is holding the facts together in order for them 
to remain stable during their transference and operationalisation 
in the complex and context-sensitive situations of clinical decision-
making for individuals and populations?
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Summary of the problems with Hume
Hume offered an account of causation by which the research activ-
ity with EBM can be understood. The way causal claims are gener-
ated within the EBM framework is, in no uncertain terms, Humean. 
This leaves us asking whether or not this account is relevant for the 
central claim of EBM, which is concerned with translating such 
claims from their source of origin (research) to place of intended 
use (clinical practice). Is the sort of causation established by EBM’s 
research methods the sort of causation we desire in either policy or 
individual clinical decision-making?
To sum up the Humean position, what we can say is that causa-
tion is in fact not causation at all, but something that is analysed 
away into a collection of discrete statistical facts. Hume and EBM 
explicitly demonstrate that they have no concern with the matter of 
causation itself, only in what can be known by the structured and 
systematic observation of constantly conjoined events. Taking these 
statistical facts to a spatiotemporally removed environment relies 
on assumptions and premises that must be defined by what those 
facts represent. Below, we can see that this is problematic if health 
care is to be thought of as something which embraces the com-
plexity of human nature and the socio-cultural environment within 
which humans exist. Indeed, this is something which is most likely 
not even up for debate. To portray this, we can consider a model of 
person-centred health care, and try to understand how a Humean 
idea of causation resonates with the characteristics of a holistic 
health care model. Previous authors have defined what might be 
meant by a humanistic, holistic health care model:
Person centered medicine an affordable biomedical and technological 
advance to be delivered to patients within a humanistic framework of 
care that recognises the importance of applying science in a manner 
that respects the patients as a whole person and takes full account of 
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his (sic) values, preferences, aspirations, stories, cultural context, fears, 
worries and hopes and thus that recognises and responds to his emo-
tional, social and spiritual necessities in addition to his physical needs 
(Miles & Mezzich, 2012, p. 219).
This model builds on earlier “landmark” casuistic framing of how 
EBM should be considered (Tonelli, 2006). Further, it references a 
historical background of care related to the evolution of a biopsy-
chosocial framework (Engel, 1977) – namely Francis Peabody’s The 
Care of The Patient, and Paul Tournier’s Medicine de la Personne.8 
Referring to Engel’s rejection of a monistic or reductionist approach 
to clinical practice, the sentiments of person-centred health care 
are clear:
In doing so, he [Engel] directly laid the foundations of the thinking that 
now recognises the importance of complexity theory in medical prac-
tice and that illustrates that clinical phenomena are generally far too 
complex to be understood solely through the use of linear cause-effect 
models (Miles & Mezzich, 2012, p. 210).
The emergence of person-centred health care can be sketched out 
from a developing EBM movement and a general idea of histori-
cal “good care” referred to as patient-centred care. The difference 
between the patient and the person is emphasised in sympathy to 
a “deep respect…as unique living beings” (Epstein & Street, 2011, 
p. 100). Person-centred health care gives a substantial and focused 
account of a “crisis” of knowledge, care, compassion and costs in 
modern medicine (Miles & Mezzich, 2012). Its claim is that an 
over-emphasis of scientific medicine has resulted in the deper-
sonalisation of care. In response, proponents of person-centred 
8 See: Peabody, F. W. (1927). The Care of the Patient. Journal of the American Medi-
cal Association 88, p. 877 – 882.; Tournier P. (1940) Médicine de la Personne, Neu-
chatel, Switzerland: Delachaux et Niestlé.
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care propose an emergent humanistic model of clinical practice 
grounded in holism and complexity. There is an easy and intuitive 
response to this, that EBM does not in fact “depersonalise” care at 
all. EBM proponents have indeed suggested how EBM has led to 
the sophisticated articulation of the proper role that patients’ values 
and circumstances play in clinical decision-making (for example, 
Montori and Guyatt, 2008 and Montori et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
it may be that the person-centred argument sees EBM as a rigid 
strategy for the practicalities of clinical decision-making (always 
do what is supported by the best evidence). This might not be a fair 
characterisation of EBM because of the tension it artificially creates 
between facts and individual values. However, despite these intui-
tive responses, it is still unclear to see how the relationship between 
facts (data, say) and values (clinical context, patient values), might 
actually develop whilst maintaining the grounded principles of 
holistic person-centred care. This is especially the case given the 
Humean characterisation of causation.
We are now left with a paradox whereby the very methods 
prioritised by EBM to inform its own practice reveal an account 
of causation in which the translation of causal claims remains 
unfounded. So the question remains: Can there be an alternative 
way of accounting for causation in EBM that relates much more 
convincingly to person-centred, holistic health care? The final sec-
tion of this chapter argues that there is, and as such sketches out, a 
possible re-conceptualisation of the causal account for EBM.
Causal dispositionalism as a way forward 
for evidence-based health care
I have drawn out an account for causation within health care by con-
sidering the way by which it structures its evidential sources. This 
is an unusual way to explore an ontology, but EBM gave few other 
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options. EBM seems not to be concerned with what causation is, 
only the observation of discrete, constantly conjoined events. As it 
stands, EBM is perhaps best considered as deontological. Although 
this might satisfy some (for example, Howick, 2011), it seems sub-
stantially to curtail further enquiry and progress into the philoso-
phy and practice of health care. I suggest a position where a causal 
ontology is developed in light of the core values and purposes of 
health care, say, as per person-centred care, and that its epistemo-
logical account follows. Therefore, what we read from the outputs of 
the methods, far better relate to the type of causal activity desired in 
making clinical decisions intended to impact on the health status of 
individual people or inform health policy. Here, I suggest that a the-
ory of causal dispositionalism can respond to many of the problems 
exposed by the Humean account. The theory in mind is one based 
on the work of Mumford and Anjum (Mumford & Anjum, 2011), 
and is one which takes causes as tendencies towards an effect, and as 
things which manifest in single instances. The theory considers the 
notion of causation as complex, and whether or not causes result in 
some effect is a highly context-sensitive issue. Furthermore, and of 
utmost importance in responding to Hume, the theory takes causes 
as real and primitive – that is, causation cannot be analysed away to 
something else, as is the case with the Humean account. Causes are 
the very things that make up what the person is, and the person is the 
most obvious source of observation to understand what causation is.
It is beyond the parameters of this chapter to lay out a fully 
detailed account of the theory of dispositionalism, and for this 
the reader is directed to supporting resources (Kerry et al., 2012; 
Eriksen et al., 2013;  Mumford & Anjum, 2011;  Mumford & Anjum, 
2012). For the purpose of this chapter, causal dispositionalism will 
be introduced within a focussed framework of key areas relevant 
to the central claims of EBM. The key areas which emerge from 
the existing problematisation of causation and which also relate to 
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EBMs central claim are i) how can a theory provide detail of causal 
content from its methods, ii) how can it motivate a viable episte-
mology, iii) how can it account for individual decision-making, 
and iv) how can it help understand the assumptions needed to 
bridge the inferential gap between population level evidence and 
clinical decisions. These four key areas are now attended to in turn.
Causal content
A traditional Humean account of causation offers some explanation 
as to how causal claims are developed from research methods. The 
account is able to discuss such claims in terms of either frequencies 
of occurrence of events, the degree of differences between two fre-
quencies, or both. Proponents of the Humean account are satisfied 
that this sufficiently explains the causal role of research content, 
specifically highlighting that this avoids unnecessary matters of 
ontology. The dispositionalist response is straightforward: the con-
tent that is being referred to here is not of causation, but of some-
thing else. The essence of causation has not been reached, and as 
such, any explanation related to causal content cannot be given. The 
“truthmaker” of causation within traditional accounts is removed 
from where causation itself is most likely to be found. What dispo-
sitionalism offers is a view that sees causation within the core of the 
content itself. Changes are seen within groups, and these changes 
occur because of multiple events tending towards and away from 
effects. Whereas Humeans consider single and necessary causes by 
proxy of frequently occurring observed events, dispositionalists see 
various causal factors that may or may not manifest in an effect. 
The causal role of these events for dispositionalism is the notion of 
how they manifest and how they may tend towards and away from 
anticipated thresholds. Dispositionalists are unsatisfied with causal 
explanations that relate to frequentist interpretations of probability, 
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as probability should be thought of in relation to the propensities 
held by causal factors.
Epistemology
Proponents of a Humean account of causation in health care have 
taken it as problematic that dispositionalism sees causes as real, for 
example Williamson (2006). By committing to the reality of causes, 
the demarcation between those matters that are problematic and 
those that are not is compromised. As such, accepting that causes 
themselves may not be a real feature of the world, permits prior-
ity of epistemological enquiry – that is, we do not need a “thick” 
theory of causation in order to understand the world. As such, 
Williamson and others prefer a theory of epistemic causality (Russo 
& Williamson, 2011). In order for such a theory to advance under-
standing of the world, it must accept that multiple methods are 
used as evidential sources. However, because there is no commit-
ment to what causation is, all that can be said is that each method 
must relate to its own interpretation of causation, for example 
RCTs relate to causes as making a difference; observational studies 
relate to causes as regularly occurring events; etc. Although this 
causal pluralism seems to advance from an idea on causal monism 
(that there is only one way to find one idea of causation), its inabil-
ity to commit to a single idea of what causation is leads again to a 
Humean stalemate.
Dispositionalism offers a commitment to monism, but an ontologi-
cal monism. That is to say, there is a single idea of what a cause is. It can 
align this with a notion of pluralism, but a methodological pluralism. 
This means that because causes are complex and context-sensitive, 
they will display many symptoms. Accepting that the outcomes of sci-
entific methods are symptomatic rather than constitutive of causation 
facilitates a methodological pluralist stance, whereby information from 
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multiple methods and sources may reveal parts of the causal process. 
These sources can include indicators of causation such as mechanistic 
science and patient narratives. Dispositionalists do not need to worry 
about the cumbersome and ultimately unsuccessful reconciliation of 
multiple theories of causation, because causes are only one thing.
Individual decision-making
Proponents of Hume say their causal account explains inference from 
research to the clinic. However, the assumptions for this are unfounded. 
They argue for this conclusion with limited consideration of the onto-
logical issues at stake. Indeed, their stance suggests those considerations 
are not even relevant. An ontological inquiry however is beneficial in 
unveiling some of the shortcomings of current causal models for the 
complexities of medical phenomena. The essence of this chapter cen-
tres on the relationship between general and particular instances of 
causes. A causal theory should account for causal processes in individ-
ual-level clinical decision-making. The traditional stance had limited 
options and utility concerning this, appealing to either a rational-
ised faith in probabilistic inference, or some claim to universal laws. 
Dispositionalism can respond with ease to this desideratum. Although 
it has no deep ontological commitment to the priority of either general 
or particular instances, dispositionalism does take the single instance 
as to where causes are. From this, the theory can account for general 
causes as being signals to where causation might lie. There is no com-
mitment needed to universal laws, and the account avoids problems 
associated with probability and induction, as below.
The inferential gap
The Humean position is simply to assert that if prioritised meth-
ods are conducted correctly – without experimental error – then 
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predictions should be forthcoming that are simple, exact and unfail-
ing. Good examples of this characterisation of EBM are found in 
critical responses to a dispositions account by, for example, Strand 
and Parkkinen (Strand & Parkkinen, 2014; 2015). However, we 
know this to be false; otherwise the problem of induction would 
not be centuries old. The gap between science and application 
will never be unfailing, and inferences can always be wrong. Any 
account of causal inferences has, therefore, to respect the obvi-
ous datum that predictions are fallible and defeasible. A Humean 
account is grounded in deductivism and therefore necessity. What 
this means is that the logical form of the traditional account dic-
tates that all claims will be necessarily so, to a probabilistic level 
(note that framing necessity in terms of probability does not solve 
this issue). So how can cases of failed causation be accounted for? 
Dispositionalism avoids commitment to ever necessitating an 
effect, and rather offers an explanation of prediction and inference 
within a fallibilist’s framework in which dispositions tend to pro-
duce their effects but might not always do so. With dispositional-
ism, the problem of induction becomes redundant.
Conclusion
This chapter has proposed that causation is an idea that is central to 
the essence of evidence-based physiotherapy. By understanding the 
structure of prioritised evidential sources within the EBM frame-
work, a causal account related to a Humean theory of causation can be 
developed. This is problematic to the central claims of EBM because a 
world of constantly conjoined discrete events does not seem prepared 
to relate to a person-centred model of health. Thus, any grounds on 
which to bridge the space between research outcomes and clinical 
decision-making remain unfounded. What would better support 
and progress the purpose of evidence-based practice is a theory of 
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causation that better understands causes to be real, singular, com-
plex, and context-sensitive. If this were the case, multiple research 
methods would be able to work in establishing where causes lie. 
However, population level research outcomes would not be con-
stitutive of causation, merely symptomatic. The real causal matter 
would be found in the single, individual case.
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CHAPTER 4
New materialism and 
physiotherapy
David A. Nicholls | School of Public Health and Psychosocial 
Studies, Auckland University of Technology
Abstract
Over the last decade, new materialism has emerged as a radical 
approach to philosophy that has profound implications for the way we 
think about education, practice and research. It challenges the human-
centredness of our everyday lives, and proposes some interesting new 
ways to think about the future. It critiques 400 years of humanistic 
science, including the more recent interest in the phenomenology of 
“being”, drawing on the work of Deleuze, Heidegger, Foucault and 
others to propose a radical new ethics based on the affective capacities 
of all things. In this chapter, I offer a broad introduction to new mate-
rialism, focusing on the ways that its various forms challenge tradi-
tional hierarchies that have long placed white, anglophone men at the 
top of the social pyramid. I explore new materialism’s challenge to the 
ideas of binaries (normal: abnormal, body: mind, etc.), the nature of 
agency, and the implications for a monistic ontology of matter. I con-
clude the chapter by speculating on the ways new materialism might 
inform future physiotherapy practice, arguing that there is much in 
the approach that physiotherapists will find familiar, but also much 
that they may find profoundly interesting and challenging.
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Background
Over the last few years, an increasing number of physiotherapy 
educators, practitioners, researchers and writers have turned 
their attention towards the experiential, qualitative and subjective 
dimensions of health and wellbeing. Moreover, although quantita-
tive, experimental approaches to research remain the most popular 
kinds of knowledge, there is a growing interest in more holistic, 
embodied understandings of physiotherapy practice and people’s 
experiences of recovery, rehabilitation and therapy. Over the last 
decade a radical new approach to thinking and practice has emer-
ged that is neither quantitative nor qualitative. New materialism 
challenges the privilege given to humans in Western philosophy 
and establishes a new philosophy of matter. So far, it has drawn 
the attention of philosophers, scientists and sociologists from a 
panoply of disciplines, but as yet little work has been undertaken 
in healthcare.
A number of these “new materialist” approaches have emer-
ged around the work of Michelle Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Félix 
Guattari and others in recent years, including actor network the-
ory, affect theory, object orientated ontology and speculative rea-
lism, and they draw on a wide range of influences, ranging from 
poststructural feminism to theoretical physics, deep ecology to 
posthumanism.
The various forms of new materialism cohere around some 
broad principles that will be unpacked in more detail below. To 
summarise, new materialist approaches reject the idea that humans 
are superior to all other forms of animate and inanimate matter 
and explore a “flat ontology” among all things. They are opposed 
to the binaries that have traditionally dominated Western thinking. 
They challenge the phenomenological emphasis on “being”, focu-
sing instead on things “becoming”. And they draw from a diverse 
set of theoretical approaches, methodologies, and practice theories, 
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including those found in the pure and applied sciences, indigenous 
cultures, postmodernism and critical theory.
Despite new materialism’s growing significance as a radical new 
voice in philosophy, it has made little impact in healthcare thus 
far, and only a few examples exist of its use in areas directly rele-
vant to physiotherapy (see for example Gibson, 2016, 2006; Mol, 
2002; Nicholls et al., 2016; Setchell, Nicholls, & Gibson, 2017; 
Shildrick, 1997, 2014). However, it does offer some interesting and 
potentially fruitful ways to examine some of the changes facing 
physiotherapy, healthcare, and some of the broader social ques-
tions facing humanity.
New materialism points to some innovative ways to engage ethi-
cally with others and re-invigorate our search for fairness and jus-
tice in the face of the increasingly discredited “humanist” project of 
the modern period (DeLanda & Harman, 2017). It opens a space 
for new relationships between people, animals, plants and objects in 
an ecosystem defined by the capacity for things to interact, not the 
superiority of one type of matter over another. Over the remainder 
of the chapter, I will unpack some of these ideas and opportunities 
and attempt to apply these to physiotherapy in an “expanded field” 
(Krauss, 1979), because to me, physiotherapy is concerned with all 
matter, and new materialism offers some tantalising opportunities 
for physiotherapists to define a practice paradigm that could open 
up multiple new “lines of flight” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).
Key principles
New materialism, as a concept, can be quite difficult to grasp, partly 
because it offers such a radical alternative to conventional ways of 
thinking, and partly because it relies on new modes of expression to 
define its parameters. Reading the works of some of its proponents, 
one is struck by how language is used differently. The meanings of 
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common terms like agency, becoming and desire, are sometimes 
extended to non-human actants, and less common words like clina-
men, conatus and monism are used to express alternative ways of 
thinking. New materialism also offers some radical approaches to 
grand philosophical concepts like ethics, ontology, subjectivity and 
teleology, and so may seem counterintuitive and perplexing to some. 
In response to this challenge, what follows is an introduction to some 
of new materialism’s key principles. This is by no means a comprehen-
sive account, and it inevitably takes some liberties with the breadth 
and diversity of writings on the subject. I have focused on five main 
principles of new materialism: “thing-power”; the challenge to tradi-
tional hierarchies; the appeal of monism and opposition to binaries; 
agency; and intermingling and becoming. After outlining these key 
principles, I close the chapter by looking at some of the ways new 
materialism might relate to a more expansive physiotherapy.
Thing-power
The first principle that unites many new materialists is an interest in 
objects, things or “matter”. New materialists are interested in what 
Jane Bennett called “thing-power” (Bennett, 2009, p. xiii). This is 
the idea that all matter has the capacity to affect and to be affected, 
and so challenges the idea that some “things” – particularly human 
things – matter more than others. New materialists see matter as 
dynamic and responsive, and these properties are inherent in the 
things themselves, not merely as human projections (ibid, p. 5). 
“Matter”, for new materialists, is no longer seen as passive, intracta-
ble and lifeless “stuff ”, but as vibrant material that makes up human 
and non-human life: from tiny atoms and chemical compounds, to 
complex organisms and social systems.
Focusing on matter in this way demands a considerable onto-
logical re-orientation away from the kinds of anthropocentric 
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(or human-centred) positions that have dominated thinking for 
many centuries (Fox & Alldred, 2016b). New materialism critiques 
much of this history, arguing that we have developed ways of thinking 
and practicing that are too humanistic, and have looked to under-
stand the world through human eyes (almost all qualitative research 
and person-centred practice, for instance, does this), or assert human 
command of other people and the natural world (most quantitative 
research and evidence-based practice). It argues that while these 
humanistic approaches have brought considerable benefits to us, they 
have also contributed, amongst other things, to the normalisation of 
white, male privilege and the systematic and industrial-scale abuse of 
the natural world for human gain. Many see new materialism, the-
refore, as a radical and necessary alternative to humanistic thinking 
and a departure from the anthropocentric philosophies that have 
dominated Western cultures since the Enlightenment.
For physiotherapists, matter gives form to our practice. Matter 
can mean the anatomical structures that we mobilise, or the bodily 
functions, synaptic connections, and the diffusion of substrates that 
we work to enhance. It can mean the assemblages that form between 
the hand of the therapist and the skin of the patient – and the myriad 
neuro-chemical processes that mediate the therapeutic experience. 
Matter also refers to objects – including the inanimate things that 
help to define our practice and differentiate what we do from others: 
our goniometers and stethoscopes, treatment beds and patient 
records. Critically, these aspects of practice are often thought of as 
less important than the human experiences, and so new materialism 
sees this privileging of the human experience as a real problem.
The challenge to traditional hierarchies
Many new materialists draw inspiration from the work of philo-
sophers like Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche, and more 
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recently, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Martin Heidegger and 
Michel Foucault, who have all critiqued the hubris of “man’s” 
sovereignty and dominion over the natural world1. Continental 
philosophers like Deleuze and Foucault have been particularly 
scathing of the idea that humans are superior to all other living 
and non-living things, with Foucault echoing Nietzsche in 
proclaiming the “Death of Man” half a century ago (Foucault, 
1970). Figure 4.1 below shows a representation of perhaps the 
most familiar representation of man’s place in modern Western 
culture.
1 I use the word “man” in specific places within the text to refer to the classical tradi-
tion of seeing the white, privileged, heteronormative and non-disabled male as the 
apotheosis of Western culture. This treatment is seen by many new materialists as 
inherently problematic, and evidence of a hierarchy that extends through “other” 
humans (non-male, non-white, disabled, marginalised populations, etc.), down 
through animals and plants, and ending finally with inanimate objects.  Destabili-
sing the metaphorical pyramid that has elevated man to its artifically constructed 
summit, is one of the fundamental tenets of new materialism.  
Figure 4.1: Human-centred hierarchy of the natural world
Human
Plants
Animal
Maer, things, objects
Adult, white, heterosexual, 
non-disabled, cis-
gendered, aﬄuent males 
occupying the most 
privileged posion
‘Others’: women, disabled,
people of colour, gay,
transgender, poor, child,
migrant, etc., occupying
subordinate posions
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It seems axiomatic that humans should sit above all other matter in 
the universe, given our capacity for conscious self-awareness, spoken 
language and ethical reasoning. Indeed, the belief that humans com-
mand the rest of the natural world can be found in pre-Socratic wri-
ting and Aristotle’s view that only man had an intellectual or rational 
soul and was, as a result, superior (Thomas, 1983, p. 30-1). Existential 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger described inanimate objects 
as being “without world”, animals and plants as “poor in the world” 
with only humans as having the capacity to be “world producing” 
(Heidegger, 1995). Jeffrey Nealon describes the hierarchy that under-
pins much of the philosophy, politics, science and religion in the west 
as “rigidly demarcated from the bottom up” (Nealon, 2016, p. 32).
The idea that humans are superior to all other matter in the cos-
mos, therefore, has a long history. Notwithstanding the many human 
achievements in the arts; economics; linguistics and taxonomy; 
science and technology; social organisation; and politics, some have 
argued that the belief in human dominion over all things has resulted 
in many of humanity’s most appalling acts of hubris. From the abuse 
of animals and the destruction of the natural world for personal gain, 
to slavery, human trafficking, and genocide, there are many examples 
of human arrogance and self-conceit that can be attributed to our 
belief in our age-old sense of privilege and natural advantage.
One of the most enduring and pernicious conceits is the belief that 
within the human domain a further hierarchy exists, such that white, 
heterosexual, Western males represent the most refined, sophisticated 
and idealised form of humanity. There are now vast volumes of writing 
from disabled people, ecology advocates, LGBTI activists, feminists, 
Marxists, equal rights activists, and many others, who have long dis-
puted this ordering, and many are now turning to new materialism 
for tools with which to trouble prevailing patriarchal, colonial, hetero-
normative and anthropocentric attitudes (Butler, 1993; Davies, 2016; 
Feely, 2016; Haraway, 2006, 2008; Lather, 1993; Riskin, 2016).
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Ironically, physiotherapists have really only just begun 
to consider the subjective human experience of physiothe-
rapy, and embrace the “idealist” philosophies of people like 
Martin Heidegger & Maurice Merleau-Ponty (see, for example, 
Bjorbækmo & Engelsrud, 2011; Sviland, Martinsen & Råheim, 
2014; Standal & Engelsrud, 2013). Fewer still are exploring some of 
the social structures that govern human experience. So, the desire 
to “flatten” the traditional hierarchy that privileges the human 
over all things perhaps comes before we have really understood 
the possibilities that humanistic inquiry (e.g., common forms of 
qualitative research) offers. Nevertheless, new materialism argues 
that privileging the human is not without its risks, however, and 
that we cannot afford to endorse the hubris in the belief that we 
are “Lords of all we survey”.
The appeal of monism and opposition to 
binaries
New materialists argue that hierarchies are problematic because 
they create the possibility for discrimination, stigma and abuse. 
Something is always sitting above something else in a hierarchy, 
and such positioning implicitly involves value judgements about 
the virtues and qualities of some things over others. Such hierar-
chies are only possible because human societies have long sought to 
understand the world through taxonomies of difference and binary 
judgements. For the last 400 years or so, these judgements have 
been dominated by scientific classifications and logics, through 
which all matter is judged and ranked according to its proximity 
to human norms. Truth can be seen to be superior to lies; health is 
better than sickness; reason more desirable than unreason; norma-
lity preferable to abnormality; and so on. Such binary judgements 
implicitly privilege one thing over another in an endless series of 
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comparisons that ultimately results in a universal hierarchy that 
defines what Foucault called the “order of things” (Foucault, 1970).
For its part, modern healthcare would not function if it were 
not for binary judgements made about ill (vs healthy) people, made 
by qualified (vs “lay” or quack) practitioners, working in organised 
institutional settings (as opposed to everyday community locati-
ons). Almost the entire basis of physiotherapy practice is based on 
binaries: from patient assessments that define what is wrong and 
needs to be fixed; to ethical codes that state what is professional 
behaviour and what is unprofessional; to funding systems that 
determine who is eligible for financial support and who is not.
New materialists argue that binary judgements are deeply 
problematic, drawing, instead, on “flat”, or what Leibniz called 
“monist” – meaning “singular” – ontologies. In this approach, reality 
is not ordered hierarchically, but as a flat plane or multi-dimensional 
matrix in which all matter is rhizomatically distributed (Deleuze 
& Guattari 1987). No arbitrary distinction is made between the 
values and qualities of humans, inanimate objects, plants, animals, 
emotions and thoughts, cultural beliefs, symptoms, functions, rocks 
and bus tickets, digital media, theories, pets, football fans, partners 
and office shelving systems. Instead, new materialists utilise a diffuse 
“continuum of materiality” (Fox & Alldred, 2016a, p. 4), in which 
human and nonhuman matter is considered dispersed and diffe-
rentiated. New materialists view microbiological matter and macro-
social processes on the same “plane of consistency” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987), often occupying multiple locations at the same time. 
They look to the self-organising capacity of things in combination, 
as well as the local, material effects of things in a constant state of 
flux – ever changing, moving and becoming. New materialists rede-
fine what people have come to refer to as “agency” – a term normally 
used to denote the volitional acts of humans – allowing that all things 
are expressive and, as such, vibrant and agentic.
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New materialist physiotherapy would begin, therefore, from 
the basis that human subjectivity is not superior to all other 
forms of matter. This might elevate, for instance, the status of a 
wheelchair from something that is merely an “aid” to a person’s 
mobility, to a necessary and equal partner in an assemblage that 
allows a person to move. Oxygen, processes of diffusion, muscle 
contractions and feelings of breathlessness, might be allied to 
air quality, pollution standards, and plant photosynthesis in an 
ontological equivalency that spans all human and non-human 
entities.
Agency
New Materialism breaks with the Enlightenment belief that “a scien-
tific explanation must not attribute will or agency to natural pheno-
mena” (Riskin, 2016, p. 2). Agency has long been considered one of 
the defining characteristics of the human species, and a concern “that 
seems as close to the heart of what science is as any scientific rule or 
principle” (ibid, p. 4). By contrast, new materialists believe that agency 
is the capacity of things to affect and be affected, and this approach 
“elides any distinction between physical/biological materiality and the 
expressive realms of concepts, thoughts and feelings” (Fox & Aldred, 
2016b, p. 18). Thus, a park bench exercises agency when it provides 
a resting place for a weary walker. It is not just the walker, with her 
powers of conscious decision-making, that “decides” what actions to 
take; all things play their part and form affective assemblages if the 
park bench is to affect change and make a synergistic moment between 
the seat and the walker possible. Even negative spaces, like openings 
in a tree line or the retirement of a work colleague, become agentic 
when they provide space for other things to move in to. In Deleuzian 
and Guattarian terms, affect equates to the desire things have to make 
things happen (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).
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The park bench, by virtue of its particular configuration and assem-
blage of capacities, desires to be sat on (as opposed to making a cup of 
tea, for which it is distinctly ill equipped). This is what Jane Bennett 
calls the vibrancy and vitality of things (Bennett, 2009). Of course, 
there have been examples of the power of matter to affect human 
life written throughout the history of education, philosophy, poli-
tics, science and society, but in these accounts agency is an attribute 
“given” to things by people, and is not inherent in the things themsel-
ves. Heidegger, for example, spoke of das Zeug or the “usefulness” of 
tools, and Marx wrote about historical materialism as a structural force 
driving human society. Few, until recently, have turned away from this 
anthropocentrism, and sought to understand what Barad et al. called 
“things in phenomena” (Barad, Nelson & Nelson, 1996, p. 176).
Intermingling and becoming
If agency is the capacity for things to act and to produce the world 
in all its dynamic vibrancy and flux (Fox & Alldred, 2016b, p. 4), 
the things we see, feel, hear, taste and touch can be said to be the 
“effects” of affective properties interacting with their environments: 
the result of millions of interminglings and assemblages formed by 
matter. This mass of matter in constant formation and deformation 
represents an “affect economy” (Clough, 2004, p. 15). In this econ-
omy, the value of matter is judged not by their proximity or use 
value to humans, but by the ability to affect or be affected by other 
things. A new materialist affect economy assumes that assembla-
ges involving humans represent only a tiny percentage of the inter-
minglings taking place across the cosmos at any one time, and so 
offers another implicit critique of the anthropocentrism present in 
most sciences and cultural studies.
Karen Barad has argued that the affect economy cannot be under-
stood as a trade and exchange between isolated sovereign entities, 
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arguing that it is misleading to talk about matter inter-acting, because 
this implies that each element is in some ways distinct from the other. 
Barad uses the term intra-action instead to refer to actions that occur 
within two or more already entangled non-bounded entities (Barad 
2007; Dolphijn & Van der Tuin, 2012). As phenomena form and 
de-form, they acquire new capacities to affect and be affected, and 
this engenders a constant movement that “goes on repeatedly wit-
hin assemblages, in a ‘rhizomatic’ branching, reversing, coalescing 
and rupturing flow” (Fox & Alldred, 2016b, p. 24). In this way, it is 
somewhat arbitrary and imprecise to attempt to define the bounda-
ries of agentic phenomena (what Deleuze and Guattari called “terri-
torialisation”), since they are always in transition; always becoming, 
never sedimenting into “being”.
New materialists reject the hermeneutic fascination with “being” 
and look, instead, to the transformative potential of things “beco-
ming”. They are less concerned with what things “are” and more with 
what things might become when they intra-act with other things. 
They are concerned with the dynamism, evasiveness and slipperiness 
of matter in combination. Where “being” represents stasis, territo-
rialisation, and fixety; “becoming” represents movement, deterri-
torialisation, deconstruction and flow. Speed and slowness – terms 
intimately connected with movement and physiotherapy – become 
key metrics for the affective capacity of assemblages, because they 
focus more on the dynamic potential of phenomena and less on nou-
mena or the things-in-themselves (Fox & Alldred, 2016a, p. 59).
How might new materialism relate to 
physiotherapy?
In many ways, physiotherapy is ideally suited to new materialist 
approaches, because new materialism is fundamentally about 
complexity and movement, and expert therapy demands an 
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understanding of all matter: from the body’s structures and func-
tions, to a sensitive humanism, from an appreciation for the social 
context influencing people’s lives, and an awareness of the non-
human matter that mediates people’s engagement with the world. 
The problem has been finding a philosophy or theoretical fram-
ework that makes sense of this complexity and diversity.
Having spent much of its history drawing from the quantitative bio-
logical sciences, physiotherapists are now starting to look towards exis-
tential philosophy and the humanities to better understand our practice 
relationship with clients, and what physiotherapy-related matter means 
for people. Nevertheless, new materialists would argue that such inqui-
ries largely reinforce the same binary distinctions between quantitative 
and qualitative, nature and culture, objective and subjective, which were 
critiqued earlier in the paper. Therefore, although physiotherapy ought 
to be well suited to complex and diverse philosophies and theories, it is 
perhaps anchored to traditional and well-established binaries that, some 
have argued, may be resisting necessary reform (Nicholls 2017).
Physiotherapists could retain their affinity 
for the biological sciences
In recent years, there has been much criticism directed towards 
physiotherapy’s historical affinity with the body-as-machine, 
(Bjorbaekmo & Engelsrud, 2011; Nicholls, 2017; Nicholls & Gibson, 
2010). These authors have argued that “real” physiotherapy practice 
is much broader than the profession itself allows, and that if physio-
therapy is to survive and prosper into the future, it must find ways to 
account for this breadth, and explain its complexity to itself and to the 
publics that draw on its skills and resources (Nicholls, 2017). Inherent 
in this is the need to incorporate new thinking with the best of the old.
Far from dismissing physiotherapy’s biomechanical heritage, as 
some recent humanistic analyses have done, new materialism not only 
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accepts the physical reality of the body, it embraces it and encourages 
practitioners to see all matter non-hierarchically. Further, it draws 
no distinction between the biological and the social, so dissolves the 
need for the kinds of factional tribalism about what is quantitative 
and what is qualitative. It sees the biological in everything. Examples 
of this openness to the biological, chemical and physical nature of 
the world are everywhere in the writings of new materialists. Karen 
Barad, for example, draws on the work of Niels Bohr’s measurement 
of sub-atomic particles to develop the idea of phenomena and intra-
action (Barad, 2007), Jane Bennett examines food, metals, electricity 
and stem cells in her work on “vibrant matter” (Bennett, 2009), and 
John Dupré writes about polygenomic organisms, alleles and micro-
biota (Dupré, 2012).
Movement and becoming
If there is one concept that most physiotherapists would agree lies at the 
heart of their professional identity, it would be movement (Covington, 
2015; Sahrmann, 2014; Standal & Engelsrud, 2013; Wikström-Grotell 
& Eriksson, 2012). In an age when even orthodox health professions 
need to market their competitive advantage, movement appears to be 
a commonly used term that physiotherapists feel confident to rally 
behind (see, for example, http://www.wcpt.org/wptday and http://
tinyurl.com/n7fmvol). Some physiotherapy authors have even argued 
that the profession needs to “own the human movement system” 
(Sahrmann 2014, p. 1040). Movement has been a defining feature of 
theoretical models of physiotherapy for nearly half-a-century (Broberg 
et al., 2003; Cott et al., 1995; Hislop, 1975), and persists in the language 
of participation and activity (Escorpizo, 2015). When physiothera-
pists refer to movement, however, they are generally referring to the 
physical movements of the body or its parts. Physiotherapists rarely 
engage with other meanings of movement: the microscopic osmotic 
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movement of molecules across cell membranes, for example, or the 
macroscopic population-scale movements of migrations and diaspo-
ras (Nicholls, Gibson & Fadyl, 2015). This is a largely self-determined 
approach, with physiotherapists’ ability to distinguish themselves from 
other competing healthcare providers a primary driver in the desire to 
“own” movement (Nicholls, 2017).
New materialism is a philosophy that embodies movement, dis-
placement, restlessness, deterritorialisation (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987), latent potential, and disruption as a positive force for 
change on a much grander scale (Braidotti, 2013; Gibson et al., 
2014; Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2014). It is concerned with the 
ceaseless “becoming” that occurs in the act of intra-acting. More 
than a decade ago, physiotherapist Barbara Gibson suggested ways 
in which the connectivity between things might carry therapeutic 
potential, pointing to a way in which physiotherapists and others 
might think differently about movement;
Connectivity is a potential to uncover new and varied ways of beco-
ming and considering how things could be otherwise. Instead of 
resisting connectivity, the project could be to explore connections and 
appreciate differences: becoming other(s) in multiple ways, a multi-
plicity of flowing connections made, released and reformed. These 
multiple becomings point towards a freedom. Not freedom from 
interference but freedom to experiment, explore, peek outside of the 
limits, journey there and back again. Refuse and re-fuse (Gibson 
2006, p. 195).
In recent years, some of the other authors in this book have joi-
ned Gibson in examining connectivity and its potential to func-
tion as a new philosophy of movement, in an attempt to open 
up physiotherapy to some news ways of thinking and practicing 
(Nicholls et al., 2016; Nicholls et al., 2015; Standal & Engelsrud, 
2013). This work suggests that a new expanded “materialist” 
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approach holds some latent potential for physiotherapists and 
others interested in movement in an expanded field.
Connecting physiotherapy to a greater 
social purpose
There can be little doubt that the physiotherapy profession has gai-
ned the respect and trust of the public, of its peers, and of “the state”, 
in large part because it has been able to demonstrate its usefulness. 
Physiotherapy has grown through times of war, epidemic and social 
reform because it legitimised a set of therapeutic practices and, when 
necessary, adapted these to the changing needs of society (Nicholls, 
2017). The future for the profession may therefore depend on its 
ongoing ability to adapt and reform, and what is increasingly clear 
is that technical proficiency and a depersonalised approach to the 
body-as-machine will no longer be enough (Trede & McEwan, 
2016). As public health services become decentralised, and people 
are expected to exercise greater choice and responsibility for themsel-
ves, health and wellbeing has become a terrain upon which complex 
negotiations are taking place, and the role of the “expert” practitioner 
is coming increasingly in question (Law & Mol, 2002; Mol, 2002).
Physiotherapists have been reticent to explore the more pro-
found aspects of their work, retaining a professional modesty about 
the biomechanical discourses that underpin their social functions. 
There can be little doubt, however, that physiotherapy practice can 
affect some people profoundly, and the reasons why people engage 
physiotherapists frequently have less to do with the more prosaic 
matters of bodily function than what these facilities make possi-
ble; how physiotherapy makes people feel; and how this represents 
transformative possibility. New materialism is grounded in a phi-
losophy of affective potential, and so provides language and ideas 
for ways that practitioners might express the radical possibilities 
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of physical therapy. It subverts familiar language and offers alter-
natives to the humanistic, scientific and sociological binaries that 
now appear to be functioning like a dragging anchor in the face of 
rapid and dynamic social change. Articulating the real breadth of 
physiotherapy’s affect economy may therefore function as a libera-
ting, progressive and critical act of resistance to the questions that 
are now emerging around the future for physiotherapy practice.
A new methodology to understand the 
complexity of physiotherapy
Finally, new materialism may provide an innovative set of con-
ceptual tools to allow practitioners to better see themselves and 
connect with a broader ecosystem, with the result being that 
the profession may find a new purpose and alternative ways to 
respond to the rapidly changing world it operates within. Baker 
wrote that “The hardest thing of all to see is what is really there” 
(Baker 1967, p. 19), and so it would seem when it comes to the 
familiar ways that we have come to understand the world through 
a modern, humanistic lens. Over recent years, however, criticisms 
have been levelled at some of the limitations of these anthropocen-
tric approaches, and these have resulted in a wave of new object- 
and ontologically-orientated approaches to research and writing, 
of which new materialism is a powerful contributor.
Adopting an entirely new philosophical approach to thinking 
and practicing physiotherapy is not without its risks however. 
Moreover, physiotherapists would need to unlearn much in order 
to adapt their practice to the needs of future healthcare. At the 
same time, new materialism allows for a great deal that has been 
long treasured by physiotherapists, and reconciles many of the ten-
sions that have slowed the growth and development of practice for 
many years. Perhaps most significantly, new materialism provides a 
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set of methodological tools to allow physiotherapists and others to 
examine their practice, redefine their professional purpose, estab-
lish a new professional ethics, and connect with a much broader 
affect economy.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to introduce new materialism, a rela-
tively new and, I believe, exciting paradigm. The reason for inclu-
ding it in this edited collection is that it may offer physiotherapists 
positive ways to practise otherwise. It destabilises many of the tra-
ditional binaries common to contemporary healthcare, and offers 
a significant challenge to the kinds of humanistic philosophy that 
have dominated Western philosophy for centuries. Its emphasis on 
an anti-hierarchical flat ontology, and its focus on the agency of 
all things, bypasses some of the tensions now being experienced 
by physiotherapists and others, and replaces them with an entirely 
new way of thinking and practicing, that connects physiotherapy 
with a much broader ecosystem. It represents a collection of rela-
ted philosophies, methodological tools, and an array of theoretical 
orientations whose time has come, and it may be of immeasurable 
support to those who wish to radically transform their practice.
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Abstract
There are elements of performance and acting techniques that are 
relevant and applicable to the (physio)therapeutic encounter. Spe-
cifically, we consider Keith Johnstone’s heuristic framework of thea-
trical improvisation around which performers can create interesting 
narratives and relationships. The concepts of “status” and “blocking” 
seem particularly pertinent to the therapeutic interaction. Much has 
been written about the power differential in a variety of healthcare 
encounters, including physiotherapeutic ones. Collaborative inte-
ractions in healthcare are considered favourable, yet physiothera-
pists have been criticised for continuing to engage in predominantly 
therapist-centred models of communication. We extend some of 
Johnstone’s theatrical constructs with the theories of feminist post-
structuralist Judith Butler to consider how they might be useful in 
understanding physiotherapists’ clinical interactions. For Butler, 
there is little distinction between personal and political, where even 
the most mundane-seeming acts are scripted by (and script) hege-
monic belief systems. She outlines how identities are formed through 
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repetition of certain “speech acts”, postures and movements. Butler’s 
theories of performativity can help physiotherapists understand 
how they (re)produce patterns of interaction in clinical encounters 
that (re)inforce therapist-centred interactions. Understanding these 
interactions using a Butlerian reading of Johnstone’s techniques can 
provide physiotherapists tools for recognising, and resisting hege-
monic physiotherapy practices.
Introduction
As this chapter introduces elements of acting and performance 
techniques and considers their relevance and applicability to the 
therapeutic encounter, we thought it relevant to introduce the 
theatrical aspects of ourselves to provide some context. Before 
retraining as a physiotherapist, Blaise Doran was a professional 
theatre actor for 10 years, working in a variety of styles, predomi-
nantly modern classics and Shakespeare. Improvisation was one 
of the foundations of his training, and it was used variously to 
develop scripts, the emotional tone of a scene and occasionally in 
performance. In his experience, parallels between physiotherapy 
and acting exist in the interactive nature of physiotherapeutic 
encounters, and this nourished his approach to such interactions, 
particularly in his current work with children and adolescents 
experiencing chronic pain. A  clinical physiotherapist – now an 
academic – Jenny Setchell also had a career as a physical thea-
tre/acrobatic performer. Her performance work was primarily 
physical – i.e. she embodied meaning through acro-balance, 
aerials, and dance. For Jenny, improvisation was a core part of 
devising new work. The content of her performance focussed 
primarily on (deconstructing/queering) gender: in many ways a 
physicalisation of some of Judith Butler’s concepts of performa-
tivity that we employ in this chapter. We hope to be able to share 
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some of our insights from our performative worlds with other 
physiotherapists.
The idea for this chapter came about during a conversation 
over a beer at a conference. We realised that we both use aspects 
of what we have learnt as performers to inform how we relate to 
patients (we use “patient” in its clinical sense, as the recipient of 
care but acknowledge that the use of the term has been criticised 
elsewhere [e.g., Langer & Abelson, 1974]). We discussed a number 
of ideas relating to performance, including that of status transac-
tions. The study of status in theatre relates to the idea of a constant, 
and sometimes subtle, interplay between supremacy and obedi-
ence (power relationships) occurring in human interaction. We 
speculated whether physiotherapists adjust their interpersonal 
communications, including status transactions, intuitively to add-
ress these relationships. Our initial discussion extended to include 
Judith Butler’s concept of performativity. Butler (1999) applied her 
ideas specifically to gender, proposing that gender identities con-
form to societal expectations as they are continuously replicated/
created through the repetition of particular physical and verbal 
actions. Gender is not innate, she asserted, but created to society’s 
specification through continual performance (ibid). We suggest 
this concept of gender performativity may be extended to other 
forms of identity construction, including “physiotherapist”. What 
constitutes a physiotherapist is not pre-existing: through repe-
tition of particular bodily gestures, attitudes and acts of speech, 
the recognisable identity of a “physiotherapist” is formed. As we 
discuss, this recognisable identity also includes certain “status” 
positioning(s).
While acknowledging that there may be more than one mani-
festation of this recognisable physiotherapist identity, continuously 
repeated elements coalesce to produce a kind of normative tem-
plate. We propose that there is, professionally and socio-culturally, 
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a collective idea of “a physiotherapist”. In keeping with the thea-
trical theme, we will call this collective idea of a physiotherapist 
an “archetype”. We will delve into the physiotherapy archetype 
more comprehensively below, highlighting how it is both produc-
tive and limiting for the profession, and in turn has implications 
in terms of physiotherapists’ power to regulate, constrain or work 
to liberate others. We argue that developing an understanding of 
this physiotherapist archetype presents opportunities to work in 
ways that subvert problematic power differentials that can exist in 
physiotherapeutic interactions (see, Harrison & Williams, 2000; 
Potter, Gordon & Hamer, 2003). To our knowledge, there has been 
no previous discussion (in physiotherapy or similar health profes-
sions) on status, improvisation and performativity in therapeutic 
encounters.
What we present is an interactional framework, and we 
argue that awareness of factors such as status can be helpful, 
particularly when therapeutic encounters become challenging. 
We acknowledge that this is one way to approach interperso-
nal communication, not the only way, and that the perspective 
we present is skewed towards Western cultures, as we predo-
minantly discuss our own experiences – primarily within the 
United Kingdom and Australia. Nonetheless, we aim to provide 
an innovative analysis of the physiotherapist’s “performance” as 
informed by established techniques used in theatrical impro-
visation that should, with considerations of nuance, have rele-
vance across numerous contexts.
Keith Johnstone’s “Impro” 
Performance training is not a homogenous entity – there are plen-
tiful (sometimes competing) schools of thought and approaches 
to training. While acknowledging this, we choose to focus on just 
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one – best known as improvisation, or more commonly, “impro”. 
A  consideration of what impro might bring to physiotherapy 
would be incomplete without exploring Keith Johnstone’s pionee-
ring work on theatrical improvisation, which was influential in 
Blaise’s actor training and Jenny’s performance devising process. 
Johnstone had a varied career as an educator, writer, script rea-
der, theatre director and drama teacher. In his monograph, Impro: 
Improvisation and the Theatre (1979; hereafter Impro), Johnstone 
outlines a heuristic framework around which performers can 
create interesting narratives and relationships. Johnstone likes to 
simplify, and a superficial reading of Impro may leave the reader 
with the impression that his approach is one-dimensional, and 
uncritically favours action over thought. However, his work is a 
complex synthesis of his observations on the processes involved 
in improvised performance, and diverse conceptual influences 
drawn from his experiences in education and theatre, which con-
cludes that the creative process (dramatic or otherwise) should 
be less about thinking and discussion, and more about doing. 
Johnstone emphasises the process of improvisation is founded 
on an ability to be aware of, and use, openness and vulnerabi-
lity. Being comfortable with failure is an important component 
of this, and we will revisit the concept in the context of clinical 
interactions. Taking the risk to move away from reproducing the 
conventional, and embracing difference and newness underpins 
Johnstone’s approach, because (as with critical perspectives in 
healthcare) the novelty of making “the familiar strange” (Kumagai 
& Wear, 2014) can be interesting and enlightening. While critical 
approaches are far from homogeneous, they arguably share with 
Johnstone a drive to shift customary thinking and established 
practices.
Johnstone peppers Impro with autobiographical details, and 
his approach to pedagogy is particularly interesting. He describes 
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working against his formative experiences of school which, as 
he describes them, were oppressive (involving power and sta-
tus). He maintains that this constraining type of education 
stunted his creativity for many years. Johnstone’s approach 
to teaching bears comparison with the methods described by 
one of the founding thinkers of critical pedagogy, Paolo Friere. 
Friere (2000) is celebrated for his censure of traditional peda-
gogic approaches, and what he called “the ‘banking’ concept of 
education” (p. 72) where students are conceptualised as empty 
vessels to be filled with information as if making deposits into 
a bank account. For Friere, to view the learner as a passive 
receptacle is a form of oppression that promotes conformity to 
the status quo, rather than a liberating process of dynamic and 
creative knowledge discovery (for a discussion of this in rela-
tion to health profession education, see Halman, Baker and Ng, 
2017). While teaching in a working-class area of South London, 
Johnstone subverted the traditional teaching methods that he 
experienced as a student (particularly: conforming to rigid 
strictures, focus on end results, and shunning failure) in order 
to creatively engage his pupils. It is possible to make connec-
tions between traditional teaching methods and the teleological 
focus (and repudiation of failure) in rehabilitation. Teaching, 
for Johnstone, is a creative act, and these experiences feed the 
epistemological stance of Impro. Rehabilitation can and should 
be a similarly creative act; an important factor in our reflections 
on therapeutic interactions below.
Next, we elaborate on Johnstone’s concept of status, which we 
propose forms an important and influential part of therapeutic 
interactions, and to the performative “physiotherapist archetype”. 
We then extend these concepts further through Judith Butler’s 
(1999) theories of performativity and highlight the relevance to the 
therapeutic interaction.
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Johnstone’s concept of status
“Status is a confusing term unless it’s understood as something one 
does. You may be low in social status, but play high, and vice versa.” 
Johnstone (1979, p. 36)
Bringing to mind status may evoke thoughts of an individual’s social 
standing and even her/his lineage, conjuring notions of hierarchy. 
Johnstone (1979), as illustrated by the above quotation, clearly uses 
the term “status” to describe what one does (how one behaves), 
rather than what one is (socially oriented concepts of self). At the 
core of his interpretation are the concepts of dominance and sub-
mission. Working with a group of actors in the 1960s, he struggled 
to get them to improvise naturalistic dialogue without sounding 
stilted or dull. His pragmatic solution was inspired by some diverse 
reading, including Konrad Lorenz’s (1952) treatise on animal beha-
viour; particularly the pecking order of birds. He used “pecking 
order” within improvisation exercises and, assuming he would be 
met with resistance if he called it “dominance and submission”, he 
coined the term “status” (Robbins Dudeck, 2013). Johnstone disco-
vered that getting actors to raise their status (dominate) or lower it 
(submit), even subtly, facilitated remarkable changes in the quality 
of the dialogue, and physical communication (e.g., Figure 5.1).
He emphasises that the taking of higher or lower status has little 
to do with an individual’s putative social standing. The process is 
rarely in stasis, as it needs to be continuously verbally and physi-
cally modulated. Johnstone believes we all have a preferred status, 
our default starting point within any given interaction. While he 
gives little elaboration as to what may influence this (other than it 
being based on his own observations). Some readers may recog-
nise that there are others who have written about preferred status, 
and how status may be socially – indeed performatively – created 
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(e.g. Bourdieu, 1977). While we recognise the importance of these 
perspectives, it is beyond the scope of this text to include them.
Status and performativity
To an extent, Johnstone’s interpretation of status resonates with the 
Butlerian view of performativity, where behaviours, speech and phy-
sical actions, continually repeated (something one does) consolidate 
an identity (the performative self), rather than it being an internali-
sed reality (something one is). Using Butler’s perspective, it is pos-
sible to consider the identities adopted in different contexts (for our 
purposes, “the patient” and “the physiotherapist”) as conforming to 
particular kinds of repeated actions, gestures, behaviours and speech. 
This connects well with the status concept (Johnstone, 1979) where 
The standing character is
hesitant in body language and
speech.  The seated character
takes up space, legs akimbo,
bag on chair.  Inspite of being
seated, this physical behaviour
is maintaining an elevated
status.
Ignoring, as the seated 
character does, is a high status 
activity, as is the unyielding, 
sarcastic answer.  Nervous 
laughter, and awkwardness are 
low status behaviours from the 
standing character. 
When the seated character 
chooses to make direct contact, 
it is done for effect, perhaps as 
a challenge or warning.  Any 
aempts to negotiate by the 
standing character are blocked.
Figure 5.1: “Is this seat taken?” An illustrated example of how status may work in an 
improvised performance (source: the authors)
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performing particular actions, physical and verbal behaviours, and 
vocal qualities produce high or low status. 
“Performativity” and “performance” have clear similarities – 
both involve language and vocal tone, physicality and movement, 
behaviour and affect. In this chapter, we will use the common 
understanding of “performance” to refer to both the representation 
of artistic works, and (more subtly) the expression of a tacit agre-
ement between individuals wherein one “acts” a role in an everyday 
context (i.e. acting offended over something that is said). To under-
stand how performativity is different from performance it is worth 
looking to the former’s original use in relation to speech. Austin 
(1962) introduced the concept of performativity in relation to the 
performative nature of certain phrases. Other than what is being 
spoken (i.e. the words used) Austin (1962) put forward two further 
elements: The “illocutionary act”, which is the speaker’s intended 
purpose behind the words, and the “perlocutionary effect”, which 
is the actual effect the person speaking has on the person they are 
speaking to. Performativity thus recognizes that speaking invol-
ves more than simply the production of words. Butler (1999) goes 
further, acknowledging the repressive power of language, par-
ticularly the elements that are repeated in societal and legal cre-
dos, and extending the concept of performativity to non-verbal 
acts. Performativity, then, for Butler, is the cyclical reproduction 
through speech, action, physical displays, and so on, that conso-
lidate an identity, and that are validated (or censured) by others.
Butler (1999) is renowned for applying the concept of performa-
tivity to gender and, in doing so, extending understandings of the 
productive power of performativity beyond that of Austin (1962). 
She deconstructs the idea that gender is a stable or predetermi-
ned inherent feature of the individual, refuting the notion that it is 
something individuals are born with. Instead Butler proposed that 
through repeated actions of speech, behaviour and mannerisms 
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(something which we learn, or receive) gender is consolidated, as 
(for example) masculinity or femininity. As Karen Barad (2007) 
succinctly depicts, Butler describes gender as an “iterated doing 
through which [gendered] subjects are brought into being” (p. 57, 
parentheses added by the authors). Gender is thus understood as 
perpetually reproduced through physical and verbal actions that 
constitute subjects through performative acts, and are policed by 
the expectations of others. There are multiple masculinities and 
femininities, however dominant forms of gender identities can be 
restrictive and coercive to those who fall outside of these putative 
“norms”. Butlerian performativity can be extended beyond consi-
derations of gender (e.g., Larsson, 2012), to describe the speech, 
behaviour, mannerisms and actions that contribute to the forma-
tion of other identities. While recognising that (like with gender) 
there is no single physiotherapist subject identity, we consider the 
dominant archetype of “the physiotherapist” below. 
One way to discuss “the physiotherapist” using Butler’s concept 
of performativity through the work of Johnstone (1979) is to return 
to our notion of an archetype. We will draw primarily on Frye’s 
(1957) understanding of the notion. Importantly, Frye acknow-
ledges Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian cultural influences on 
western notions of archetype, and emphasising the quintessential 
qualities of characters as being recognisable in spite of the differing 
detail of the narrative (e.g., the hero, the villain, the mentor, the wise 
woman), particularly if one stands back to see the (mythopoeic) 
design. This cultural influence is significant for our interpretation, 
as it opens up the possibility of archetypes being performatively 
reinforced by the culture from which they emanate. The archetype, 
then, is the recognisable “normative template” that Butler (1999) 
might argue is (re)produced through performativity. To use a thea-
trical example, in Commedia dell’Arte (a form of Italian improvisa-
tional theatre dating back to the 16th Century), there are four main 
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archetypes: Zanni (servants), Vecchi (old men), Innamorati (lovers), 
and Capitani (captains), (Chaffee & Crick, 2015). A 16th century 
audience attending a performance by a Commedia troupe would 
expect to see such stock characters, and expect them to behave in 
certain ways. They are the genotype to the phenotype of the indi-
vidual actor’s improvised performances - the inscribed model 
from which all others are made, and are usually strong enough to 
withstand whatever personal interpretation the actor brings. 
To apply the concept of an archetype to physiotherapy, one 
might perform a simple thought experiment: You are a casting 
director for a film or television show that is to have a physiothera-
pist as one of the characters. You must decide what type of actor 
you would cast so s/he will be easily recognised as a physiothera-
pist: you will need to make decisions about gender; ethnicity; body 
shape; mannerisms; and vocal quality. Note that this “archetypal 
physiotherapist” does not necessarily reflect what you actually 
see in your workplace but rather the dominant societal concept 
of a physiotherapist. We created Figure 5.2, below, to show some 
Figure 5.2: Possible descriptors of the archetypal physiotherapist (source: the authors)
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possible descriptors associated with physiotherapists in Western 
healthcare settings.
Reflecting upon the elements that you decided formed an “arche-
typal physiotherapist” may be a revealing process. Physiotherapy 
(perhaps wishfully) likes to portray itself as a diverse profession, 
but it is worth considering whether the idea of diversity stays at 
the forefront of your mind when imagining a physiotherapist and 
if your first imprint, reflecting a “normative template”, suggests 
something more like the descriptors shown in Figure 5. 2, above.
Because we suggest that the archetype is culturally embed-
ded, something reinforced performatively and reflecting the con-
cepts of Butler (1999), a possible challenge arises: How does the 
physiotherapy profession encode a different archetype that reflects 
the constative desire of the profession to be inclusive and diverse? 
Evolving from this archetype of the physiotherapist may be dif-
ficult, because it is mediated by sociocultural expectations from 
within the profession as well as broader society (Hammond, 2013; 
Dahl-Michelsen, 2014). Mediators such as training syllabuses, col-
league practices and behaviours, patient expectations, professional 
codes of conduct, and juridical foundations of our scopes of prac-
tice (amongst other things) delineate how physiotherapists think, 
look and act. Thus, Butler’s (1999) performativity can be applied 
to physiotherapy “as set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regu-
latory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of 
substance, a natural sort of being” (pp. 43-44). The performative 
view of physiotherapy (as expressed through the archetypal “phy-
siotherapist”), then, is that it is not so much what one is, but what 
one does. As a profession, or at least in professional contexts, we 
collude in this performative act by continuing to embody it. Central 
to Johnstone’s conception of improvisation is the notion that crea-
tive risks need to be taken and that failure is expected, even neces-
sary at times, to produce more interesting work. The physiotherapy 
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profession may need to consider how playful or creative subver-
sions of our established archetype may benefit us, and acknowledge 
that there may be failures along the way.
The verbal and physical actions that constitute a physiotherapist 
(e.g., observing bodies move, measuring joint range, interacting 
with patients, using outcome measures) form a state of doing rather 
than being. Such constraints exist before one enters the profession, 
and while individual acts of physiotherapy remain unscripted and 
can be subjectively (i.e. individually) interpreted, once the designa-
tion is assumed it becomes difficult to shift or subvert the physiothe-
rapist identity too far out of its relatively fixed framework without 
consequences. We invite the reader to consider further what consti-
tutes “the physiotherapist” as a performative identity (Butler, 1999). 
An identity that requires the tacit agreement and observance of 
received expectations that (taking a Foucauldian perspective) form 
a kind of carceral system, with its associated network of panop-
tic resources to ensure compliance, with judgements passed and 
punishments meted out for those who do not conform (Foucault, 
1975; Eisenberg, 2012). As we propose in the next section, this phy-
siotherapist archetype has the capacity to constrain or to liberate 
through the use of status in its performative acts.
The fundamental components of status 
transactions
While by no means comprehensive, we have emphasised and 
extended aspects of Johnstone’s (1979) concepts of status to con-
sider contexts familiar to physiotherapists. It is probable that 
many physiotherapists already use parts of these concepts within 
their work (consciously or unconsciously). Based on our own 
clinical practice experiences, we suggest that through conscious 
awareness of therapist’s and patient’s status behaviours (as will be 
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outlined below), a greater appreciation of how they influence clini-
cal interactions can be developed. We hope that an exploration of 
status presents opportunities for physiotherapists to recognise and 
modulate their own status behaviours in any given context, and to 
strengthen the therapeutic alliance. It is our reflection that such 
explicit consideration fosters more positive interactions, particu-
larly when therapeutic relationships become challenging.
There are some fundamental tenets in performed improvi-
sation that are transactional components of status. Perhaps the 
foremost of these is the offer: indeed Johnstone (1979) suggests 
that anything an actor does is an offer that can be either accep-
ted or blocked. An offer is usually a clear, brief interaction (ver-
bal or non-verbal) that sparks the improvised narrative. In order 
for any action to advance, the other performer needs to accept. 
If the performer avoids, repudiates, or contradicts the offer this 
is a block. Blocking kills the action, and distracts from the ori-
ginal offer (and performer who offered) shifting the focus to the 
blocker. However, there are more subtle ways in which blocking 
is used that feed into status. These do not wholly negate the offer, 
but alter the status between the two actors as the offer is not fully 
accepted by one party. Such behaviour is considered by Johnstone 
to be adopting a high status position. We created a fictitious 
example (Figure 5.3) to show how this may apply to someone 
experiencing low back pain who is referred to a physiotherapist 
by an orthopaedic surgeon. 
There is a creative way to prevent “blocking” speech behaviour 
(both in impro, and everyday interactions) and that is to use “Yes, 
and…” as an answer to patient offers. “Yes, and…” is an improvi-
sational concept that allows the action to keep flowing, and it is 
almost impossible to block another person’s offer when it is used. 
There are clearly other ways to maintain “flow” in an interaction, as 
we briefly illustrate below (Figure 5.4):
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Person with back pain: I’m in terrible pain all the
me.  I’ve been told my spine is crumbling, and it’s 
bone-on-bone in parts of it…
[Offer]  The person seeking treatment offers 
their narrave.
Physiotherapist: I see. Who did you hear that from? [Block]  Although apparently accepng, it is 
non-commi­al.  There is a wariness that the 
lay interpretaon of facts may require 
correcng with expert knowledge makes it a 
block, albeit a paral one.  This sets up a 
status differenal, so that the therapist takes 
high status.
Person with back pain: The orthopaedic surgeon
told me.  I’ve had an MRI, and…
[Offer]  While this appears to try to block the 
therapist, the person seeking treatment is 
actually trying to offer their narrave again, 
but ups the ante to raise their status, by 
menoning significant players, and imaging as 
“proof”.
Physiotherapist: I don’t think that’s what he meant.
Can you remember what he told you?
[Block]  This is a clear negaon of the second 
a­empted offer, then cross-examinaon.  
Again, Johnstone would consider this taking 
high-status.
Person with back pain: Degeneraon… or … I don’t
know… something…
[Offer]  Although an offer, the answer is 
essenally coerced.  Status is lowered, verbal 
qualies start to change (hesitaon, loss of 
confidence).
Physiotherapist: You’re probably thinking of
degenerave joint disease.  That doesn’t mean your 
spine is crumbling.  Let me explain it to you…
[Block]  The physiotherapist connues to 
block, through correcng the person seeking 
treatment, even though the answer was 
coerced from them.  The physiotherapists 
then goes on to further negate the original 
narrave; “trumping” the offer maintains the 
higher status.
Figure 5.3: Example of a physiotherapist-patient encounter to demonstrate offers 
and blocking (source: the authors)
Person with back pain:I’m in terrible pain all the

me.  I’ve been told my spine is crumbling, and it’s
bone-on-bone in parts of it…
[Offer]  The person seeking treatment
offers their narra
ve.
Physiotherapist:Yes, and the way you describe it
sounds distressing.  Can you tell me what that means 
to you?
[Accept]  Instead of blocking, an
affirma
ve response indicates
acceptance of what has been
offered.  Furthermore, following
up with an open ques
on that
solicits informa
on maintains “flow”. 
Figure 5.4: “Maintaining Flow”: An example of a physiotherapist-patient encounter 
to demonstrate offer and acceptance (source: the authors)
Obvious discrepancies in status do appear in clinical interac-
tions, but commonly much subtler status transactions occur. The 
“see-saw principle” is a term used by Johnstone (1979, p. 37) to 
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convey the constant give-and-take exchange in status transactions 
that, in a performance context, are reflective of relatively balanced 
power interactions in real life. More successful clinical interactions 
likely rely on the consistent give-and-take of high and low status 
where both (or all) parties alternate positions; as if on a see-saw 
(Baker et al., 2011). While eliminating all power differentials may 
be a challenge, alternating status positions in physiotherapist-pati-
ent interactions is a possible way to dynamically share power and 
promote collaborative practices such as shared decision making 
(Joseph-Williams et al., 2014). The notion of the expert physio-
therapist has been part of modern developments in the profession, 
with specialisation pathways in Australia, and consultant physio-
therapists in the UK as two examples. This is not problematic per 
se, but an awareness of our actions (what we do) in relation to use 
of status might need to be factored in. As physiotherapists, our 
desire to educate those who come to see us, where people are refer-
red to us for our expertise, may end up blocking patient offers with 
the unintended effect of creating therapist-centred interactions 
(e.g., Hiller, Guillemin & Delany. 2015) thereby giving higher sta-
tus to the therapist. Following is a précis of information contained 
within Johnstone’s Impro that he suggests are manifestations of 
high and low status behaviours.
Physical control 
Physical control equates to “body language” or physicality. 
Physicality that creates high status includes enacting precise, effici-
ent and confident movements. High status posture, depending on 
context, can be relaxed, open and changing fluidly between postu-
ral sets (dominating postures), or can be upright and still (intimi-
dating postures). Self-interaction is limited, and often used for a 
desired effect (such as superciliously holding on to one’s chin while 
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listening to what others are saying). Thus, movement and posture 
in those claiming high status exudes control. Movements used to 
create low status are effectively the opposite. Moving tentatively, 
with twitches, or with poor coordination – or those who move with 
unusually stiff and awkward physicality enact low status. Johnstone 
suggests that in adopting low status, the body may be stooped, or 
internally directed (as if folding in on oneself) or low tone and 
slack (acquiescent). Low status is also enacted through frequent 
head movement, and self-interaction that is influenced by the level 
of nervousness (e.g. covering one’s mouth with one’s hand, fidge-
ting with clothing, etc.). As might be expected, in physical terms, 
those displaying low status exude a lack of confidence.
It should be easy to recall or imagine scenarios in which, purely 
in terms of physicality, a physiotherapist behaved in a high status 
manner and the person seeking treatment displayed low status 
behaviour, according to the above indicators. Certainly, people 
referred for physiotherapy treatment may be moving awkwardly, 
stiffly, and so on; the semaphore of “low status”. What may be 
potentially missed from this is that in contrast, the physiotherapist 
(though their physicality) is likely to enact high status – placing 
themselves in the “higher” position of the status see-saw from the 
moment an individual comes to see them. While we re-iterate that 
this does not apply to all physiotherapists at all times, to conform 
to archetypes, competence and confidence in movement are part 
of the stock-in-trade of physiotherapy. However, it is informative 
that a typical physiotherapist posture (likely created through a con-
tinual rehearsal of “good posture” or through conveying a “sporty” 
image: see Dahl-Michelsen, 2014), can be perceived as high status 
and potentially intimidating. From a performative perspective, the 
fit and physically confident archetype of the physiotherapist pitted 
against the patient whose movement has been labelled as “patholo-
gical” or “incompetent” creates a status differential. Physiotherapists 
bl a ise  dor an and jenny se tchell
142
see patient physicalities as movement compensations, or as part of 
psychologically-informed diagnoses like fear-avoidance, or kine-
siophobia, but may neglect to consider the status or performative 
implications of such physicality. To our knowledge, physiothera-
pists rarely receive training in these types of broader, sociocultural 
implications of movement/posture in therapeutic encounters (for 
an informative discussion see Larsson & Quennerstedt, 2012).
Knowing that particular physical expressions create diffe-
rent status positions might help physiotherapists choose when 
to change their physicality from their archetypal “correct” pos-
ture and movement. The purpose would be to see if such an offer 
is accepted by the patient and if so, to observe if their physicality 
alters. For example, when a physiotherapist wants to hear a patient’s 
perspective, they might choose to temporarily slouch a little. Try it! 
We have both found that changing our physicality to claim lower 
status at times appeared to help create a more two-way interaction 
with patients. Be aware, that choosing to subvert the physiothera-
pist archetype (e.g. by slouching) may have any number of other 
consequences (i.e. a risk that the subversion may fail). There is 
the possibility, for example, that a patient may perceive a therapist 
to be less “trustworthy”, “competent” or “professional”. However, 
it can be powerful to creatively subvert the archetype, and while 
both patients and physiotherapists may find it challenging, it is not 
necessarily negative.
Vocal and verbal control
Physical control theoretically goes in tandem with vocal and/
or verbal control. As might be predicted, people adopt high sta-
tus positions by speaking in a volume “suitable” to the context, 
modulating pitch and tone accordingly, with fluidity, and accepted 
prosody. Vocal and verbal behaviours that enact low status might 
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include speaking in a voice that is quiet and/or monotonous or a 
volume that is considered inappropriately loud for the context. The 
speech may have an overly rapid, blurting quality, or may equally be 
hesitant and mumbling, and there are likely to be fillers (“um”, “er”, 
“ah”, “like”, etc.). On the last point, Johnstone (1979) makes a dis-
tinction between how fillers may be used differently to create high 
or low status. Vocal fillers generally transmit hesitation and lack of 
confidence (low status), but high status behaviour may be to extend 
those sounds to take up aural space so that others cannot interrupt.
It is likely that physiotherapists moderate their vocal quality to 
suit various patient situations. When considering that around half 
the physiotherapeutic encounter may be verbal (Roberts & Bucksey, 
2007; Roberts, Whittle, Cleland & Wald, 2012), both vocal quality 
and verbal content are bound to be influential. To our knowledge, 
there is no physiotherapy-specific examination of vocal quality. 
However, within medicine, some researchers discuss an associa-
tion between affect conveyed by vocal tone and malpractice liti-
gation against surgeons (Amabady, LaPlante, Nguyen, Rosenthal, 
Chaumeton & Levinson, 2002). There may also be a long-lasting 
negative influence from what clinicians say to people experien-
cing low back pain (Darlow, Dowell, Baxter, Mathieson, Perry & 
Dean, 2013), and a need to recognise the emotive nature of orthopa-
edic vocabulary (Vrancenu, Elbon & Ring, 2011). Physiotherapists 
may wish to consider their own vocal qualities, reflecting upon 
the contexts in which they use high or low status vocal qualities 
with patients. For example, a physiotherapist might use confident-
sounding, high status speech when disagreeing with a patient on 
a diagnosis. This could be problematic if the patient consequently 
feels less comfortable about raising doubts. A greater awareness of 
the effects of vocal quality, and acknowledging the possibilities for 
disrupting usual performative physiotherapist voice, might help 
provide physiotherapists with options to work differently. 
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Touch
Johnstone makes surprisingly little of the use of interpersonal phy-
sical contact in Impro. The clearest examples he provides relate to 
the crossing into someone else’s peri-personal space intentionally 
(in order to make them uncomfortable, creating high status) or as a 
gaffe (creating low status). These examples are, however, simplistic; 
the nuance of interpersonal touch, and the myriad contextual fac-
tors that influence it have been stripped away (likely to gain more 
comedic effect). 
The question of touch in a physiotherapeutic context (and how 
it relates to status) is difficult to establish, as touch has a host of 
factors that influence it. Nonetheless, considering the importance 
of touch in physiotherapy it is worthy of reflection. In a physio-
therapeutic context, touch is often expected/desired (Nicholls & 
Holmes, 2012) and thus may not be experienced as an invasion 
of personal space. Because touch is a foundational element of 
physiotherapy, there is an expectation that it forms part of treat-
ment, so it may or may not produce the high status often produ-
ced by touching someone in other contexts (for example: guiding 
someone by the elbow as they walk, or patting someone on the 
back or head often generate high status). On the other hand, rele-
vant positions of high (therapist) and low (patient) status may 
be reinforced with patients who fear pain associated with touch, 
are uncomfortable with a stranger touching them, or simply 
dislike it. Physiotherapists have only just begun to explore such 
elements of “doing” physiotherapy. Notably, in a study of physio-
therapist-patient interactions, Hiller et al. (2015) observed that 
while dialogue was often practitioner-centred (i.e. the physiothe-
rapist adopted high status) this was frequently tempered by the 
use of touch and casual conversation, which these authors argued 
produced more balanced status interactions. There is considera-
ble nuance to discussions of the status produced from touch in 
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a physiotherapy setting – individual contexts are important to 
consider in any given interaction. 
Status as communicated by the environment
The relationship between environment and status is something 
Johnstone addresses only briefly. He suggests that status transactions 
are not exclusively with another individual, but can be with the envi-
ronment itself, and dominance and submission (status) can be seen 
in the context of territoriality. Referring to space, he proposes that 
environments and objects can influence whether an individual takes 
high or low status; the socio-cultural meaning of which is explored in 
more depth by social theorists such as Ahmed (2006), and Bourdieu 
(1977). Thus, the status of a physiotherapist (and the individuals 
using physiotherapy services) is likely to vary if their environment 
changes. For example, when a primarily outpatient-based physiothe-
rapist is required to work on an inpatient ward, or an inpatient thera-
pist is required to work in domiciliary rehabilitation, there are likely 
effects of the different status of different work environments as well 
as a possible drop in status due to reduced familiarity with surround-
ings. Regardless, in all these scenarios, the physiotherapist usually 
leads (adopts high status) and the individual seeking treatment 
acquiesces (adopts low status). When in the rehabilitation gym, the 
physiotherapist is in a familiar environment, moves comfortably and 
confidently, knows what the equipment is called and how to use it. A 
patient unfamiliar with this environment must conform in order to 
interact, and it is likely that conformity will mean deference (lowered 
status). The environment, then, can influence status transactions and 
identity formation of the physiotherapist and patient through the 
trappings of the physiotherapy workplace, such as plinths, parallel 
bars, training equipment (Nicholls, 2012). They are an intrinsic part 
of the performativity of physiotherapy. 
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Conclusions
Becoming aware of what occurs in status transactions might 
assist physiotherapists in forming more helpful therapeutic alli-
ances with patients. The contextual identities we inhabit (our 
performative selves) tether us to unconscious subroutines of 
behaviour, which in turn serve to reify a particular type of phy-
siotherapist. Status is an inherent part of performing “the physio-
therapist”. The physiotherapist may be seen, through repetitions 
of various actions, behaviours and speech acts to be at once an 
arbiter, a sage, and a master of their craft; granting permissions, 
imparting knowledge; dexterous and restorative in their hand-
ling. The client seeking treatment may likewise be perceived as 
the vessel (perhaps vassal) that is the receiver of this combined 
acumen, but who is also asking for help. For this to be the case, 
the hierarchical nature of the relationship as described requires 
conformity to the model it puts forward, which is why it may be 
described as performative. Reflecting on this, someone labelled 
by a physiotherapist as an engaged patient may be conforming to 
the status that his/her performative identity allows: an identity 
that has been constructed, reproduced and internalised by patient 
and physiotherapist alike and which manifests in their behaviour 
and judgments. Conversely, the challenging patient may resist this 
construction, perceiving herself to be of equal or higher status 
than the physiotherapist, and conflict arises from each agent con-
stantly vying for high status. Neither of these scenarios is neces-
sarily helpful for achieving what is arguably the ultimate goal of 
physiotherapy – meaningfully improving the lives of those who 
seek care. A power difference tipped towards the physiotherapist 
is likely to reduce the ability for patients to bring their own needs 
and meanings into physiotherapy encounters. With a greater awa-
reness of the performative nature of enacting “the physiotherapist”, 
perfor m ative  ac t s  of  phys iother apy
147
and its status implications, we may be able to contribute to add-
ressing power discrepancies, and subvert our entrenched perfor-
mative identities. Doing so should open up opportunities to act 
and speak in ways that creatively play with what it means to be 
“a physiotherapist” and “a patient” – providing more options for 
agile, tailored care for those who seek it. Furthermore, in the spi-
rit of Impro we should not be afraid to fail at doing so, or at least 
become more comfortable with it. Understanding physiotherapy 
through theatre and performance techniques offers a way to scru-
tinise what we do as physiotherapists. Exploring status and per-
formativity offers specific “thinking and doing” approaches that 
are not usually part of physiotherapy training.
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Abstract
This chapter explores what might be learnt about physiotherapy 
by considering its intersection with stigma. Stigma was described 
by Goffman as a phenomenon whereby an individual has an attri-
bute that is deeply discredited by society, and is rejected as a result 
as a result of the attribute; where “normal identity” is “spoilt” by 
the process of stigmatisation. From a post-structuralist critical 
perspective, stigma is not static or finite but is (re)constructed 
in various social, historical, cultural and political environments. 
A characteristic that is stigmatised in one context may not be in 
another. Considering this, the context of physiotherapy has the 
possibility to (re)create or (re)inforce stigmatisation of certain 
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attributes not only in ways that may reflect general societal stigma, 
but also in ways that may be specific to the profession. In this 
chapter, we discuss stigma in physiotherapy broadly, considering 
what it is about physiotherapy that may contribute to the discre-
diting of certain attributes. We use the example of weight stigma, 
a topical and little explored form of stigma that is becoming more 
evident in healthcare in the current climate of “the obesity epide-
mic”. We draw from empirical research, definitions and narratives 
of physiotherapy in different countries (particularly our home 
countries of Nigeria and Australia) to help examine weight stigma 
in physiotherapy. We explore how weight stigma is enacted in a 
physiotherapy context – a profession in which there is an inherent 
focus on bodies. We conclude with a discussion of possibilities for 
the physiotherapy profession to learn from a greater considera-
tion of stigma.
Introduction
He [the physiotherapist] was very sporty and fit. Even though I’d been 
doing step aerobics I didn’t feel very fit …. I think I have a stereotype 
that physios are very healthy and very fit and very slim and …. I feel 
like I’m not really like that… I guess that makes me feel sort of inade-
quate in a way…. It’s almost like I started making lots of excuses.
Hetti (pseudonym), from Setchell, 2015.
This chapter explores physiotherapy using a stigma lens. We argue 
that thinking critically about stigma can illuminate much about 
physiotherapy – in particular some of the psychological, social, 
political and power aspects of the profession. We highlight that tra-
ditional understandings of stigma tend to focus primarily on the 
psychological and interpersonal aspects of stigma (e.g., the essen-
tialist understandings of Allport, and Adorno, and the symbolic 
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interactionism of Goffman) and do not sufficiently attend to broa-
der contextual aspects. To further understandings of stigma in 
physiotherapy beyond the psychological/interpersonal, and to 
consider broader contextual issues, we draw on post structuralism 
(in particular Foucault) to engage a critical perspective. The epi-
graph above provides hints of some of these contextual factors: for 
example, it reveals that physiotherapy is constructed as health- and 
fitness-focussed. Often returning to the exemplar of weight stigma, 
we discuss how such constructions can have some (usually uninte-
ntional) negative effects, which we believe are little explored in the 
profession.
The epigraph, and other findings from the same study which 
involved interviews with patients about their experiences of atten-
ding physiotherapy, provide an opportunity to imagine what it 
might feel like for someone with a stigmatised characteristic (in 
this case being labelled “overweight”) to enter a  physiotherapy 
 clinic (Setchell, Watson, Jones & Gard, 2015). People in this 
study described their experiences of discomfort when attending a 
 physiotherapy clinic including: sitting on a chair that is too small 
for them; seeing health promotion posters of thin people on the 
walls; observing sporty-looking people exercising in the Pilates 
area; meeting the physiotherapist who (like in the epigraph) was 
thin and sporty-looking; feeling like their body was exposed to 
judgement when they undress or are observed; and being told that 
their condition was due to their weight (ibid). These types of expe-
riences, where the person feels judged (stigmatised) for a particular 
characteristic, are known to negatively affect people, including cau-
sing them to have poorer physical and psychological health outco-
mes; exercising less; having more disordered eating; and avoiding 
health care appointments – effectively being denied healthcare 
(Drury & Louis, 2002; Phelan et al., 2015). This chapter explores 
why patients might have these types of stigmatising experiences 
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in physiotherapy, and considers what physiotherapists might do 
to help create a more supportive environment for their clients. We 
have divided the chapter into two distinct sections. The first section 
is a theoretical introduction to stigma – and a critical exploration 
into why it might occur. The second section discusses the physio-
therapy profession, highlighting how thinking critically about the 
nexus between stigma and physiotherapy can help develop new 
thinking and practices.
Stigma
Research on the nature of stigma has spanned a number of discipli-
nes, and many stigmatised characteristics, which may explain why 
there are many definitions of stigma. Crocker, Major, and Steele 
(1998) produced a widely-used definition: “stigmatized individu-
als possess (or are believed to possess) some attribute, or characte-
ristic, that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular 
social context” (p. 505). Their definition, derived from Goffman’s 
1963 symbolic interactionist stigma theories, outlines some of 
the major micro-social components of stigma: it is linked to an 
attribute, it involves negative judgement, it is social rather than 
individual, it does not reside within a person or the stigmatised 
characteristic but is produced in interactions with others, and it 
is not a static phenomenon but is created only in some contexts. 
Applied to this chapter’s examplar of weight stigma, this defini-
tion highlights that people are judged negatively based on their 
perceived status as overweight, and that this conveys a devalued 
social identity in many contexts (at times including, as we will 
argue,  physiotherapy). However, while useful, we believe there 
are a number of limitations to such definitions. To explore this 
issue, we will discuss and critique three mainstream approaches 
to  understanding why stigma happens – and illustrate what they 
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might mean in the context of physiotherapy research on weight 
stigma. We have chosen these approaches because, while they are 
largely discredited as comprehensive theories, they continue to 
underpin most research into stigma, and are also part of what cur-
rently constitutes lay understandings of (and rationale for) stigma-
tisation (Dixon & Levine, 2012).
Social cognition approaches explain stigma as the result of the 
brain’s oversimplification when processing the large amounts of 
information it receives about other people (Allport, 1954). By sug-
gesting that all minds function similarly, these approaches present 
stigma as an inherent, essential part of being human. However, this 
theory cannot explain why only some people stigmatise. It cannot 
explain why some physiotherapists score highly on weight stigma 
tests, while others do not (Abaraogu, Duru & Setchell forthcoming; 
Setchell, Watson, Jones, Gard & Briffa, 2014). Further attempts to 
explain stigma include the personality trait approaches associated 
primarily with Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford 
(1950). As the name suggests, these theories posit that only people 
with certain personality types stigmatise; that is, the physiotherapists 
who stigmatise do so because they have a particular personality type. 
One critique of these approaches, however, is again their essentia-
lism: they constitute personalities as static and do not allow for ana-
lysis of stigma that is incited in particular social or political contexts. 
Both the personality and the social cognition approaches are indivi-
dualistic and cannot consider, for example, the societal or institutio-
nal production or perpetuation of stigma that has repeatedly been 
shown to be possible in experimental and real life conditions.
The final proposed way of understanding stigma we discuss 
is grounded in Goffman’s symbolic interactionism. The group 
membership approaches focus on the effects on individuals of 
being part of a group (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). Those using these 
approaches argue that when people behave as members of a group 
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(e.g. physiotherapists) they react to other people according to their 
group’s social beliefs in order to consolidate their own sense of 
identity, or as a result of cognitive simplifications (like the social 
cognition approaches). As a result, proponents argue that people 
give preferential treatment to those they identify as being part of 
the same social group to which they themselves belong and may 
stigmatise other people on the basis of perceived other group mem-
bership. Using this theory, physiotherapists (and other groups) 
are seen as inherently stigmatising – they might be expected to 
stigmatise people who are overweight (for example) if they are 
not seen to be similar to physiotherapists – thus constituting an 
outside “group”. While this group membership understanding of 
stigma is more complex, and takes social context into account more 
than other approaches we have outlined, stigma is still considered 
to be a by-product of cognitive simplifications (Tuffin, 2004). As a 
result, the same criticisms are relevant as for the social cognition 
approaches regarding the nature of stigma as inherent to human 
thinking (ibid). Some have also contested that this theory presents 
an oversimplified, static understanding of how groups operate, 
arguing that they are largely considered in isolation from wider 
contexts (Jenkins, 2008). For example, some cultures tend to favour 
people from other groups rather than stigmatise them (Gough & 
McFadden, 2013). In relation to physiotherapists and people who 
are considered overweight – this is a valuable approach to under-
stand some of the stigma that might pass between the two groups, 
but the approach lacks the nuance to consider how broader insti-
tutional issues of power might be involved, or where these issues 
might vary (for example, what happens if a physiotherapist herself/
himself is labelled overweight?).
In summary, while the three approaches (social cognition, perso-
nality trait, and group membership) we have discussed above may 
account for certain occasions of stigma they all lack mechanisms to 
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understand the effects of political, cultural or historical variations 
on stigma, and do not directly consider the relevance of power 
(Gough & McFadden, 2013). As a result, they are not able to acco-
unt for possible contextual aspects of stigma in physiotherapy. To 
address these issues, we draw from post-structuralist thinking, in 
particular work based on theories of the French post-structuralist 
philosopher Michel Foucault.
Foucault considered behaviour, interactions and feelings to be 
produced through discourses (ways of constituting knowledge 
through particular patterns of thinking and doing), which he saw as 
created by (and creating) not only social, but also political, cultural 
and historical contexts (Foucault, 1977, 1978). Applied to stigma, 
Hannem (2012) argued that this means stigma is not only socially, 
historically, culturally and politically situated, but also created or 
recreated. Stigma is not finite or static but may be (re)constructed 
in varying environments and linked to power inequalities.
Foucault’s theories (particularly those on governmentality) con-
tribute an understanding that power and governance are exerci-
sed not only by the state and its institutions, such as the army and 
police, but also by other institutions that are not traditionally seen as 
exercising power (Foucault, 1979). While never directly discussed 
by Foucault, other theorists such as Stacey Hannem have applied 
Foucault’s thinking to stigma in ways that help to consider osten-
sibly power-neutral “institutions” such as physiotherapy (Setchell, 
Gard, Jones & Watson, 2017). For example, Hannem (2012) noted 
that stigma can come from the institutionalisation of ways of mana-
ging the perceived risk of a stigmatised attribute. While the insti-
tution often intends overtly to help “when the need for assistance 
is justified by the inherently ‘different’, ‘risky’ or ‘tainted’ characte-
ristics of the population, stigma is created in the very agencies that 
are  supposed to be providing help” (Hannem, 2012, p. 25). With 
characteristics identified as risky, certain “truths” are produced 
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that they (or the people that possess these characteristics) require 
management, or what Foucault would call “discipline”. Particular 
behaviours and bodies are thus valorised, allowing for other beha-
viours (e.g., exercising, dieting) and bodies (e.g., thin, muscular) 
to become considered “less-than”: in this way, power is interwoven 
into some forms of stigma. It is important to note, however, that 
this power moves in both directions; people who are stigmatised 
can resist individuals or institutions (Foucault, 1977). These theo-
ries on power provide an opportunity to explore this production of 
truth in the profession of physiotherapy that may result in stigma.
Post-structuralist perspectives provide insight into the socio-
political reasons behind weight stigma in a contemporary context. 
Foucault argued that the ingenuity of the systems of power (or what 
he referred to as “regimes of truth”) that create the conditions for 
disciplining people who have particular characteristics is that any 
people, even those who possess the “risky” characteristic themsel-
ves, can take up a disciplining action. People are thus disciplined 
(or discipline themselves) to manage this socially produced risk-
truth so that they are maintained as “productive citizens’ to support 
the ‘greater good’ of society” (Farrugia, 2009). Therefore, a person 
can be seen as “unproductive” or “expensive” and can be held indi-
vidually accountable for this lack of productivity (Foucault, 1978). 
This thinking can be applied to this chapter’s example of weight 
stigma, but it can also help understand aspects of other types 
of stigma found in physiotherapy such as chronic pain or disability 
stigma. Foucault (1979) argued that this way of viewing people is 
in line with neoliberal economic rationalist systems of governance, 
where there is a focus on individual (rather than state) responsibi-
lity for productivity.
Furthermore, Foucault highlighted an increase in medicali-
sation, where attributes that had not previously been considered 
“an illness” were subsequently deemed “abnormal” and the subject 
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of medical attention – and stigma (Gard & Wright, 2005; Lupton, 
2012a). For example, Murray (2007) discusses medical construc-
tions of fatness as “deviance”, and Tischner and Malson (2012) 
argue that health approaches to “obesity” often present fatness as a 
“failing”. Again, similar thinking has been applied to other forms of 
stigma such as disability stigma (Shildrick, 1996).
Based on these post-structural, critical perspectives on stigma, 
we argue for an emphasis on power, and the historical, political, 
cultural constructions or enactments of stigma. A post-structu-
ral perspective helps illuminate why weight stigma, for example, 
appears common in the west (Puhl et al., 2015) and has been less 
common, but is increasing, in the global south (Brewis, Wutich, 
Falletta-Cowden, & Rodriguez-Soto, 2011), and that weight stigma 
also differs with various other contexts such as gender or sexuality 
(van Amsterdam, 2013). A nuanced understanding of context is 
thus important to an exploration of stigma. In the next section, we 
highlight how the context of physiotherapy might intersect with 
stigma.
Physiotherapy
Overall there has been little discussion about stigma in the phy-
siotherapy literature. A small amount of research has been done 
on the stigmatisation of disability, mental illness and chronic pain 
(e.g., French, 1994; Probst & Peuskens, 2010; Synnott et al., 2015). 
To summarise, this research highlights two main points: stigma 
occurs in a number of situations in physiotherapy, and physio-
therapists lack an understanding of the stigma that their patients 
might experience. There is an even smaller amount of research 
highlighting the claim that physiotherapists also are stigmatised 
(or self-stigmatise) for possessing various “othered” attributes. For 
example, physiotherapists hold self-stigmatising fears of gaining 
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weight (Setchell et al., 2014), discipline their own bodies to “main-
tain a healthy weight” (Black, Marcoux, Stiller, Qu & Gellish, 
2012, p. 1424), and negotiate disability stigma (Atkinson, & Owen 
Hutchinson, 2005). This second body of research, although not the 
focus of this  chapter, highlights that it is important to acknowledge 
that physiotherapists too can have bodies, behaviours or attributes 
that may be stigmatised. As we hope readers are already starting 
to see, a deeper consideration of stigma might illuminate much 
about  physiotherapy – providing opportunities to enact social, 
psychological and political aspects of care towards rethinking 
aspects of practice that might produce stigma. We now examine 
 physiotherapy reflexively to consider some relevant assumptions 
underpinning the profession thinking and practices.
The physiotherapy profession demonstrates many similarities 
across the world, despite some local variations. Similarities are evi-
dent in the self-definitions of professional bodies on their official 
websites. The Australian Physiotherapy Association (2015) defi-
nes physiotherapy as “a healthcare profession that assesses, diag-
noses, treats and works to prevent disease and disability through 
physical means”. The physical focus of the Australian association 
is echoed by the Nigeria Society of Physiotherapy (2015), which 
defines physiotherapy as involving the “evaluation of patients 
through the administration of physical tests to determine the pre-
sence and/or extent of an injury prior to the use of physical moda-
lities for preventive and therapeutic purposes”. However, this focus 
applies not only to our home countries. For example, the Chartered 
Society of Physiotherapy in the United Kingdom (2015) provides 
a similar, but somewhat broader, definition of physiotherapy as a 
profession that helps “people affected by injury, illness or disabi-
lity through movement and exercise, manual therapy, education 
and advice”. While seemingly an obvious point, it is interesting to 
note the repetition in these definitions of words such as “physical”, 
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“exercise”, “manual” and “injury”. While these words cannot reveal 
what happens in clinical practice, we argue that they do highlight 
an underlying institutionalised assumption in physiotherapy that 
physical issues are primary, and necessarily demand physical tests 
and physical treatments. We unpack and problematise this assump-
tion in the remainder of this chapter and argue that it is a key issue 
that exploring stigma exposes in the profession.
Many physiotherapists would argue that this physical focus 
of the profession is changing. Certainly, in recent times there 
have been signs of a shift away from a purely physical approach 
in some sub-specialities. For example, there is growing aware-
ness that conditions such as pain may also have psychological or 
social origins. However, relevant to considerations of stigma, there 
remains a notable absence of any discussion of the cultural, politi-
cal or temporal factors involved in physical health. Theoretical and 
 philosophical investigations of physiotherapy are scarce, and some 
authors argue that the profession lacks self-analysis (Wikström-
Grotell & Eriksson, 2012), reflexivity (Trede, 2012) and acknowled-
gement of its historical and sociopolitical context (Shaw & DeForge, 
2012). A small but growing number of authors (many of whom are 
included in this book) have begun to investigate the philosophical 
underpinnings of physiotherapy. We draw mainly upon the work 
of these critical physiotherapy scholars (and at times critical health 
literature from related fields) to discuss elements of the profession 
relevant to stigma. Here we apply the Foucauldian concept introdu-
ced earlier: that power and governance play out in physiotherapy, 
an institution that has not been traditionally thought of as a site of 
political power. We make visible the elements of the profession that 
can render stigma (with a particular focus on weight stigma) pos-
sible, salient and consequential. We introduce these topics under 
three sub-headings: “positivism”; “bodies, visibility and norma-
lity”; and “professional reflexivity”.
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Positivism
Positivism is underpinned by the idea that there is a stable, know-
able reality that can be described through observation and is the 
underlying philosophy behind traditional scientific approaches 
to health research. Although physiotherapy practice is arguably 
grounded in both humanistic and scientific paradigms, the pro-
fession generally focuses on the biomedical scientific perspec-
tive grounded in positivism (Praestegaard & Gard, 2013; Setchell, 
Nicholls & Gibson, 2017). Parry (2004) argued that the adoption 
of this orthodox “medical model” dates back to gender-related his-
torical constraints on the women who founded the profession and 
who were willing to “trade autonomy for orthodoxy, to carry out 
ancillary and subordinate tasks … in exchange for recognition and 
patronage” (p. 310). Today, this positivist way of thinking is evident 
(for example) in the way that randomised controlled trials and sys-
tematic reviews are upheld as “gold standards” in the profession, 
to the marginalisation of other methodologies (Crosbie, 2013). 
Orthodox biomedical approaches are also reflected in the physical 
focus of the professional definitions we discussed earlier, and many 
aspects of physiotherapy-patient interactions.
Before continuing, we want to highlight that we do not intend 
to suggest that positivistic scientific endeavours are unimportant, 
or necessarily bad. Rather, like others, we propose that this type of 
science can only address some of the phenomena physiotherapists 
deal with, while also having some underexplored negative con-
sequences. For example, Bolam and Chamberlain (2003) argued 
that positivism positions the health professional as the powerful 
“expert”. Recent literature discusses this “expert positioning” in 
physiotherapy, highlighting that physiotherapy practice is often 
primarily practitioner-centred, where the therapist often controls 
the direction, content and definition of “truths” in their interac-
tions with patients (Hiller, Guillemin, & Delany, 2015). This expert 
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positioning can have ethical implications (Trede, 2006; Wikström-
Grotell & Eriksson, 2012). For example, Bjorbækmo and Engelsrud 
(2011) argued that an “expert” perspective can be noted in extensive 
“testing” of children with disabilities. Using a phenomenological 
approach, the authors suggested that such testing transmitted the 
physiotherapists’ views of what was “important, correct or admi-
rable” (p. 123), which could result in insecurity and lack of con-
fidence of the patient in themselves. In a Foucauldian analysis of 
Danish physiotherapy practice, Praestegaard, Gard, and Glasdam 
(2015, p. 22) argued that when patients resisted physiotherapists’ 
“regimes of truth”, including those about body size, they were met 
with stigma and judgement from physiotherapists:
These patients resisted the physiotherapists’ understandings and 
descriptions of body image, self-care and medicalization of the body. 
This means that the patients do not accept the premise for physiothe-
rapeutic treatment, and even worse, they defy by not obeying. Accor-
dingly, the physiotherapists meet these patients with judgmental and 
stigmatizing attitudes. Patients, who are not able to live in the politi-
cally defined, normative “healthy” way, are disapproved as they are 
regarded as not taking active responsibility for their own life. (p. 22)
Another possible negative consequence of having a positivist per-
spective is that the health professional is often established as a sci-
entific or “objective” observer, assumed to be free from subjective 
observations or moral judgements (Lupton, 2012b). Assumed objec-
tivity or neutrality is likely to obscure the need for critical examina-
tion of the beliefs underlying healthcare practice. In particular, the 
social, cultural, power and political elements of practice may not be 
attended to (Eisenberg, 2012; Jorgensen, 2009). Patton and Nicholls 
(2014) posited that lack of attention to these elements might result 
in health professionals having difficulty observing judgement or 
stigma in their own attitudes or behaviour. This explains the findings 
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in the stigma studies that physiotherapists often overlook that stig-
matised attributes such as fatness can potentially be assigned social, 
cultural and economic/political value (e.g., Setchell, Watson, Gard 
& Jones, 2016). As Nicholls and Gibson (2012) argued, these aspects 
may well be overlooked as “confounding factors” when employing a 
predominantly positivist perspective.
We want to be careful to clarify that we are not suggesting that 
positivism necessarily leads to behaviours such as practitioner- 
centred practice or positioning the therapist as an “expert”, nor that 
these ways of working always lead to less ethical practices. Rather, 
we wish to argue that in relation to the stigma, it is important to 
consider potential issues of power involved in positivism, which 
can be evident in some of the clinical expressions of this particular 
way of viewing the world.
Bodies, visibility and normality
The body is clearly central to practice in physiotherapy. “Doing” 
physiotherapy involves closely observing bodies, touching bodies, 
and partial undress of the body. In clinical settings physiothera-
pists commonly comment on, assess, move bodies or body parts. 
Furthermore, they ask patients to be aware of their own bodies, so 
that, for example, patients can learn about and potentially change 
their postural or movement habits. This can involve physiothera-
pists encouraging patients to give visual attention to their bodies 
by observing themselves in mirrors or video recordings. Clinical 
interactions are frequently about two (or more) bodies interacting 
in close and intimate ways. We argue that these interactions are 
about the fleshy reality of bodies at least as much as about think-
ing about the vector a muscle exerts on a bone or the number of 
degrees a joint moves. The corporeal presence of bodies (and thus 
corporeal stigmatised attributes such as fatness) are thus routine 
and integral parts of physiotherapy.
jenny se tchell  and uk achuk wu abar aogu
164
While a physiotherapist might ostensibly focus on observing 
the movement of a joint, other elements of what they are doing 
have implications for the visibility of stigmatised characteristics. 
Returning to this chapter’s example of weight stigma, the fatness of 
a body is likely to be more obvious because the physiotherapist may 
have removed clothing from the body, might be touching the body 
and looking closely at the body (Setchell et al., 2015). Increased 
visibility of this stigmatised attribute could have a number of effects 
on the consultation. Rolls of fat can become exposed, touched, and 
under the therapist’s gaze (ibid) in ways that are rare in many other 
healthcare environments (e.g., dentistry or psychology) or most 
day-to-day interactions. Regardless of what the therapist is actually 
thinking, the way the body looks – including visible stigmatised 
characteristics - may become a particularly salient issue for people 
in physiotherapy contexts.
Despite the integral involvement of the body in  physiotherapy, 
little theoretical or philosophical attention has been given to how 
the body is constructed, viewed and managed by the profession 
(Nicholls & Gibson, 2010). This is not unexpected when consid-
ering the predominantly physical focus of the definitions of the 
profession presented earlier in this chapter and the positivist theo-
retical perspective that underpins much of the thinking in the pro-
fession. Congruent with these theoretical underpinnings, Nicholls 
and Gibson (2010) argued that physiotherapists generally attend to 
the body in a biomechanical (or “machine-like”) way. For example, 
physiotherapy research and clinical work has placed much focus 
on the length of muscles, joint range of movement, the type of 
exercises to prescribe for a particular condition and physical func-
tion (Jorgensen, 2009; Thornquist, 2006). However, there are many 
other possible understandings of bodies that physiotherapy mar-
ginalises, such as the person’s lived experiences of their body in 
health and illness, and the social, cultural or political meanings of 
a cr it ic al  per spec t ive  on s t igm a in  phys iother apy
165
bodies, including stigma. The priority physiotherapists ascribe to 
various understandings of the body has important implications for 
clinical practice.
Using a Bourdieusian approach, Gibson and Teachman (2012) 
examined the biomechanical focus of the profession, arguing that 
physiotherapists put considerable effort into establishing what a 
“normal” body is. This effort can be seen in studies such as the 1000 
Norms Project, which aims to establish for physiotherapists what 
a “normal” range is in “healthy” humans in the areas of dexterity, 
balance, ambulation, joint range of motion, strength, endurance 
and motor planning (McKay et al., 2016). Looking at power from 
a Foucauldian perspective, considering who constructs what con-
stitutes “normal” is very important, as these people have the power 
to decide who/what needs intervention (disciplining) to become 
more “normal”. As discussed by Nicholls and Gibson (2010), hav-
ing a construction of a “ normal” body in physiotherapy necessarily 
means an “abnormal” or “deviant” body is also established. When 
physiotherapy seeks a normatively functioning body it “disciplines” 
bodies that are “abnormal”. Notions of normality can contribute to 
negative self-identities, and potential stigmatisation, of those who 
are constructed as “not normal”.
Professional reflexivity
Considering the potential issues that we have outlined associ-
ated with positivism and the understandings of bodies, we sug-
gest it is a matter of concern that authors have highlighted a lack 
of reflexive practice within the profession (Shaw & DeForge, 
2012). Clouder (2000) has argued that this lack can be seen at 
an individual level where, unlike some other healthcare profes-
sions, reflexivity is not an established part of the practice and 
education of clinical  physiotherapists. In some cases, clinical 
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self-reflection is encouraged (Patton, Higgs, & Smith, 2013) and 
has been taken up institutionally (Frith, Cowan, & Delany, 2015; 
Rowe, 2012). However, in discussing interviews and workshops 
with physiotherapists on the topic of self-reflection, Clouder 
(2000) highlighted that while participants often demonstrated the 
ability to reflect on the technicalities of practice (such as the suc-
cess of treatment techniques), they found it difficult to consider 
their own subjectivity: “the clinician her/himself did not appear 
to be part of the reflective frame of reference. Even though self-
awareness was clearly identified as important, there was – without 
exception – a transfer of attention to the client/patient” (p. 216). 
Similarly, Trede (2006) maintained that there is little prioritisa-
tion of a deeper individual reflexivity, such as consideration of 
social, philosophical, interpersonal, emotional, embodied or 
power elements of practice. We suggest that this could mean 
that physiotherapists are ill-equipped to recognise and respond 
to potentially complex or sensitive interactions involving stigma. 
There is also a lack of theoretical and philosophical reflexivity at 
the discipline level. For example, little attention is given to these 
factors in physiotherapy education curricula or research endeav-
ours (Nicholls & Gibson, 2012; Setchell et al., 2017). Without 
these intellectual resources, the profession is likely to be unaware 
of its theoretical underpinnings; psychological, social and politi-
cal issues such as stigma; and may struggle to find other ways of 
thinking about its practice.
Conclusion
Thinking critically about stigma in physiotherapy opens up 
opportunities to think and practice otherwise in the profession. 
Investigating stigma in physiotherapy has an unsettling effect on 
some of the premises currently underpinning the profession: it 
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contributes to thinking and practice that questions the dominance 
of the body-as-machine focus of the profession. Questioning this 
focus supports calls for the profession to incorporate other ele-
ments such as the socio-political aspects of bodies and other 
things. It contributes to calls for more person-centred approaches 
to the individuals who seek our care. Encouragingly, this work has 
begun to be taken up in a number of areas. For example, a number 
of physiotherapists have argued for more reflexivity in education 
and practice. Both Patton et al. (2013) and Rowe (2015) argued 
that it is important to critically examine physiotherapy pedagogy 
to enhance clinical learning, and Nicholls and Gibson (2012) dis-
cussed the importance of philosophy in physiotherapy. Further, 
Grace and Trede (2013) suggested the need to rethink pedagogi-
cal approaches to incorporate philosophical knowledge. There are 
also a growing number of physiotherapists who are developing 
comprehensive theoretical insights into physiotherapy (Nicholls 
et al., 2016; Nicholls & Gibson, 2012; Setchell et al., 2017). This 
book also contains many examples of physiotherapists approach-
ing the socio-political and philosophical aspects of the profession 
that can help physiotherapists build the theoretical resources to be 
aware of aspects of stigma discussed in this chapter. Broadly, this 
thinking matters politically. It is a challenge to an over-reliance on 
reductionist thinking, including powerful systems that preference 
individual blame for health conditions. This chapter supports other 
critical thinking that advocates a paradigm shift to a physiotherapy 
that incorporates broader considerations of the socio-political con-
ditions that create the possibilities for issues such as stigma.
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Abstract
The application of touch has arguably formed the cornerstone of 
physiotherapy practice. The phenomenon of touch, specifically 
its legitimisation as a professionalisation strategy has already 
undergone critical analysis. What has been explored to a lesser 
extent is the meaning of touch from the patient perspective. Why 
is the “laying on of hands” seemingly so important to patients 
and service users, especially given that interpretation of empiri-
cal research findings within an evidence-based practice paradigm 
appears to question the comparative effectiveness of touch-based 
interventions? The imperative of the increasing public desire for 
an embodied health experience will constitute a central theme of 
our argument. In this chapter, we aim to develop a better under-
standing of touch by critically analysing the phenomenon within 
the context of physiotherapy. We begin with a short history of 
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touch, highlighting its importance to our embodied self-know-
ledge. We then contextualise touch within a therapeutic context. 
We consider what constitutes therapeutic touch and body work, 
before addressing what touch might mean for professional iden-
tity and mandate. Finally, we draw on ideas from sociology of 
consumption (specifically touch as a consumer health techno-
logy). We do this in order to reconceptualise the narrative regar-
ding the use of touch, as well as commenting on the impact of 
such a reconceptualisation for the future of the profession. Some 
suggestions are made in our conclusion regarding options for the 
framing of touch in physiotherapeutic work. Our suggestions 
could serve towards redefining our professional identity, our rela-
tionship with those who seek our care, and the nature of what 
society sees as a consumer health technology.
Introduction
In this chapter, we argue that touch in physiotherapy can be 
 productively rethought. Touch has been a central notion within 
physiotherapy since the origin of the profession, so much so that 
the identity of the profession has been largely determined by touch 
and what touch is. Pre-dating its place in physiotherapy, touch has 
a rich sociological and philosophical history. This history can pro-
vide a context on which a modern reworking of touch as a pro-
fessional device can be predicated. Further, a sociological lens can 
expose, in late modernity, the notion of touch as a consumer health 
technology – that is, something which members of a contemporary 
society desire as part of their human identity and function. This 
raises challenges and opportunities for the physiotherapy profes-
sion. Do we acquiesce to this modern consumerism and provide 
touch as a service despite empirical research findings that contest 
its therapeutic effectiveness (what we will call “scientific evidence”)? 
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Or do we abandon touch on the grounds of such “evidence”, and 
in doing so risk alienating ourselves from the consumerist public? 
We offer here an analysis of the phenomenon of touch with these 
questions and this background in mind. The chapter begins with 
a focussed summary of touch as a human sense, followed by how 
touch can be aligned to therapeutic intents. Our sociological argu-
ment then unfolds.
A short history of touch
The role of the sense of touch in sensory consciousness has histo-
rically played understudy to other sensory modalities such as sight 
and hearing (Massie, 2013). In the Aristotelian treatise on the soul, 
for example, the sense of touch is ranked fifth in order of esteem 
relative to the other senses. Paradoxically however, Aristotle also 
acknowledges it as the most perfected sense in humans compared 
to animals, this discrimination rendering man the most intelligent 
of animals (Massie, 2013). The complex constitution of touch is 
 equally well represented in the philosophical debate regarding touch 
as a unisensory or multisensory experience. Whilst this argument 
is beyond the scope of this chapter (instead cf. Fulkerson, 2011), 
the experience of touch is irrefutably diverse, involves innumera-
ble receptors and nerve endings, and serves a multitude of func-
tions (Routasalo, 1999). Touch is considered crucial to a reflexive, 
 embodied existence; Husserl states that without touch we could 
never truly experience our own body, “…when we are touched, our 
body appears to us; it appears as our lived body in a way that it can-
not appear in vision” (Mattens, 2009, p. 101).
A phenomenological perspective, and specifically the work of 
Merleau-Ponty, argues that it is our sensory experience that pro-
vides the foundation for our understanding and interaction wit-
hin the world around us. Merleau-Ponty asserts that we relate to 
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the world not via a dualism of subject-object or micro-macro, but 
rather an intimately entwined relationship: “To belong to the world 
in this way means that our primary way of relating to things is 
neither purely sensory and reflexive, nor cognitive or intellectual, 
but rather bodily and skilful” (Thompson, 2005, p. 3). Touch is a 
unique sense in that it has the ability to bring objects, people and 
the world into proximity (Paterson, 2007). It is the lack of diffe-
rentiation between body and world, the indivisibility between the 
moment of touching and the act of being touched, that contributes 
to a Heideggerian sense of “being-in-the-world” (Bjorbækmo & 
Mengshoel, 2016; Thompson, 2005).
Touch and the therapeutic context
From a developmental psychology perspective, touch is conside-
red the primal sense, operant from eight weeks gestation (Valsiner 
& Connolly, 2002) and of fundamental importance during early 
infancy. In adulthood however, touch can be more problematic as 
we “accede to an understanding of ourselves as essentially singular, 
unified and bounded” (Price & Shildrick, 2002, p. 70). In acquie-
scing to an ethics of touch, we become quintessentially cautious 
about whom and how we touch, and what may constitute unwel-
come or inappropriate touch (Nicholls & Holmes, 2012). For healt-
hcare professionals, including physiotherapists, there has been a 
clear move to make a distinction between physical and therapeutic 
touch (Bjorbækmo and Mengshoel, 2016). For the purpose of this 
chapter, we align ourselves with this move and agree with Paterson 
(2007), for example, in defining therapeutic touch as the range of 
physiotherapy treatment practices incorporating touch. This dis-
tinguishes the nature of the phenomenon from the ubiquitous 
physical touch, which could be talked about within a range of pro-
fessional and layperson contexts. We are not necessarily concerned 
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with some of the generic ideas of physical touch that relate across 
contexts and professions, but rather the notions of touch that have 
a therapeutic intent within the physiotherapy domain. Therapeutic 
touch in physiotherapy is often disguised and denoted by other 
terms:
“In physiotherapy, touch (both the word and the concept) is not neces-
sarily referred to as such. Instead, it exists tacitly in such concepts as: 
palpation . . . , nonverbal skills . . . , and embodiment and body work . . . 
The term ‘massage’ also implies touch.” (Bjorbækmo & Mengshoel, 
2016, p. 11).
Thus, what we mean by therapeutic touch in physiotherapy is some 
sort of assemblage of the above ideas. Concerning body work, we see 
this also as something which physiotherapy can clearly exemplify. 
Twigg et al., (2011, p. 171) refer to body work as “paid work on the 
bodies of others”, and early definitions detail the notion allowing 
for dimensions including “the production or modification of bod-
ies through work” (e.g. Gimlin, 2007, p. 353). We will soon juxta-
pose our idea of touch in the sociological sense with the hard-line 
empirical evidence of therapeutic effectiveness of the sort of touch 
we are referring to. This can be characterised by therapeutic touch 
“interventions” such as mobilisation and manipulation techniques. 
This will simply serve as a tool to allow us to make commentary 
about how the profession should respond if empirical evidence 
conflicts with a complex, more humanistic understanding of touch.
The move to distinguish between types of touch is exemplified in 
the history of practitioners pre-cursory to physiotherapists: trained 
masseuses. Socio-political antecedents to the attempts of these mas-
seuses to professionalise their trade, including the desire to legitimise 
their practices by establishing a disciplinary approach to therapeutic 
touch, have been described by others (e.g. Nicholls & Cheek, 2006). 
Such attempts have perhaps resulted in removing “any association 
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between touch and eroticism”, and putting “distance between them-
selves and prostitutes” (Nicholls & Gibson, 2010, p. 500).
The use of therapeutic touch as a professionalisation strategy has, 
in the main, served physiotherapy well. Over one hundred years of 
rhetoric have supported the notion of physiotherapy as a “hands-
on” profession, performing in a “high touch arena” (Owen, 2014; 
Roger et al., 2002, p. 170; Thornquist, 2006). Manual therapy and 
manual handling (as a way of facilitating movement) have become 
bastions of professional and clinical physiotherapy practice (Owen, 
2014) – “manual” deriving semantically from the Latin manualis, 
meaning of, or belonging to, the hand (Oxford Dictionaries, 2012).
Owen (2014) noted that, as part of the professionalisation proj-
ect, physiotherapists sought to distance themselves from the “low 
tech” hands-on practices associated with low status manual work. 
Specifically, “[t]he presence of technical equipment provided defi-
nition of the practice by differentiating physiotherapy’s hands from 
the hands of the laity, and the plethora of other ‘manual’ work-
ers… practicing in the healthcare system” (Owen, 2014, pp. 171-2). 
Perhaps more significantly, Owen also described how the develop-
ment of hands-on therapy was implicated as an integral component 
of clinical reasoning and autonomous, embodied problem solving 
practices. She noted that touch allows the physiotherapist to “recon-
struct” the patient’s body, facilitating the assessment- inference-
treatment sequence that is constitutive of professional practice. 
This observation is also supported by Rose (1999) who studied 
a graduate physical therapy programme that trained students 
in manual therapy skills and tactile discrimination. Rose noted 
that “…manual therapy places strong emphasis on the systematic 
manipulation of musculoskeletal structures through an array of 
hands-on techniques that are used strategically as the therapist, 
through careful observation, questioning and listening, develops a 
hypothesis about the source(s) of a patient’s problems; rejects or 
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refines the hypothesis; formulates a treatment plan” (Rose, 1999, 
p. 137 emphasis added).
In this way, the embodied touching/moving practices of physio-
therapy have served not only to define and distinguish the nature 
of the profession, but also to discriminate the tacit knowledge/
skills that underpin it. As such, the haptic practices of physiothe-
rapy have arguably provided the foundations for the “craftwork” or 
“art” of physiotherapy (Remedy Physio, 2015; Sennett, 2009). These 
haptic practices are visible through the eyes of service users, and 
the case vignette below offers such an example.
Service users’ perception of touch
Case Vignette: David’s Story
“Of course, I’ve had neck and back problems for years. Really struggled at times 
to manage it. I’ve tried all sorts of things, TENS, heat, physiotherapy. I’ve seen any 
number of physiotherapists! To be honest, my experiences have been mixed. Some 
have been brilliant, others not so. Do you know, one physiotherapist never even 
touched me? They went through the entire appointment without ever once laying 
their hands on me! Obviously I didn’t go back. What sort of physiotherapist doesn’t 
touch their patient? I eventually found a superb practitioner who I’ve used pretty 
much since. They instantly got me onto the treatment bed and gave my neck a 
good massage, a move around and a good ‘click’. I go back periodically for more of 
the same – a bit of a ‘sort out’ to keep me in good shape.” (Authors’ paraphrase of 
personal communication with a patient)
Like David’s story, anecdotal and empirical accounts have emp-
hasised the significance that service users attach to touch and 
corporeal proximity in therapeutic encounters (Bjorbækmo & 
Mengshoel, 2016). Drawing on interviews and anecdotal accounts, 
Bjorbækmo & Mengshoel (2016, p. 17) described the physiothera-
peutic intervention as a “silent, touching, moving dance” that ensues 
once an initial conversation has taken place. The interconnection 
between therapist and patient is predicated, the authors stated, on 
elements of both gnostic touch (cognitive, investigative, intellectual 
and technical), and pathic touch (emotive, expressive, attentive). 
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The authors assert that the result of this haptic encounter – a vital 
dialogue mediated through touch and movement - is that the pati-
ent “feels safe, heard, respected and ready to accept [the therapist’s] 
invitation to explore new possibilities” (Bjorbækmo & Mengshoel, 
2016, p. 19).
That touch is much more than a physiological, cutaneous sensa-
tion is a well-rehearsed argument (Leonard & Kalman, 2015). What 
Bjorbækmo & Mengshoel (2016) added was an exploration of the 
meaning of touch (to a patient or service user) within the context of 
the therapeutic encounter. However, might there be other ways to 
conceptualise the experience of touch that provides us with alter-
native understandings? Below we suggest that there is value in uti-
lising notions of body work and consumption, and consequently 
considering touch as a form of consumer health technology.
Touch as a consumer health technology
Our argument states that, in order to better understand patients’ 
desire for hands-on therapy, we must situate it within the 21st 
century service economy and contemporary consumption practi-
ces and preferences. For example, Baudrillard (1998) has argued 
that, in modern society, consumption has become institutionali-
sed and normalised as a duty of the citizen, whereby consumption 
relates not only to goods, but also human services and, therefore, 
relationships. As such, consumption has become an integral com-
ponent of everyday life and thought, and influences our personal 
identity (Henderson & Petersen, 2002). We would argue that this 
is a relevant perspective for physiotherapists given the increasingly 
pervasive view of health as a commodity, patients as consumers, 
and a changing relationship between the state and the citizen in 
terms of “responsibility” for health and wellbeing (Henderson & 
Petersen, 2002).
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Perceptions of health and disease have changed significantly 
since Talcott Parsons’ structural-functionalist account of modern 
medicine (Parsons, 1951). In this account, illness was represented 
as a deviant or dysfunctional state preventing effective performance 
of normative social roles, and with the affected individual entering 
into a dependent relationship with a specific therapeutic agent or 
agency (Shilling, 2002). Late modernity (i.e. contemporary soci-
ety) has instead become increasingly defined by health promotion 
and the pursuit of well-being – citizens as governed subjects who 
are deemed responsible for health-seeking behaviours, in the pur-
suit of physical, emotional and social wellbeing (Bunton, Burrows, 
& Nettleton, 1995). The “rationalities” and “technologies” of such 
government (Lemke, 2002) now extend far beyond the traditional 
confines of the “clinic”, and instead pervade any number of diverse 
domains and discourses. The intent of this new public health is 
described as a paradigm shift from reducing disease, to impro-
ving health, via increasing reliance on empowered, autonomous 
and self-disciplining individuals rather than expert dominance 
(Vallgarda, 2011).
Foucault argued that self-government required individuals to 
act upon their own bodies, beliefs and behaviours as an ethical 
project of the self (Dilts, 2010). As such, individuals endeavour to 
create “appropriate” subjectivities (conscious/unconscious sense of 
self) and identities that are contingent on their interpretation of 
the socio-cultural context and the dominant discourses (Lupton, 
1995). For Foucault, discourse was not simply the prevailing rhe-
toric that shapes thinking and meaning, but in fact the way that 
bodies, minds and lives become constituted and governed (Weedon, 
1996). Bunton et al. (1995) noted that under late-modernism the 
notions of health and identity are inextricably and intimately rela-
ted with that of consumption – we have become consumers of 
health information, vitamins and supplements, activity monitors, 
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calorie counting apps and cholesterol reducing margarine, for 
example. Furthermore, in this consumer culture (Bauman, 1989), 
one’s reflexive self-identity becomes ever more linked to the “body 
as a project” (Bunton et al., 1995). Shilling (2003) attributed this 
body project (in part) to the fact that individuals are increasingly 
aware that the body is a work in progress, influenced and formed 
by lifestyle choices that are frequently products of consumption 
practices, for example purchasing (or not purchasing) gym mem-
bership, complying (or not complying) with national guidelines for 
physical activity.
Consuming touch: body work as part of the 
body project
What we propose here is that many individuals come to “consume” 
physiotherapy as an inherent part of this body project and in 
response to their self-identity as health seeking citizens. The service 
nature of physiotherapy is conceptualised by these individuals as 
a form of body work – in this instance, the notion that their body 
is attended to by another as a form of paid labour (Gimlin, 2007). 
However, to truly understand individuals’ motivations, Bunton et al. 
(1995) advise that we must be cognisant of the symbolic meanings 
embedded within our health “commodities” – specifically, in this 
account, the symbolic meaning of touch within physiotherapeutic 
body work.
The symbolism of touch extends far beyond the “simple” 
process of mechanically influencing soft tissues or articular 
structures. Therapeutic touch ultimately affects the recipient’s 
self-identity,  purportedly creating an individual who feels 
“aligned”, “mobile”,  “supple”, “balanced”, or “tension-free” 
(patients’ anecdotal descriptors). Furthermore, touch – espe-
cially massage and manipulation – may be viewed as an example 
f iona moffat t and rog er k erry
184
of service work associated with tending the body (Twigg et al., 
2011). Service work of this type makes deep connections between 
healthcare and consumer culture (Maguire, 2001), and is perhaps 
best exemplified by those who seek out sports massage or osteo-
pathic/chiropractic “adjustment” on a regular, prophylactic basis, 
and at their own expense. Therefore, we should ask: does touch - as 
a popular consumer health “technology” - reflect the habits and 
dispositions of late modern subjects embedded within both con-
sumer culture and “new public health”? Critically, we should then 
question whether therapeutic touch begins to confer a symbolic 
status for the consumer? Indeed, the successful pursuit of a body 
project in general, is resolutely associated with individuals who 
possess financial resources, time, health literacy and/or sociocul-
tural capital (Shilling, 2002). Could it therefore be that therapeutic 
touch (as a preferred consumer health technology) has come to be 
associated with such a status? If so, it is not surprising that consum-
ers “shop around” (Shilling, 2002) in the way described by David 
(case vignette) in order to identify a practitioner who facilitates the 
formation of that self-identity via touch oriented body work. This 
consumerism also challenges the traditional power relations asso-
ciated with healthcare body work, where the advantage is gener-
ally situated with the practitioner who possesses the expertise and 
authority that mandates how the body will be treated (Twigg et al., 
2011). In David’s case the power relations of body work become, 
arguably, more egalitarian as his consumer status affords him some 
element of choice.
Whilst the argument presented here is of significance in terms of 
expanding our understanding of health consumerism in particular, 
it also raises significant questions for the profession of physiothe-
rapy. If the perceived success of physiotherapy rests (at least for a 
significant number of patients) with practitioners who interweave 
touch with their service users’ self-identity and body projects, 
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what does that mean for a profession whose origins have been his-
torically embedded in touch? Perhaps more fundamentally, what 
then happens to individuals’ body projects if the profession recon-
ceptualises its fundamental ideas of therapeutic intervention in 
response to a prevailing discourse influenced by a multitude of fac-
tors? Of particular interest for this debate is the profession’s com-
mitment to scientific bureaucratic medicine. With this in mind, we 
then explore the impact that “scientific evidence” may have for this 
critical analysis of touch.
The crisis of evidence - a catalyst for 
change?
The sociocultural argument presented so far offers a thick theory 
for understanding the relationship between identity and touch – 
touch being an integral notion for the body project and consu-
mers of health. However, there may be a crisis at hand. What does 
the scientific evidence1 tell us about the role of touch in achieving 
meaningful health outcomes in a cost-effective way? Moreover, 
what are we to make of developing contemporaneous models of 
healthcare that presuppose limitations in singular, passive, and 
biologically driven interventions? There is a well-rehearsed dia-
logue about “hands-on versus hands-off therapy”. This is somet-
hing we wish to avoid repeating, primarily because the usual 
framing of such dialogue not only fails to embrace sociocultural 
aspects of identity and consumerism, but also artificially cha-
racterises the utility of scientific data in developing some sort of 
1 For the purpose of our argument, we are taking the narrow view of the term scien-
tific evidence as shorthand for comparative quantitative data – the sort prioritised 
by practice frameworks such as Evidence Based Medicine.  For example, systematic 
reviews of high quality randomised controlled trials. 
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professional consensus. What is necessary, however, is to attend 
to the knowledge and thought that this type of scientific evidence 
does provide, and wonder what that might mean to us professio-
nally, and to users of our services.
It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a detailed review 
of the evidence of therapeutic effectiveness for therapeutic touch. 
However, for the purpose of our argument we can surmise that 
such evidence leads us to believe that in terms of commonly utilised 
health outcomes, touch-based therapies might not be as compara-
tively effective as once thought (for example O’Keeffe et al., 2016)2. 
The effect of this belief extends to the recommendation that uti-
lity of touch-based therapies is seriously questioned in the mana-
gement of many painful and movement dysfunctions (e.g. NICE, 
2016). Similarly, biopsychosocial models of practice with limited 
understanding of what “psycho” or “social” might mean, may shift 
the emphasis away from touch-based interventions towards thera-
peutic strategies aimed at the (limited) empowerment of individu-
als through active pursuits such as exercise and physical activity. So 
without touch, what is physiotherapy?
Although we are interested in much more than just a scientific 
programme here, the interpretation of findings as presented above 
seem to be edging towards a shift in the way we as physiothera-
pists consider human identity and the role of touch. However, 
is this an opportunity to re-evaluate the sociocultural aspects of 
2 Of course, there are interpretations, systematic reviews, and meta-analyses that 
do not explicitly or conclusively dismiss the comparative effectiveness of some 
touch-based therapies in particular conditions and dysfunctions. However, in this 
chapter we are anticipating a certain trend being witnessed in a specific area of 
practice (in this case management of pain in musculoskeletal dysfunction). This 
trend indicates a potential shift in the profession’s scientific understanding of the 
human and, as such, a potential shift in what the profession might mandate as 
clinically effective. For our argument, this simply serves as a tool to use in allowing 
an advance in commentary on the nature and role of touch.
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how humans interact in terms of body work? Of course, there are 
other options. We could work on the sociocultural theory irre-
spective of this interpretation of findings, and continue in a linear 
trajectory to build the story of humans and touch further. This, 
however, would lack some responsibility to that part of our pro-
fessional commitment that strives towards an evidence-based 
framework normatively underpinned by data from prioritised 
research methods. Hence, at this point we are motivated to con-
sider whether the rich reports of identity and touch so far can be 
reconceptualised in a way by which our profession can be better 
characterised, taking into account the “evidence base” as well as 
sociocultural understandings of touch.
Navigating the future of physiotherapeutic 
touch
This discussion must inevitably close with consideration of the 
issues at stake for physiotherapists working in late modernity, 
where the concepts of new public health and consumerism remain 
significant leitmotifs. How are physiotherapy professionals to add-
ress the issue presented here – that is, that our emergent “evidence 
base” does not necessarily align well to consumer preference?
Owen (2014, p. 194) notes that when attempts to “devalue” 
or undermine therapeutic touch have been encountered histo-
rically, professionals have stalwartly sought to defend the value 
of such work. She argues that this has been achieved in one of 
two ways: either by adaptation or development to create an alter-
native touch “technology”, or by maintenance of the “movement/
touch rhetoric”. The motivation for this, she contends, is preser-
vation of historical physiotherapeutic identity and its occupa-
tional jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988). Nevertheless, is there value 
in blithely pursuing the same strategy at this particular nexus? 
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Instead, is this an opportunity to re-evaluate the corporeality of 
physiotherapy work?
It appears that there are (at least) three options for the profession 
and its membership (Figure 7.1: Options for the future framing of 
touch in physiotherapeutic work). The first is that we respect the 
professional and social values of touch and elect to retain it (in all 
its therapeutic guises) as a principal component of our manage-
ment approaches. The implicit risk however, is that having aligned 
the profession with a commitment to a particular type of evidence 
based practice, we jeopardise our credibility within the wider scien-
tific and healthcare community. The second alternative is to accept 
the abandonment of all “non-evidenced” therapeutic touch as a 
treatment option. However, historical precedents suggest that this 
abandonment of touch will be unsuccessful and has the potential to 
alienate a considerable proportion of the professional membership 
and the general public/health consumers.
Figure 7.1: Options for the future framing of touch in physiotherapeutic work
LATE MODERNITY
NEW PUBLIC 
HEALTH
HEALTH
CONSUMERISM
THREATS
OPPORTUNITIES
OPTIONS
Displace touch
(historically failed)
Risks: alienate public and profession
Retain touch
(respect professional & social values of touch)
Risks: credibility of the profession
Rebrand (physiotherapeuc)
body work
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The third option offers a reconciliatory position. Here we sug-
gest the value of re-branding physiotherapeutic body work and 
redefining sociocultural conceptions. This reconceptualisation 
would encompass body work in a range of iterations: work done 
to the body by the health consumer themselves (e.g. physical activ-
ity / self-management programmes), work facilitated remotely (e.g. 
via tele-rehabilitation), as well as work that entails physical touch 
of the body. This option acknowledges that touch is an important 
part of professional identity and consumer preference and there-
fore prevents it from being displaced by evidence, whilst still creat-
ing space for interventions that are therapeutically effective. Many 
physiotherapists will already use this approach in their practice, but 
our challenge here is to complete this reconceptualisation process 
en masse.
Conclusion
The sociocultural analysis of touch offered within this chap-
ter reveals further opportunities for a deeper understanding of 
both the profession, and the relationship between physiothera-
pists and those who consume our services. We propose here an 
opportunity to redefine body work, whilst preserving a recogni-
sable dimension of professional and human identity. The profes-
sion’s rich history of “holding on at all costs” to the idea of touch 
now seems to do us no favours. Subtly, health consumers might 
be persuaded of an empowerment and identity that derives 
from the interaction between themselves and physiotherapy - a 
profession committed to aligning itself with the resolution of 
global health burdens whilst being conscious of humanity and 
some of its deepest and complex desires. To do this, we need to 
understand being human not only as body, but also as a social 
consumer.
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CHAPTER 8
Equine-facilitated 
physiotherapy – devised 
encounters with daring and 
compassion
Tobba Therkildsen Sudmann | Department of Occupational 
Therapy, Physiotherapy and Radiography, Western Norway 
University of Applied Sciences
Abstract
Physiotherapy with horses and rider-patients builds on communi-
cation and interaction through groundwork and mounted work. 
This chapter discusses outdoor equine-facilitated physiotherapy 
on green care farms with three patients representing ideal types 
from the author’s clinical practice. The practice of co-creation 
and improvisation, i.e. devising, is used to discuss how the triad 
of physiotherapist, rider and horse, work together to support the 
rider’s step-by-step changes towards better health. Being with 
horses facilitates exploration of communicative strategies and 
embodied ways of being, whilst nature and physical activities add 
value to the  therapeutic benefits. Horses represent risk and desire, 
as does the facing of bodily constraints or habits. Physiotherapy 
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aims to facilitate a purposefully created change by playing with 
daring (out-of-the-ordinary experiences when usual boundaries 
are pushed) and compassion. Therapist, rider and horse face dares 
and desire together by experimenting, improvising, and testing 
new modes of co-being and becoming. The ideas and tools from 
applied drama (i.e. collaborative creation and contact improvisa-
tion) tune human and horse bodies to communication and action. 
Outdoor practice and devising equip physiotherapists with a larger 
toolbox for a playful practice.
Introduction
Physiotherapy practice should not be confined to hospitals, out-
patient clinics or other health or training-related facilities. Many 
of physiotherapists’ approaches and practices can be applied in a 
wide range of settings, by appropriating and exploiting the mate-
rial and non-material resources available. This chapter presents 
a Norwegian case of equine-facilitated physiotherapy in outdoor 
settings at green care farms. The first section introduces the use 
of horses in Scandinavian physiotherapy treatment, followed by 
a section on rhythm, balance and suppleness, comparing horses’ 
and riders’ bodies. The next two sections detail the theoretical 
foundation of the chapter; the intertwined relationship between 
micro-interaction, biological adaptation to living conditions, and 
improvisation, and present three idealised patients constructed 
from the author’s clinical practice. The last two sections discuss 
encounters with daring and compassion, and devising strategies 
for including these in equine facilitated physiotherapy. The con-
clusion sums up the argument on how devising ways of working 
with daring, out-of-the-ordinary experiences and compassion may 
give deep bodily satisfaction and facilitate step-by-step health-
promoting life changes.
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The Scandinavian approach to equine-
facilitated physiotherapy
Horses have been used to ameliorate or treat health concerns 
since their domestication around 3,500 years ago, and professio-
nal and lay riders often refer to ancient anecdotal evidence for 
their healing effect on the human mind and body. In Norway, the 
use of horses in physiotherapy has been approved since the early 
1960s. Since the turn of the century, the Norwegian Physiotherapy 
Association (NPA) has continually taken steps to assure the qua-
lity of professional development education in the use of horses 
in physiotherapy and associated horsemanship. There is no inter-
nationally agreed definition of the practice of practitioners using 
horses for health purposes. In Norway, the NPA uses the concept 
of riding physiotherapy/physiotherapist to emphasise that riding 
is both a means and an end. A riding physiotherapist approved 
by the NPA may offer group-based or individual treatment ses-
sions on horseback, lasting up to one hour. Patients pay for horse 
rental, and physiotherapists are reimbursed from the National 
Insurance scheme.
The cases presented in this chapter draw on the author’s expe-
riences of offering equine-facilitated physiotherapy on green 
care farms. In Europe and the USA, some health and welfare 
services are available at farms. These services build on strength-
based approaches toward participants, and the health-promoting 
effect of contact with animals and nature (Haubenhofer, Elings, 
Hassink, & Hine, 2010; von Lindern, Lymeus, & Hartig, 2017). 
Persons suffering mental health problems show improvement 
after a farm-animal intervention (Pedersen, Patil, Berget, Ihlebæk, 
& Gonzalez, 2015). People living with dementia report that day-
care on farms adds considerable value to their life (Sudmann 
& Børsheim, 2017), as do people taking part in drop-in centre 
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activity with horses (Sudmann, Forthcoming 2018). The context of 
the therapy is important; physical activity and contact with nature 
effects health in a positive manner (Ottosson, 2007; Thompson 
Coon et al., 2011; von Lindern et al., 2017). In Norway, green care 
farms are trademarked Inn på tunet (Into the Farmyard), and are 
required to comply with health, environment and safety require-
ments. The term “green” in “green care farms” refer to agriculture 
and sustainability.
When horses have been used therapeutically in physiothe-
rapy, their contribution to human health and wellbeing has been 
explained as deriving partly from physical and social activity 
around horses, e.g. mucking out, preparing fodder, grooming, 
tacking up, (Håkanson, 2008), and partly as a result of rhythmi-
cal movements shared between rider and horse to facilitate body 
awareness, mobilisation, balance or coordination (Angsupaisal 
et  al., 2015; Håkanson, Möller, Lindström, & Mattsson, 2009; 
Von Dietze, 2011). Horses are used in substance abuse and men-
tal health therapy at several Norwegian hospitals, increasing tre-
atment retention and learning (Kern-Godal, Brenna, Kogstad, 
Arnevik, & Ravndal, 2016; Thelle, 2010). Adapted riding for 
disabled children is offered at two hospitals and in local muni-
cipalities (Trætteberg, 2006), and horses are shown to contribute 
to development of self-esteem (Hauge, Kvalem, Berget, Enders-
Slegers, & Braastad, 2014; Træen & Koren, 2003). In Scandinavia 
horses are used successfully in social work with self-harming 
adolescents (Carlsson, 2016). Horses may be used as means and 
ends in drug rehabilitation outside the realms of treatment insti-
tutions, e.g. as work placement or day centre activity (Sudmann, 
Forthcoming 2018; Sudmann & Agdal, 2015). A common deno-
minator in research on horses’ impact on human health is the 
focus on the subtle micro-interaction and communication bet-
ween humans and equines.
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Rider’s and horse’s rhythm, balance and 
suppleness
Professional or leisure horseback riding is rewarding when the human 
and the non-human athletes have sufficient and adequate training 
for the discipline of choice. The aim of the training and education of 
the horse and rider is to prepare the horse for increasingly complex 
tasks while carrying the rider. For the horse to keep its balance while 
moving, the rider must balance on the horse by integrating rhythm 
and suppleness (Von Dietze, 2010, 2011). When rider and horse are 
connected and synchronised, their movements are fluid and har-
monious. The art of riding is to connect and communicate with the 
horse through micro signals via the rider’s seat and body posture, 
making the horse move as the rider wants, or the rider move as the 
horse wants – whether this is in a supple or collected mode (see 
Figure 8.1). The horse’s training scale bears resemblances with how 
physiotherapists assess and facilitate body awareness and movement 
in their patients. The arrow in the figure indicates increasing com-
plexity in the horse’s movements under saddle. The key to success in 
riding is non-verbal communication – i.e. the rider must develop her 
sensitivity for arousal, tensions and rhythm in horse and herself. In 
therapy, reaching beyond the first three steps is rare.
Figure 8.1: Horse Training Scale (White Oak Stables, 2014). Used with permission. 
(http://white-oak-stables.com/2014/12/19/horse-training-scale/)
Rhythm Suppleness Contact Impulse Straightness Collection
Horse Training Scale
white-oak-stables.com
For many rider-patients who have been subjected to traumatic 
experiences or are struggling to live with mental health challenges 
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or substance use disorders, bodily resources are drained, and many 
have temporarily lost the ability to fine-tune and integrate attention, 
respiration, muscular tension and movement. Living with threats 
or worries, pains or cravings often leads to a distorted and “dis-
tant” relationship to bodily sensations and needs. Disadvantages, 
traumas or abuse, or long standing drug abuse literally changes the 
body at a biological level, which subsequently may be measured 
(Getz, Kirkengen, & Ulvestad, 2011). In the Norwegian psychomo-
tor physiotherapy tradition, the Global Body Examination (GBE) 
is used for assessment and quantification of bodily problems and 
resources. The GBE score is composed of examination of pos-
ture, respiration, movements, muscles and skin (Kvåle, Bunkan, 
Opjordsmoen, & Friis, 2016). Kvåle et al. have shown that patients 
with longstanding pain, mental health issues or musculoskeletal 
disorders have significantly worse GBE scores than the control 
groups without these problems (Kvåle et al., 2016).
Using the complete GBE necessitates partly undressing the pati-
ent, which is time-consuming and neither feasible nor necessary 
to accept a rider-patient for treatment. The theoretical base for the 
GBE builds upon an understanding of the lived body as an inte-
grated biological, physiological, emotional and cognitive unit, a 
predominant notion in the psychomotor physiotherapy tradition 
(Bunkan & Thornquist, 1990). Dysfunction in any domain of the 
GBE (posture, respiration, movements, muscles and skin) will 
always influence the others. The theoretical foundations for the 
“Horses’ Training Scale” is built on a cognate philosophical foun-
dation directing therapists’ and trainers’ attention toward posture, 
respiration, movements and muscle tension in relation to con-
text in horse and rider alike. Suppleness in horses equates dyna-
mic muscle tension, unrestricted respiration and attentiveness in 
humans – keys to effortless movement and balance. By observation 
and hands-on guidance the therapist gets valuable information 
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about the patient’s bodily resources, i.e. how lived life is inscribed 
in the body. Henceforth, riding physiotherapy is an approach to 
re-integrating and re-discovering the interdependencies of mind 
and body on horseback, while working with rhythm and balance 
in movement.
Interaction and improvisation
Physiotherapy is a means to support changes in bodily habits to 
enhance wellbeing and health. To reach this aim, the physiotherapist 
must create therapeutic alliances with patients, and make use of 
available resources and experiential possibilities. Working with 
rider-patients and horses is to balance risk-taking and safety, daring 
and compassion. Around horses, it is wise to be cautious, and it is 
dangerous to be a daredevil. The potential danger adds a challenge, 
providing a mixture of risk and pleasure that seem highly valued 
by all riders – patients or not. When communicating with horses, 
humans must move, talk and touch the horse in ways that assure 
the horse that the humans are part of their herd, and not a threat to 
their welfare. Horses are prey animals and are extremely sensitive 
to how members of “the herd” (the human and non-human ani-
mals) behave and communicate. Depending on the human’s com-
portment and behaviour, humans may be interpreted as part of the 
herd or as predators. Communication through movement, voice 
and touch is always related to the present, which calls for a compas-
sionate approach to horses, and an attentive presence.
Equine-facilitated physiotherapy pays heed to a multitude of 
micro-details in deportment, demeanour and movement, in horses 
and humans. Goffman builds his sociology on detailed studies of 
animal and human behaviour, and demonstrates how movements, 
breathing, tensions, signs and gestures feed into any encounter and 
social setting (Bourdieu, 1983; Goffman, 1959, 1972). We emit signals 
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that are hard to alter – smell, height, weight, age, disability, heartbeat, 
breathing, and skin colour - and other signs that can be control-
led at will, such as movement, clothes, speech, and hair colour. The 
four domains assessed by GBE – posture, respiration, movements, 
and muscle tension – give signals that are perceived by horses and 
humans alike. Goffman (1983) argued that the interaction order is a 
moral domain, where we are responsible for each other’s wellbeing. 
We use signs given and given off as indications of whether the situa-
tion is safe, and negotiate a situational definition. Communication 
with horses is based on co-being and co-presence, where bodily dia-
logues are salient (Maurstad, Davis, & Cowles, 2013). A therapy situ-
ation must be created anew every time a patient and a therapist meet, 
especially when there is a horse present. The triad of rider, horse and 
therapist must meet and greet, negotiate and create the content of the 
session, and must close the session and break the triad when done 
(Shambo, Young, & Madera, 2013).
Using ideas and tools from applied drama in physiotherapy, such 
as “devising”, can be viewed as applied micro-sociology. Devising is 
the process of designing and directing collaborative creative work, 
whether the aim is to create a public drama performance or new 
bodily experiences. Creating new bodily experiences or perfor-
mances with a horse as co-actor and co-creator calls for contact 
and communication by means other than words. In applied drama 
and physical theatre, a creative session often starts with contact 
improvisation (e.g. following another person’s lead through direct 
or indirect contact), and exercises and selected movements to 
tune the present bodies to communication and interaction (Boal, 
1995; Nicholson, 2005). In equine-facilitated psychotherapy and 
learning aka the HEAL-model, the concepts of devising, nego-
tiation and play are used to guide interaction between horse and 
human (Shambo et al., 2013). Goffman’s studies show how con-
texts and materiality represent possibilities and barriers for social 
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interaction, how situations are defined and how various alternati-
ves to ordinary activities are developed (Goffman, 1986). Applied 
drama is deeply indebted to micro-sociology and to Goffman.
As stated above, lived life is inscribed in our biology (Getz et al., 2011), 
and contemporary conceptualisations of health point toward health as 
a collective resource and a social practice (Crawford, 2006). Health is 
also defined as the ability to adapt and self-manage in the face of social, 
physical, and emotional challenges (Huber et al., 2011). Health pro-
moting adaptation necessitates new stimuli and challenges, which can 
be coaxed out with equine-facilitated physiotherapy.
Three patient ideal types
For the sake of the argument, and to be able to build a case of 
devising for dares and compassion, three [ideal typical] cases are 
presented below. These persons do not exist; they are fictional con-
structs built for analytical purposes from the author’s experiences 
working as a riding physiotherapist. Following Kim (2012), Weber 
argued that “an ideal type is formed by the one-sided  accentua-
tion of one or more points of view” according to which “concrete 
individual phenomena … are arranged into a unified analytical con-
struct” (Gedankenbild). In its purely fictional nature, it is a metho-
dological “utopia [that] cannot be found empirically anywhere in 
reality” (Weber 1904/1949, 90 in Kim, 2012). Ideal types are fic-
tional, and the ideal type never seeks to claim its validity in terms 
of a reproduction of or a correspondence with reality. Kim (2012) 
states that the validity of the ideal types can be ascertained only 
in terms of adequacy. In my study of how female physiotherapists 
dealt with bodily proximity to their male patients, I constructed the 
ideal types “The good patient” and “The clever physiotherapist” to 
show how gender, age and sexuality were constituents of the the-
rapeutic relationship (Sudmann, 1998). Judging by the reception 
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of the argument, the validity of the ideal types was adequate. 
The  subject matter of this chapter has been discussed with several 
of the author’s rider-patients, and they have given valuable inputs 
to the construction of the cases and to the arguments presented 
below. A corresponding methodology, the composite case study, 
has also been used to provoke critical thinking in health profession 
practice, including physiotherapy (e.g. Samenow, Worley, Neufeld, 
Fishel, & Swiggart, 2013; Setchell, Nicholls, & Gibson, 2017).
Ava (16): “Everything is about feeling safe”
This young girl has anorexia and demonstrates self-harming beha-
viour, social anxiety, anxiety attacks, concentration problems, and 
social problems. She lives in foster care and has partly dropped 
out of school. When we meet, Ava walks towards me with a smile, 
shifty eyes, respiration movements that are hard to detect, and a 
flexed body posture with almost imperceptible arm movements as 
she walks. She looks both hesitant and determined when walking 
into the farmyard. She talks to the horse and me in a low voice. She 
tells me that she finds the horses scary, and that she has dreaded 
coming to the stables. I am happy to greet her, and to tell her that it 
is wise to be wary and a bit nervous around horses. Furthermore, I 
tell her that being attentive and alert prevents accidents, and keeps 
the horses calm around us, because they are more afraid than we 
are. We smile to each other and talk about prey (horses) and pre-
dator (humans) animals, and how humans may act as predators 
towards each other, making us feel like prey. Ava has been with 
horses as a child, but did not learn to ride. During therapy, it is 
Ava’s preference to fetch the horse from the pasture, groom the 
horse, and ride with as little tack as possible – just the bridle and a 
lead rope for the therapist. The horse walks or trots (the therapist 
jogs).
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Benjamin (32): “I’ve been thinking about riding 
ever since my last mount”
This young man has a long history of drug use (alcohol, nicotine, 
marijuana, psychotropic pills, self-designed drugs), he is a drifter 
and periodically a street-dweller, and has no contact with family. 
Friends are fellow users or drifters. Because I do not want to focus 
on possible “failures”, I do not ask - and therefore do not know - 
about his level of education or his employment history. Benjamin’s 
body is usually in a half-stooped or flexed position, looking self-
assured and insecure at the same time. He presents himself as an 
active survivor, not victimised or a passive sufferer. He tells me 
about a valuable life, and his multiple skills enabling him to survive 
on the streets, and moving around in several countries around the 
world. He impresses me with his survival skills, and I ask about 
how he keeps warm when the temperature is well below zero, how 
he finds shelter and safety to protect life, limb and property, and 
other questions relating to survival and wellbeing. Benjamin used 
to be a skilled rider and horse handler. During sessions, Benjamin 
prefers to find the horse in the stable, groom the horse himself and 
use standard tack when riding: a saddle and a bridle. We go trail 
riding together.
Charlotte (48): “It’s a revelation!”
Single-mother, divorced, long term sick leave, complicated rela-
tionship with ex-husband and father of her children. Her marriage 
exposed her to spousal abuse, as well as financial and practical bar-
riers preventing her from leading a life on her own. She is very 
wary when arriving at the stables, her breathing is shallow, and her 
body is in an extended standby position – always already prepared 
to react on any demand or threat. Charlotte has never been on a 
horse before, and a friend had recommended that she try riding 
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physiotherapy. At first, Charlotte does not want to learn riding, 
and is experiencing a mixture of fear and delight when we meet. 
As therapy progresses, Charlotte finds that she prefers a bareback 
pad when mounted, and she likes the horse to be groomed and 
tacked when she arrives. The horse is handled from the ground by 
the therapist, by lead rope and bridle. Charlotte enjoys being car-
ried by the horse, and the sense of safety the natural surroundings 
and the triad gives her. The therapist occasionally offers Charlotte 
the reins, but she refuses to take them: she would rather just enjoy 
being carried and communicating with the horse through her seat. 
We walk and talk in the woods – following trails or gravel roads. 
Charlotte relaxes and grows on the horse, and looks relaxed and 
content after the session. After every ride, she has strengthened 
herself so that she is able to make and stick to a plan for facing next 
week’s demands and challenges.
Encountering daring and compassion
These ideal typical patients have referrals from their local doctor, 
informing about diagnose(s) or functional problems (pain, myal-
gia), but little more. Patients referred to me are invited to visit the 
stables and greet the horses and me before they decide to start 
riding therapy. During this first encounter (free of charge), we talk 
about horses, about when and how to meet, and we walk around 
the farm. Sometimes they want to try to sit on a horse for 5 minu-
tes, and sometimes not. I never ask them about their worries, diag-
noses, medication or other treatment they are undergoing or have 
been subjected to before. However, my experience in the GBE and 
neurological rehabilitation (particularly Bobath therapy) combi-
ned with my intimate knowledge of the challenges and survival 
skills in the field of (substance) abuse and mental health, equip 
me with a keen eye and observational curiosity. My observations 
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during this first meeting give me detailed information about the 
patient-rider’s bodily functioning, e.g. by observing walking and 
alertness towards the farm environment. Walking is a functional 
vital sign, and speed, cadence, balance and rhythm are depen-
dent on the functioning of all bodily organs (Middleton, Fritz, & 
Lusardi, 2015). Drug abuse, worries, side effects of (prescribed) 
medication or pain manifest by impacts on walking. The riders’ 
interaction and communication with animals or other persons 
reveal desires, wants or fears, and their awareness of and respon-
siveness to micro-communication and signs. Horsemanship also 
provides a valuable source of information. When on horseback, the 
horse’s reactions most often confirm my observations about mus-
cular tensions, arousal, restricted movement or breathing, insecu-
rity or fear – but also desire and delight. The horse always shows 
when the rider is supple and connects to the horse. Suppleness 
is a dynamic flexibility and a moment-to-moment adjustment of 
movement and tension and unrestricted breathing synchroni-
sed with the horse’s own suppleness. The horse will try to adjust 
itself to the rider. Becoming attuned to these details highlighted 
by interactions between horse, rider, environment and therapist 
can give profound insight and food for thought for the patient. 
Rider-patients often utter sentences like “Can you really see that?” 
or “How can you possibly know that?”.
To connect with the horse, the rider must be aware of her bre-
athing and her seating. Breathing calms or arouses the horse, and 
may make it stand still, trot, canter or even bolt. The seat of the rider 
communicates with the horse through pelvic movements, changes 
in tension in the pelvic floor (e.g. by breathing), micro-movements 
around the body axis, or eye-movements. The horse’s responsive-
ness to these invisible and otherwise insignificant changes in arou-
sal, tension and movement guides the rider when exploring and 
playing with body awareness. When working with breathing, pelvic 
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movement, dynamic core stability and posture, the rider is given 
different tasks or exercises to perform. These movements and their 
accompanying images (hold a large ball, juggle eggs, pick apples, 
scratch your wrist, pedal your feet, comfort the horse, pat the 
horse’s hindquarters or shoulders, make yourself tall, make your-
self small, be a queen, be a beggar, swim) all have an impact on the 
rider’s seat, posture, muscle tension, breathing, attention and con-
nection with the horse. These tasks and movements directly affect 
the bodily qualities assessed by the GBE (Kvåle et al., 2016). For 
example, when working with Benjamin, we used images relating to 
his dreams of being a cowboy, riding his own horse, sleeping rough 
in the wilderness, wrangling or catching his own food. Some days 
Benjamin would trust the horse and connect with it without hesi-
tation, other days he was anxious on arrival and the horse became 
anxious as well. Our working together shifted from riding in walk 
and trot together, to Benjamin being mounted and the therapist 
accompanying as a sidewalker. Contact improvisation was more 
difficult when the anxiety level was high, but also easier because 
a worried but sensitive rider feels the horse’s reactions to his wor-
ries, and may allow the therapist to hold her hand at the forefoot, 
the thigh, the lower back or on the horse’s withers to calm them 
both. When the therapist uses “hands-on” on the rider, the rider is 
encouraged to follow the therapist’s lead, or to take the lead and let 
the therapist follow the movements. Ava and Charlotte played with 
being led/taking the lead as well, to increase their range of motion 
and experience of safety in the saddle – and to exercise agency.
Being mounted on a large horse is to view the world from a dif-
ferent position. For many this is frightening. Ava always wants an 
Icelandic pony, which is easy to work around from the ground, being 
only about 135 cm tall at the withers. When on the ground, she 
refers to the pony as small and sweet, but when mounted she gets 
scared because it is so tall. Working with a pony makes it easy for 
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the therapist to physically guide and comfort both rider and horse, 
always keeping one hand on the bridle and the other at the back or 
thigh of the rider, or on the horse’s mane or neck. Ada is guided to 
feel the horse’s movement, count its steps, or tell a story of us being 
in a completely different setting; riding in the mountains, swimming 
with the horses, teaching a dog to follow a horse. Imagining other 
places and activities reduces her muscular tension and deepens her 
breath, and helps her connect with the horse, with me and the actual 
setting. Sitting on a horse places you above the walkers, in a position 
associated with power and control. Many patients find this powerful 
position frightening. Because they are accustomed to being the one 
who gets intimidated, they experience the roles as reversed, and may 
have difficulty enjoying their empowered position. Riding physio-
therapy enables encounters with difference and otherness, and per-
mits strange encounters within the familiar (Ramsden, 2017). Horses 
facilitate encounters with alterity or strangeness and provide tools for 
step-by-step life changes. Charlotte’s experience of horseback riding 
as a revelation is telling.
Devising for equine facilitated 
physiotherapy
Horses need to be looked after, groomed and included in the herd 
of human and non-human animals. Horses fascinate the Avas, 
Benjamins and Charlottes, but they are also afraid of them and have 
experienced the double-edged consequence of horsing around – 
daring and compassion. While around horses, therapeutic tools are 
verbal and bodily dialogue (Sudmann, 2009). I talk with and touch 
horse and rider, and use the whole of my body close to the horse, 
and close to the rider, without asking permission to do so to ensure 
the horse’s trust and security in the person, and the person’s trust in 
the horse. Subsequently I might ask, “Did you see or feel what I just 
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did?”, and invite a discussion about non-verbal and touch-based 
communication and social interaction between humans and non-
human animals. Everything is about micro-communication and 
voluntary risk taking (Goffman, 1967; Lyng, 2005), about volun-
tary signs given and involuntary signs given off – and our interpre-
tation of these infinitely small and minute signs.
Ava, Benjamin and Charlotte and their peers have intimate 
knowledge about social stratification, about put-downs and mar-
ginalisation, about how people socially police each other and 
how this is embodied (Getz et al., 2011). Being with horses crea-
tes a recuperative and healing space where alternative modes of 
being can be crafted or tested. These modes of co-being facilitate 
a biosocial becoming – where body and mind are integrated, and 
human and non-human animals are tuned towards each other 
(Davis & Maurstad, 2016; Maurstad et al., 2013). The environ-
ments on farms and in stables are rich; they offer an everyday con-
text for therapy, contact with nature and new biosocial becoming. 
Benjamin’s dreams about the centaur – the merging of human and 
horse (Bornemark & Ekström von Essen, 2010), Charlotte’s desires 
to be carried and comforted (Shambo et al., 2013) or Ava’s desire to 
ride bareback (Von Dietze, 2011) are examples of how horses make 
dreams come true, and how they facilitate exploration of self and 
steps towards health-promoting changes.
Physiotherapists are designers of movement and motor learning 
situations, but many are probably still inclined to take sole respon-
sibility for the design, forgetting to involve patients as they should. 
Working with people and horses, the practice of  devising – i.e. col-
laborative creation and contact improvisation – provides a rele-
vant and inspiring approach. Devising is a physical way of working 
through movements to tune bodies to communication and inte-
raction, as described in the sections above. Augusto Boal, one of 
applied drama’s founding fathers, created numerous games and 
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activities to enhance our ability to “see what we look at, to listen 
to what we hear, and to feel what we touch” (Boal, 1985). Boal’s 
(1995) volume on theatre and therapy provides a collection of exer-
cises for tuning bodies to the situation at hand, and for wounded 
bodies to heal. Using Boal’s exercises on horseback introduces an 
element of risk not present in his practice. The relation between 
risk-taking, desire and pleasure, has been detailed by Lupton and 
Lyng as a powerful source for wellbeing (Lupton, 2013; Lyng, 2005). 
In our western societies, we work hard to preclude or minimize 
risk, making life predictable and relatively safe. However, many 
find safety synonymous with boredom, and many find challenging 
cultural boundaries intriguing. Daring to face risks and cultural 
taboos may create a sensual titillation, a sense of accomplishment, 
or fear. Making changes in bodily habits or embarking on a life-
changing journey is risky, but it presupposes a desire for change, 
and a pleasurable reward when done. The young adults that par-
ticipated in Andvig and Hummelvoll’s one-year inclusive theatre 
project, summed up their experiences in “I dare!”. Their applied 
drama project was resource oriented, created a space for connec-
tedness to others, and an arena for consciousness-raising (Andvig 
& Hummelvoll, 2017). Interestingly, they compare their findings 
with what green care farms offer young adults. Equine facilita-
ted physiotherapy, as individual treatment on farms, has the pri-
vilege to draw on the available restorative resources in a natural 
environment (von Lindern et al., 2017). Devising for daring and 
compassion in physiotherapy is to create a space for improvisa-
tion and testing of new bodily habits and communicative styles. 
Critical consciousness grows from verbal and bodily dialogues, and 
from the playing around with alternative scenarios for one’s life. 
Encounters with alterity or the commonplace add value to same 
endeavours - as do encounters with generosity (Frank, 2004).
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Concluding remarks
The outback (dirty) environment of riding, the rhythm and move-
ment of the horse, the exposure to changing weather, and the triad 
between human and non-human animals combine to offer a situa-
ted treatment approach that may seem unintelligible in a limited 
medical paradigm. Drawing on micro-sociological approaches to 
communication and on understandings of health as social and bio-
logical adaptations to living conditions made it possible to unpack 
equine facilitated physiotherapy as a co-created performance, 
where possibilities and barriers for healing are explored. The keys 
to understanding how physiotherapy with rider-patients enhances 
bodily confidence and communicative sensitivity and strengthens 
their ability to face challenges of everyday living are co-presence, 
co-being and co-becoming. Interestingly, rider-patients who do 
not dare to see a regular physiotherapist have the bravery and curi-
osity to embark on a quite challenging therapeutic journey.
Earlier on, students of physiotherapy were educated as designers 
of motor learning situations. Based on the discussions above, one 
might suggest that tomorrow’s students should be educated in devi-
sing and improvising as well, to empower patients to dare to subject 
themselves to new bodily explorations and experiences. New health 
promoting habits can be supported and facilitated by curiosity and 
surprise. Rider-patients such as Ava, Benjamin and Charlotte have 
been hurt a lot; abused and maltreated beyond the imaginative 
capacity of most people. They know too much about fear, anxiety 
and pain – and must regain bravery to dare to face the world and to 
protect themselves. The stable, for most people a challenging envi-
ronment, necessitates sensitivity, wariness, and presence. Horses 
and physiotherapists can enhance healing, enablement, add value 
and support to the steps they need to take themselves to improve 
their own life.
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Minutious studies of social encounters and relations in public 
were the subject matter of Goffman’s studies of animals, gam-
blers, filmmakers and everyday interaction. He introduced the 
interaction order as a subject matter in itself, and argued that 
the interaction order was sacred, a ritual that preserved the 
moral and social standing of everyone present (Goffman, 1983). 
Micro signs and actions such as glances, smiles, touch, micro 
movements, grins, winks, or utterances/sounds are necessary to 
uphold a situational definition and to agree upon who we are, 
or may become, in this communal setting. To share food and 
coffee, gloves, hats, or sheepskins or deer hides to keep warm, 
necessitates awareness of others’ needs in relation to one’s own 
needs and illustrates the sacred and ritual character of social 
interaction. The stables and environments at green care farms 
offer a social arena where wounded bodies may heal (Frank, 
2004).
The Avas, Benjamins, Charlottes and their peers, would profit 
from a more generous and less intrusive and invalidating recep-
tion by physiotherapists or other carers, helpers or professionals. 
At the end of the day, it all comes down to being able to lead the 
life of ones’ own choosing, and to finding a way of co-being with 
fellow humans or animals that is more rewarding than taxing. 
Health is a collective resource and social practice (Crawford, 
2006; Huber et al., 2011), and most health problems and solutions 
emerge outside the health care systems and their professionals 
(Getz et al., 2011). Appropriation and exploitation of resources 
outside the standard healthcare frame, such as farms and animals, 
situates healthcare where health problems arise – in everyday 
living within everyday contexts. Using the ideas and tools from 
psychomotor physiotherapy in creative conjunction with applied 
drama, indoor or outdoor, equips physiotherapists with a larger 
toolbox and a playful practice.
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CHAPTER 9
Unbinding physiotherapy 
knowledge. Critical 
disability studies’ 
epistemology: moving 
towards a socially-just 
physiotherapy profession
Karen Yoshida | Department of Physical Therapy, University 
of Toronto
Abstract
In this chapter, I describe a critical alternative epistemology for 
Critical Disability Studies. Epistemology is the study of what is 
knowledge and truth. An epistemology delineates what is knowl-
edge, who can claim knowledge and how it is assessed through 
a particular worldview. I base my critical disability studies epis-
temology (CDSE) on Afro-centric feminist epistemology as 
articulated by Collins and augmented by bell hooks, This Afro-
centric feminist epistemology, in opposition to a euro-centric 
masculinist epistemology, embraces the concept of interlocking, 
diverse forms of oppression and promotes resistance. A CDSE cen-
ters on the generation and validation of knowledge through critical 
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reflection of embodied experiences, active dialogue emphasizing 
connectedness to others and community, and the ethics of care 
- emotionality and empathy as investment and accountability 
related to one’s relationship(s) to disability. Incorporating a CDSE 
will support the further development of critically reflexive and 
analytical physiotherapy students, clinicians, teachers, researchers 
and policy makers to promote more socially just PT practices.
Introduction
Physiotherapy knowledge has moved from being a “craft” occupa-
tion (Miles-Tapping, 1989), to a clinical science-based knowledge 
dominated by evidence-based and health science discourses (Jette 
et al., 2003). One important health science approach that has influ-
enced health professions in Canada and elsewhere is the Social 
Determinants of Health (SDH) approach (Public Health Agency 
of Canada, 2011). The SDH approach takes as its focus that health 
is based on many influences of which health services is only one 
component. An SDM approach examines the context of disease 
and ill health and promotes the idea that while individual behav-
iour towards health is important, this behaviour is conditioned 
and influenced by the social circumstances and social locations 
of individuals, communities and populations. Proponents of the 
SDH approach indicate that people’s socio-economic status, occu-
pation, and social networks are the most important influences on 
health (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2011). The importance of 
the SDH approach is that it has encouraged health professions in 
Canada to look explicitly and intentionally at the “social” aspects 
and to incorporate this approach within the content and practice of 
their professional activities.
This turn towards the social is evident within physiotherapy. 
Proponents of the national and international PT professional 
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community have moved to articulate and conceptualize PT as a 
socially-informed and socially-producing knowledge base (see 
Critical Physiotherapy Network Website). This includes expli-
cating, interrogating and disrupting the “physicality” of physical 
therapy. Over the years, work within the profession has taken a 
more “social” approach to problematizing and re-conceptualiz-
ing key concepts and issues within physiotherapy (Cott, Finch, 
Gasner, Yoshida, Thomas, & Verrier, 1995; Gibson & Teachman, 
2012; Nicholls, Gibson & Fadyl,2015; Yoshida, 1993; Yoshida, 
1994) such as the concepts of movement, self-conceptions, and 
disability. Historically and currently, the concept of disabil-
ity has been predominantly defined in individual/medical and 
physical terms as a deficit, defect or lack within the body that 
requires some intervention to ameliorate or reduce the disabil-
ity. Given this view, those living with disability were/are seen 
as unable to engage in everyday aspects of life – living in the 
community, school, work, relationships, travel, having intimate 
relationships, and raising children. Disability advocates/activists 
as early as the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, Canada and 
United Kingdom challenged the individual/medical view of dis-
ability and put forth a social model view of disability (Dejong, 
1979; Oliver, 1990; Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation [UPIAS], 1975). In this framework, notions of dis-
ability are considered to be created by the inaccessible physical 
environments, policies and practices of an abelist or able-bodied 
majority society (UPIAS, 1975; Oliver, 1990). These grass roots 
organizations called for equal rights for disabled people and 
seeded the development of academic scholarships in Disability 
Studies in the United States, Canada and United Kingdom 
(Dejong, 1979; Shakespeare, 2010; Driedger, 1989) and globally 
with the United Nations’ Convention for the rights of People 
with Disabilities (United Nations, 2006). In the United States 
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and Canada, Disability Studies as a discipline has distanced itself 
from deficit models of disability commonly used in medicine, 
rehabilitation and special education (Linton, 1998). However, 
if traditional professional views of disability and practices are 
to change, there is a need for direct engagement of Disability 
Studies scholarship in these disciplines (Chen, Kirchner & 
Kudlick , 2004; Block, 2004; Yoshida, Self, & Willis,2016). There 
is scepticism, however, among Disability Studies scholars toward 
this excursion into non-Disability Studies academic programs. In 
addition, while there are a few healthcare professional programs 
that have CDS content/programs, there is still a lack of accep-
tance and acknowledgement that CDS is relevant or legitimate 
knowledge. This tension provides the context for this chapter.
As both a DS scholar and physiotherapist, I began teaching 
Critical Disability Studies (CDS) in the Department of Physical 
Therapy at the University of Toronto, Canada, more than 20 years 
ago. I have detailed key principles and values needed to teach CDS 
(Yoshida et al., 2016), critical pedagogical imperatives, and some 
of the major teaching content as well (Yoshida, Self, Willis & Rose, 
2017). I argue here that it is important to incorporate CDS into 
current physiotherapy (PT) knowledge, as it provides a critical 
alternative epistemology (CDSE). Epistemology is the study of 
what is knowledge and truth. An epistemology delineates what 
is knowledge, who can claim knowledge and how it is assessed 
through a particular worldview.
I suggest that a CDSE unbinds or opens up PT knowledge to 
relevant, alternative knowledge claims and critical analyses and 
therefore would lead to more socially just PT pedagogies and 
practices. CDSE coupled with social justice pedagogies and prac-
tices within PT can support the further development of critically 
reflexive and analytical students, clinicians, researchers and policy 
makers within PT and rehabilitation.
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In this chapter, I offer a CDSE – what it consists of, and its mer-
its for PT education and the profession as a whole. Theoretically, 
I bring together Afro-centric Feminism epistemology (Collins, 
1991), feminism and praxis (hooks, 2000), and disability and social 
justice (Berne, 2015; Mingus, 2011) to underpin the CDSE that I 
use in PT education at the University of Toronto. The writings of 
Collins and hooks have been important touchpoints for my teach-
ing and research over the past ten years. In what follows I : 1) state 
my positionality (social locations); 2) discuss the four basic tenets 
of Afro-centric Feminist epistemology (Collins 1991) – concrete 
experience, use of dialogue, talking from the heart (expression, 
emotions and empathy) and ethics of personal accountability, and 
show how this standpoint differs from euro-centric masculinist 
epistemology; 3) describe how I have shaped a CDSE using Collins 
and bell hooks1 works as a foundation. In doing this, I do not con-
flate disability, gender and race, but seek to illustrate their similari-
ties and acknowledge their important differences; and 4) discuss 
the importance of physiotherapy taking up this alternative epis-
temology of disability to support socially just PT pedagogies and 
practices. I also will envision a future PT profession that incorpo-
rates CDS epistemology in terms of its key features.
I: Positionality and background to this 
chapter
Stating one’s positionality (i.e. one’s social locations and relationships 
to disability) provides the reader with information to understand 
how experiences shape the focus and analysis of one’s work and in 
this case, this chapter. It is also an important element of a CDSE 
that I describe later. I am a non-disabled, cis-gendered, Canadian 
1 bell hooks does not capitalize her first and last name
k aren yoshida
226
woman of third generation Japanese ancestry, raised in a work-
ing class home. I am privileged as a tenured professor, located in 
an academic department of physical therapy, positioned within a 
Rehabilitation Science Institute and embedded within a Faculty 
of Medicine. I work in a public, research intensive university in 
Canada. My graduate training was in the sociology of health and 
illness and the sociology of disability in a graduate program that 
emphasized the examination of the social inequities of health.
My relationships to disability (O’Toole, 2013) are multiple. I 
am a Critical Disability Studies scholar and ally. I have disabled 
family members. I have worked with disabled colleagues and other 
disability-positive allies in research and teaching since 1987. In my 
work, I place the word “critical” in front of Disability Studies to dis-
tinguish it clearly from disability as a medical/clinical issue, given 
the context in which I work. In this paper, I use “disabled person or 
people” as a politicized term to signify that disability is a positive 
identity for many people and that disability is a social product(s) 
of diverse and multiple social relations within a western capitalist 
society.
II: Afro-centric feminist epistemology 
(Collins)
Patricia Hill Collins’ articulation of Afro-centric Feminist epis-
temology (AFE) (Collins, 1991) and bell hooks’ feminist theory 
(2000) provide the foundation for this chapter. These two seminal 
feminist pieces center issues of domination, multiple oppressions, 
and resistance. They provide a strong foundation for my articulation 
of Critical Disability Studies epistemology. In this chapter, I summa-
rize the key points of Collins’ AFE that I believe are important to a 
CDSE. In writing this summary, I remain respectful of and use her 
specific wording of identifications throughout my paper.
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According to Collins (1991), the AFE epistemological stand-
point is oppositional to the euro-centric, masculinist knowledge 
validation process that dominates academic discourse. Black 
women have to struggle against white males’ interpretations of the 
world to articulate a self-defined (black woman’s) viewpoint, which 
can be seen as subjugated knowledge (Collins, 1991). Within this 
web of domination, both Collins (1991) and hooks (2000) reject 
the notion of separate oppressions (i.e. gender, race and class), and 
the adding on of other oppressions (additive model of oppression) 
in viewing domination. They propose reconceptualizing relations 
of domination for Black women as a system of interlocking oppres-
sions of race, class, and gender because these oppressions arise 
from an encompassing, historical system of dominance. For Black 
women, race, class and gender are most important. This interlock-
ing approach promotes thinking explicitly about these oppressions 
and other forms of oppression, such as religion, age, ability/dis-
ability and sexual orientation, the interplay between them and how 
they may work to dominate others.
In placing African-American women and other marginalized 
groups in the center of analysis, one can see how groups have vari-
ous amounts of privilege and penalty (oppression) in a historically 
created system (Collins, 1991). For example, white women can be 
penalized by their gender, but privileged by ability. A white disabled 
person may have privilege in some setting and a racialized disabled 
person may not. Within a system of interlocking oppressions and, 
depending on their social circumstances, a person may be a mem-
ber of an oppressed group (disabled), may be an oppressor (male) 
and thus simultaneously oppressor and oppressed (Collins, 1991). 
For example, domination related to race and gender produces rac-
ism and sexism (hooks, 2000). These oppressions exclude people 
from having choice and opportunities and most importantly, 
socializes the oppressed to believe that their oppression is natural. 
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hooks (2000) describes sexism as the process whereby individuals 
are socialized or taught/learn to behave in particular ways that make 
them act in compliance with oppressive dominant social structures 
and institutions. For example, Black women are taught that rela-
tionships with other Black women will not enrich their lives and 
are taught not to bond together. According to hooks (2000), Black 
women need to unlearn this. This unlearning of “internalized sex-
ism/racism” is pivotal to creating political solidarity among Black 
women.
Collins’ Afro-centric Feminist epistemology reflects elements of 
both women and African-Americans’ epistemologies. This means 
being a part of these groups and yet, at the same time, standing apart 
from both groups (Collins, 1991). hooks (2000) believes this insider-
outsider position is essential to Black women’s consciousness. 
Collins (1991) acknowledges the diverse experiences of oppression 
among Black women given their varied insider-outsider positions. 
This diversity of experiences informs her epistemology.
Collins’ four basic tenets of Afro-centric Feminist epistemology 
(AFE) are: a) concrete experience as a criterion of meaning; b) use 
of dialogue to assess knowledge claims; c) ethics of caring - talk 
from the heart (expression, emotions and empathy); and d) ethics 
of personal accountability. These four tenets are interrelated and 
work together to form an AFE.
Concrete experience as a criterion of meaning
In this dimension of an AFE, Collins suggests that there are two 
ways of knowing – knowledge and wisdom. The distinction between 
the two is based on lived experience. Knowledge is information not 
experienced whereby wisdom is knowledge gain through expe-
rience. Those who have lived experiences of a situation are con-
sidered to have more credibility than those who have no direct 
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personal experience. Related to the importance of lived experience 
is the use of practical images, narratives and stories that are repre-
sentative of the lived experiences of Black American women. These 
forms of knowledge allow for subjectivity between women, reside 
in the women (not higher authorities) and are experienced directly 
in the world, not through abstractions (Collins, 1991). Within her 
narrative method, these stories or experiences are told and trusted 
by the communities of Black women. Concrete experiences of self-
definitions are valued and validated within various institutions of 
black women’s lives – their centrality in the family, the church and 
other places where people congregate.
Use of dialogue to assess knowledge claims
The process of validating and assessing claims to knowledge 
is done through the use of dialogue. Dialogue here is equal and 
mutual engagement between two active individuals (hold subject 
positions)– the speaker and listener who are both members in the 
community. This is in contrast to euro-centric masculinist epis-
temology of active subject to a passive object (Collins, 1990), in 
which there is no dialogue.
The primary epistemological assumption supporting the use of 
dialogue in determining knowledge claims is the connectedness to 
others (Collins, 1991). This connection with others is part of a tra-
ditional African holistic worldview which seeks out harmony. This 
connectedness is an important aspect of the knowledge validation 
process from an AFE. In this process, people actively engage in seek-
ing connections with others and become more human and empow-
ered within the context of a community (Collins, 1991). This is in 
contrast to euro-centric masculinist epistemology of separation or 
isolation to create knowledge within research settings such as the 
laboratory, and within academic spaces isolated from communities.
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The ethics of caring – talking with the heart
A third tenet of an AFE epistemology is the ethics of care 
or  talking with the heart, which involves three related dimen-
sions:   personal expressiveness, emotions, and empathy. All three 
dimensions are pivotal to the AFE knowledge validation process 
(Collins, 1991).
The first dimension of the ethics of care is the impor-
tance of  the  uniqueness of each individual. Based in African 
humanism,  each person is seen as a distinct and valued being 
(Collins,  1991). One example of this value is illustrated in black 
women quilters who place vibrant patterns and colours next to 
each other in a quilt. The individual differences within patterns are 
seen as enriching the entire quilt, not competing against each other 
(Collins, 1991).
The second dimension is the legitimacy of emotions in dia-
logue. To display emotion in dialogue, means that the speaker is 
invested in the validity of the argument (Collins, 1991). In AFE, 
there is no need to separate emotions from intellect to advance 
and assess knowledge. This is in contrast to euro- centric male 
epistemology which favours dispassionate and objective knowl-
edge. In this epistemology, knowledge can only be gained if the 
knower excludes emotion and feelings. This separation of emo-
tions from intellect supposedly avoids bias in acquiring knowl-
edge through a scientific research process. The third dimension 
is the development of the capacity for empathy. Collins (1991) 
claims the capacity for empathy is important not only for the 
knower (oppressed) to extend to others, but to believe in oth-
ers’ capacity for empathy. Collins acknowledges that the ethics 
of care may be part of women’s experiences and this supports 
the AFE of connection in which “truth” emerges through care 
(Collins, 1991).
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The ethics of personal accountability
The last of AFE’s proposed ways to assess a person’s knowledge 
claims is, at the same time, to evaluate the person’s character, val-
ues, and ethics. This is done by asking for information on the indi-
vidual’s values and daily life experiences. In relating their concrete 
experiences, individuals reveal their point of view, what they hold 
important, how they relate to people and the derived meanings of 
these experiences. All of these qualities, point to the overall char-
acter of the person, their relationships to others and to the actions 
they take in everyday life and in acquiring  knowledge. According to 
Collins (1991), this accountability is essential to assess the knowl-
edge claims of any person. These major tenets of AFE provide the 
basis to shape a Critical Disability Studies epistemology to which 
I now turn.
III: The shaping of a critical disability 
studies epistemology
In this section I discuss how I have shaped a CDS epistemology to 
teach CDS within the Physical Therapy program at the University 
of Toronto. The CDSE I articulate and use is underpinned by many 
of the views expressed by Collins (1991) and hooks (2000) and dis-
ability justice activists (Berne, 2015; Mingus, 2011). Collins (1991) 
suggests that subjugated knowledge is produced by groups who are 
marginalized or othered by dominant groups. As disabled people 
have been (and still are) excluded from mainstream society, they 
are a group that have produced their own subjugated knowledge.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, I am not conflating gen-
der, race and disability- they are not interchangeable. I agree with 
Collins and hooks in their observation that there are many sites of 
oppression that are interlocked or connected, as they are produced 
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by an overarching historical system of oppression. Disability as an 
axis of oppression shares some similarities with race and gender, 
but the expression of privilege and penalty of disability will be var-
ied, and the meanings of privilege and penalty will be influenced by 
the particulars of the disability/difference and many other axes of 
oppression (race, gender, class, age, sexual orientation, indigenous 
identity, rural/urban, nation state, etc). This acknowledgement of 
how multiple social locations may be seen as interlocking oppres-
sions is the basis for current understandings of intersectionality. 
Given this, intersectionality (Hankivsky, 2014) is an important 
concept and way of thinking that physiotherapists need to embrace. 
Earlier in this chapter I mentioned that the Social Determinants of 
Health has helped the health professions to turn towards the social. 
The SDH is an important first step in understanding an intersec-
tional approach and could be implemented within PT curricula. 
In  addition, writings on Disability Justice emphasize this under-
standing of intersectionality (Berne, 2015; Mingus, 2011).
In what follows, I draw on the four tenets of AFE to inform my 
formulation of a CDSE. I will elaborate on how each “fits” or is con-
sistent or not consistent with current disabled scholars’ thinking of 
disability. I bring into this conversation disabled scholars who are 
speaking about some of the same issues – oppression, intersection-
ality and disability social justice.
“Lived” experiences as an essential criterion of 
meaning
The importance of concrete lived experience is core or fundamental 
to any CDSE, and I have shown that this lived experience is essen-
tial to an AFE. The lived or embodied experiences of disabled peo-
ple provide the foundation for critical reflection and analysis. This 
lived or embodied experience means that individuals are able to 
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critically articulate how social structures/ institutions (e.g.  policies, 
rules) have impacted their lives (Williams, 1998). However, domi-
nation related to disability can make it difficult for disabled people 
to “see” and articulate how institutions and practices affect their 
daily lives.
Disabled people’s oppression has often been labelled ableism. 
Ableism is a system of oppression produced by the dominant abled-
bodied majority view (Campbell, 2008). This view is reflected in 
physical/social environments , practices and behaviours taken 
for granted. Disabled people are excluded in society if the physi-
cal environment is constructed in such a way that it poses barri-
ers to access, e.g. barriers to wheelchair users. Social practices of 
watching a movie in a theatre demand that all who attend can see 
and hear the movie. This would exclude those identified as deaf 
and/or blind. Taken for granted interactional practices, such as 
how one greets another person by saying hello and looking directly 
at them, assumes that everyone can interact in this way.
Ableism as a system of oppression is based on a normal/abnor-
mal dichotomy. Like sexism and racism, it has its roots within a 
western dichotomous system of thinking. Even within a more cur-
rent western culture of hybridity and diversity, this dichotomous 
mode of thinking of disability still prevails. The concept of the 
normal and its construction has been fully articulated elsewhere 
(Davis, 1995), and is summarized briefly here. The idea of the 
“norm” was spurred by Eugenics and the population movement. 
Measures such as weight, height, limb length and so on, were 
seen to be distributed along a “bell” shape curve, with the mean 
or most frequently observed measurements forming the centre 
point of this curve. This bell shaped curve has two endpoints that 
indicate amounts of the trait/measure that is lesser or greater than 
the average for the population. Both would be seen as departures 
from the average measure. This posed a problem for eugenicists 
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as traits such as intelligence or heights that were greater than the 
average would be seen as departures from the norm, albeit, in a 
negative way. To deal with these situations, Francis Galton, created 
the concept of quartiles (Davis, 1995). The bell curve distribution 
of a trait was then segmented into quartiles, and he substituted the 
idea of ranking. This meant a rank order from lowest (first) to the 
second and third quartiles encompassing the majority of the area 
under the centre part of the bell curve. The highest quartile is at the 
upper end of the curve. This use of ranked quartiles has allowed 
eugenicists to say that those who were very tall in height – fourth 
quartiles) possessed a desirable amount of the trait. At the other 
end of the curve, those whose traits were in the first quartile were 
seen as possessing insufficient amount of the trait (e.g. intelligence, 
height, weight) and were seen as deviating from normal and thus 
devalued (Davis, 1995).
This arbitrary definition of normal contributes to the normal/
abnormal dichotomous thinking in western science that continues 
to be propagated by institutions that promote this particular way 
of being and doing things. For example, in medicine and reha-
bilitation, there are specific “normal” ways to move around in 
the world. This usually involves walking upright as the standard 
(Gibson, 2016). This is an ableist view of moving around. This 
dominant assumption of standing upright has implications – for 
example, how physical environments are structured (stairs), how 
space to get around is configured, and how clothes are designed 
and produced.
Disabled people who attend healthcare institutions for treatment 
risk becoming socialized to see the world in this way and to believe 
this is the correct way. For example, the idea that upright mobility 
is only way they should move. Given this, disabled persons may 
spend much time learning how to move in this way and may forego 
any other options for mobility. This is an ableist view of mobility.
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If a person comes to learn and believe that upright mobility 
is the only or preferred way to move in the world, one can say that 
the person has internalized an ableist perspective on mobility. 
The disabled person’s internalized ableism is a form of oppression 
inculcated from the dominant abled bodied majority. This internal-
ized ableism is widespread – it can relate to every facet of everyday 
life, such as work, school, relationships, family and social etiquette. 
Similar to Black women, disabled people may need to unlearn the 
internalized ableism, to reflect, question and challenge it and to 
speak out about how they believe they should be in the world based 
on their experiences (Campbell, 2009).
Use of dialogue to assess knowledge claims
It is essential for a CDSE that disabled people speak and share their 
experiences with other disabled people. The importance of dialogue 
to assess knowledge claims was highlighted in AFE. Historically, 
disabled children had been segregated in schools, and had lived in 
rehabilitation treatment centres, especially in urban centres. It was 
thought that this separation from mainstream society would help 
disabled children to learn and focus on normalized ways of being 
and doing. While the situation has changed today, in that disabled 
children are not isolated from others, the emphasis during treatment 
is still to learn how to move and act in normalized ways. However, 
clustering together in rehabilitation spaces has had, in many cases, 
unanticipated effects. By being together, disabled children also can 
share their stories and their experiences. Individuals speaking to 
each other may learn that their differences are not individual, are 
socially produced and in some cases, learn how to resist these nor-
malizing processes (Yoshida, Shanouda & Ellis, 2014).
Dialogue is also important for the teaching of others who do 
not have this direct lived experience. Disability Justice scholar 
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Patti Berne (2015) talks about sustainability, which means that 
disabled people’s teachings and experiences are the critical guide 
to a disability justice movement. For physiotherapists, this means 
seeking out and acknowledging the legitimacy of disabled person’s 
experiences and how this knowledge is important to our collec-
tive practice, teaching and research. Disabled people need to be 
involved in the teaching of their own lives to non-disabled people 
(Linton, 1998). This leadership is important as disabled people, 
disabled scholars and disabled physiotherapists know how the sys-
tem impacts their daily lives (Berne, 2015). In teaching CDS using 
a CDSE, this means using first person narratives (in for example, 
print, video or in person) to impart knowledge. It also means 
including disabled scholars’ writings as well. Dialogue needs to 
be set up between the disabled person/teacher and non-disabled 
student/learner in an environment that is safe and encourages 
participation.
The ethics of caring – “talking from the heart”
A CDSE needs to emphasize the importance of passionate dia-
logue, or speaking from or with the heart, as part of the process 
to assess knowledge claims. The first dimension of speaking with 
the heart involves the reflection and expression of each unique 
disabled person. Each disabled person is valued as they are and 
who they are within an approach acknowledging that all people 
are worthy (Berne, 2015). This valuing of each disabled person and 
his/her/their individual self(ves) expression(s) is important and is 
exemplified by the disabled community’s efforts to engage in dis-
ability social justice related to access. The disability social justice 
notion of access emphasizes moving away from accessibility as an 
individual and independence perspective to a view of access as col-
lective and interdependent action (Mingus, 2011). This means the 
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group acknowledges every person’s uniqueness as well as support-
ing each other to achieve access. For Mingus (2011, p. 1), acces-
sibility is important because “It is the concrete resistance to the 
isolation of disabled people”.
The importance of emotionality in dialogue is related to this self-
expression. Emotionality conveys the individual’s life world to oth-
ers in a more complete, complex and nuanced way that resonates 
with disabled and non-disabled people. Finally, a CDSE requires 
empathy. Empathy requires the willingness of the knower to con-
tinuously listen and learn from disabled people  themselves. This 
continuous learning is important for both disabled and non-dis-
abled people. For disabled people, it is not enough to know one’s 
own experiences, but in addition to learn from other disabled 
people’s experiences and needs. For non-disabled people, includ-
ing myself, there is always something to learn from my disabled 
colleagues both in the community and in academia.
The ethics of personal accountability - one’s 
relationship to disability
In evaluating people’s knowledge from a CDSE, it is important to 
assess their relationships to disability (O’Toole, 2013). This infor-
mation gives the listener important knowledge about the knower. 
From a CDSE, one would question: who are the relationship(s) 
with? What is the type of relationship? Is it with a professional ser-
vice organization for a disability or a disability rights organization? 
Is it led by disabled people? What orientation to disability does the 
knower claim – Individual, Medical, Social or Disability rights? Are 
the relationships temporary, enduring, reciprocal and/or equitable 
in nature in relation to issues of power and control? Do the rela-
tionships embrace everyday knowledge and/or professional know-
ledge? All of these questions will provide the listener with a way to 
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assess an individual’s character, values and ethics and ultimately to 
assess their knowledge claims related to disability (Collins, 1991).
Conclusion
I have presented a CDSE that has supported my teaching CDS 
within the Department of Physical Therapy at the University of 
Toronto. I have used AFE as articulated by Collins, reinforced by 
hooks, as the basis for this alternative CDS epistemology. CDSE 
emphasizes a number of important principles: the critical reflec-
tion of lived experiences, active dialogue related to connected-
ness to others and the community, emotionality and empathy 
as investment in knowledge and accountability related to one’s 
relationship(s) to disability. These principles of a CDSE are situated 
within a system of interlocking oppressions which can constrain 
action and opportunities.
What is the way forward for the future of physiotherapy rela-
tive to CDS? CDSE provides an alternative and critical episte-
mology that brings in embodied knowledge of disabled people to 
better inform physiotherapists in teaching, research, and  practice. 
Understanding the impact of the health and social systems on dis-
abled people will assist physiotherapists to be allies (disability jus-
tice) in supporting and advocating with disabled people within the 
context of complex health care systems. For example, a shift away 
from an abelist notion of independence (being physically self suffi-
cient) to encompassing an interdependent view of physical therapy 
practice ( embracing access, mixed abilities and helping others) 
would mean challenging the exclusive importance of upright 
walking to embracing a more diverse way(s) of mobility based on 
a person’s need in different spheres of life. Given the intersecting 
issues of racism, sexism, and poverty with disability, physiothera-
pists would need to consider these issues as well in working with 
unbinding phys iot her apy k nowledg e
239
people to develop desired forms of mobility. In this way, physio-
therapists will be supporting these justice movements as well. We 
need to incorporate a critical epistemology that will support the 
continuing evolution of our critical, reflexive and action-oriented 
profession. In this way, CDSE provides the basis for socially just 
physiotherapy practices that will support equitable health services 
for all.
References
Berne, P. (2015) Disability Justice – A working 
draft. Retrieved from http://sinsinvalid.org/blog/
disability-justice-a-working-draft-by-patty-berne.
Block P. (2004). Disability studies in the belly of the beast. Disability 
Studies Quarterly, 24(4). Retrieved from http://dsq-sds.org/article/
view/884/1059.
Campbell, F.A.K., (2008). Exploring internalized ableism using critical 
race theory. Disability & Society 23(2), 151-62.
Chen, L., Kirchner, C. & Kudlick, C. (2004). Guidelines for disability 
studies: Highlights of a 2004 SDS Listserve discussion. Disability 
Studies Quarterly, 24(4). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.18061/
dsq.v24i4.894
Collins, P. H. (1991). Towards an Afro-centric feminist epistemology. 
In P.H. Collins (Ed.), Black feminist thought (201-220) . London, UK: 
Routledge.
Cott C., Finch E., Gasner D., Yoshida, K.K., Thomas S. & Verrier M. 
(1995). The movement continuum theory of physical therapy. 
Physiotherapy Canada, 47(2), 87-95.
Davis, L. J. (1995). Enforcing normalcy: Disability, deafness and the body. 
New York, NY: Verso.
Dejong G. (1979). Independent living: From social movement to analytic 
paradigm. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 60, 
435-446.
Driedger, D. (1989). The last civil rights movement: Disabled Peoples’ 
International. London: Hurst.
k aren yoshida
240
Gibson, B.E. & Teachman, G. (2012). Critical approaches in physical 
therapy research: Investigating the symbolic value of walking. 
Physiotherapy Theory and Practice, 28(6), 474-484.
Gibson, B.E. (2016). Mobilities (Chapter 6). In Rehabilitation: A post-
critical approach (113-136). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Hankivsky, O. (2014). Intersectionality 101. The Institute for 
Intersectionality Research and Policy. Vancouver, BC: Simon Fraser 
University. .
hooks, b. (2000). Feminist theory: From the margins to the center. Second 
Ed. London, UK: Pluto Press.
Jette, D.U. , Bacon, K. , Batty, C. , Carlson, M. , Ferland, A. , Hemingway, 
R. , . . . Volk D. (2003) . Evidence- based practice: Beliefs, attitudes 
knowledge and behaviors of physical therapists. Physical Therapy, 
83(9), 786-805.
Linton, S. (1998). Disability studies/not disability studies. In claiming 
disability: knowledge and identity. (132-156). New York, NY: New York 
University Press.
Miles-Tapping, C. (1989). Sponsorship and sacrifice in the historical 
development of Canadian physiotherapy. Physiotherapy Canada, 
41(2), 72–80.
Mingus M. (2011). Changing the framework: Disability justice. 
Retrieved from https://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2011/02/12/
changing-the-framework-disability-justice/
Nicholls, D.A., Gibson, B.E. & Fadyl, J.K. (2015). Rethinking movement: 
Postmodern reflections on a dominant rehabilitation discourse. In K. 
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Abstract
During the past decade, there has been an increased focus on 
evidence-based practice in physiotherapy programmes. Evi-
dence-based practice involves combining best research evidence 
(external evidence), clinical expertise and patients’ values and 
preferences. Competence to search and evaluate research evi-
dence is considered crucial in ensuring that a new generation of 
physiotherapists are able to choose treatments proven to have the 
best effect. Physiotherapy programmes also focus on equipping 
students with clinical skills and taking patients’ values and needs 
as their starting point for evidence-based practice. How these 
different forms of knowledge relate to one another, however, is 
unclear. Inspired by Karen Barad’s theory of agential realism, this 
paper explores evidence-based practice as processes of becoming 
within the physiotherapy encounter. Drawing on the experiences 
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of physiotherapy students, who prior to their study in the physio-
therapy programme had encountered different physiotherapists, 
we put Barad’s concept of “intra-acting" into play as a critical and 
alternative way to conceptualise evidence-based practice. Our 
findings show how knowledge as best research evidence (exter-
nal evidence), knowledge as clinical expertise, and knowledge 
as patients’ values and preferences, is co-constructed into the 
phenomena of evidence-based practice within the physiotherapy-
patient encounter. When discussing how students should develop 
their skills in order to learn how to perform evidence-based prac-
tice, we argue that physiotherapy programmes need to take into 
account that evidence-based physiotherapy comprises a number 
of intra-active processes of becoming rather than being a fixed 
phenomenon.
Introduction
During the past decade, there has been an increased emphasis 
on evidence-based practice within physiotherapy programmes 
(Olsen, 2015). This emphasis fits a general trend favouring evi-
dence, particularly in Western societies, implying that all educa-
tional programmes, professional actions and political decisions 
should be evidence-based (Kyvik & Vågan, 2014). In medi-
cine, the foundation for the evidence-based paradigm was that 
historically, medical treatments relied solely on tradition, anec-
dotes and theoretical reasoning from basic sciences (Hofmeijer, 
2014; Engebretsen et al., 2015; Greenhalgh et al., 2014). Thus, 
there was a lack of evidence as to whether or not treatments 
were effective. At its most extreme, there was a risk that tre-
atments would provide small benefits, have no effect at all or 
be potentially harmful. To avoid these scenarios, one solution 
was to use experimental evidence, giving priority to randomised 
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controlled trials (RCTs) and meta-analyses of trial results 
(Engebretsen et al., 2015, p. 529). Historically, there has been a 
strong link between the professions of physiotherapy and medi-
cine (Haugen, 1997; Nicholls & Cheek, 2006; Ottosson, 2007), 
which helps explain why evidence-based medicine, e.g. know-
ledge generated from RCTs design, has also come to strongly 
influence physiotherapy. Within both professions, the following 
definition from Sackett et al. (1996) communicates the key to 
evidence-based practice as being a combination of evidence and 
clinician expertise:
Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious 
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of indi-
vidual patients. The practice of evidence based medicine means inte-
grating individual clinical expertise with the best available external 
clinical evidence from systematic research (Sackett et al., 1996, p. 71).
Crucially, Sackett and colleagues found that good clinicians 
combine individual clinical expertise and best available external 
evidence, and neither is found to be sufficient on its own. However, 
they did not include patient/client preferences, which is a deficit in 
their definition. Heated debates ensued about how to comprehend 
evidence, not least in Norway, where the term “evidence-based” 
was translated as “knowledge-based”, causing critical attention to 
focus on what counts as knowledge in the clinical health profes-
sions (Ekeland, 2009; Ekeli, 2001, 2002; Heggen & Engebretsen, 
2009; Nortvedt & Jamtvedt, 2009).
Conflicting logics behind the evidence-
based practice model
The debate concerning how to approach and interpret evidence-
based practice has been fuelled by discussions of the relationship 
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between the various concepts as well as how to assess experi-
ence-based and scientific knowledge. Some of the key questions 
in this debate relate to the following: What counts as scientific 
knowledge? Do circumstances or context alone count in relation 
to patient values? Is tacit and personal knowledge devalued as 
part of clinical expertise? In addition, questions have been raised 
as to whether results from clinical trials can inform decisions 
about real patients, whose complexity seldom fits the textbook 
description of disease (Greenhalgh et al., 2014). As highlighted 
by Norwegian philosopher Harald Grimen, the evidence-based 
model stems from two conflicting logics: the logic of the evi-
dence hierarchy and the logic of the circular model (Grimen, 
2009, p. 212). The evidence-based model consists of three 
components: research (external evidence), clinical expertise 
and patients’ values and preferences. In this model, research is 
a priority while research designs are arranged in hierarchical 
order. By comparison, in the circular model, research (external 
evidence), clinical expertise and patients’ values and preferen-
ces comprise three circular components of equal size. Together, 
these three circles form another larger circle, namely the cir-
cle of evidence-based practice (see Jamtvedt et al., 2015, p. 22). 
Grimen’s concern revolves around how the circular components 
are supposed to interact. In this interaction, external evidence 
seems to play the leading role, although the three circles are 
ostensibly of equal importance.
Given that the point of evidencing is to inform rather than eli-
minate discretion, it is hard to see how proponents of evidence-
based practice conceptualise or give meaning to the concept 
of discretion (professional judgement) (Grimen, 2009, p. 214; 
Hofmeijer, 2014). In other words, what is the point of the circu-
lar model if the evidence hierarchy is given priority? And if the 
circular model is given priority ‒ or if the two different logics are to 
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be considered equal ‒ what is the point of the evidence hierarchy? 
(Grimen, 2009, p. 214). Along similar lines, other critics have 
called for more attention and value to be focused on both cli-
nicians’ and patients’ experience-based knowledge. Greenhalgh 
and colleagues, for example, have argued that evidence-based 
medicine needs to be person-centred, an approach they call “real 
evidence based medicine” (Greenhalgh et al., 2014, p 3). Gibson 
and Martin (2003) have addressed potential contributions from 
qualitative methods in evidence-based physiotherapy practice. As 
they put it, “if the aim of physiotherapy is to work collaboratively 
with patients to maximize their integration into the community, 
then the research agenda needs to address the lived experiences 
of patients within and outside the physiotherapy setting” (Gibson 
& Martin, 2003, p. 356). These scholars also suggest that qualita-
tive methods are well suited to capture complexity. In addition, 
they argue that physiotherapy programmes should arm students 
with a broad understanding of the nature of evidence in order to 
prepare them to evaluate research critically (Gibson & Martin, 
2003, p. 356).
Within the context of physiotherapy education, Olson and 
colleagues (2014) explored students’ evidence-based learning 
processes. They found that students who were exposed to more 
teaching in evidence-based practice more often conducted 
a critical review of research than those who were exposed to 
less teaching in evidence-based practice. However, in clinical 
situations involving patients, there was no difference in terms 
of how the students utilised research-based knowledge (Olsen 
et al., 2014). Although students tried to use an evidence-based 
approach, they felt uncertain, as novices in clinical practice, 
about how to actually go about doing it. As a result, they relied 
on their clinical instructors, were more engaged with clinical 
work, and lacked role models who could show them how to 
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use an evidence-based approach (Olson, 2015, p. 78). In other 
words, students seemingly struggled with how to integrate best 
research evidence (external evidence), clinical expertise and 
patients’ values and preferences into diagnosis and selection of 
appropriate treatment approaches.
Approaching evidence-based physiotherapy 
through Barad
In this paper, Karen Barad’s agential realism informs our criti-
cal approach to traditional notions of evidence-based physiothe-
rapy. Barad’s theory (2007) is founded on the idea that not only 
humans, but all entities have agency. As Høigaard and colleagues 
put it:
Agential denotes that everything “does” something, in other words, 
that everything is performative and has agency. Nothing is delimi-
ted as a separate entity. Everything is always engaging something 
else, in specific ways designated by the concepts; intra-activity, i.e., 
matter and meaning, object and subject, nature and culture are 
all mutually articulated and mutually entangled (Højgaard et al., 
2012, p. 68).
Agency enables us to undercut notions of fixation, linearity and 
the one-dimensionality of matter and materiality. Instead, we can 
emphasise performativity through intra-active processes across 
the distinctions by which we normally operate. These distinctions 
include human/nonhuman, subject/object and matter/discourse. 
According to Barad, an intra-active mode of thinking offers a 
fruitful alternative to the linear and somewhat individualistic agen-
tial concept of inter-action. Indeed, the concept of “intra-action” is 
essential within Barad’s framework, implying that all entities have 
agency. Whereas inter- means “among”, intra- means “within”. 
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In the context of physiotherapy, interaction would be when the 
bodies of a patient and physiotherapist interact but both bodies 
remain independent. Conversely, physiotherapy from the per-
spective of intra-action implies that the body of the physiothera-
pist and the body of the patient co-exist within the encounter. Put 
differently, whereas interaction assumes that there are separate 
individual agencies, which precede their interaction, intra- action 
recognises that agency emerges through intra-action (Barad, 2007, 
p. 33). Indeed, agency emerges through entangled constitution 
(Barad, 2007, p. 33; Højgaard et al., 2012, p. 69). In this regard, 
intra-action can be understood as a relational and entangled 
phenomenon, always in process. There is no definite beginning or 
end, no clear-cut timeline (Juleskjaer, 2013, p. 756). Such a radical 
stance enables us to critically explore evidence-based practice as 
becoming. More precisely, we argue that evidence-based practice 
cannot be understood as consisting of research, clinical expertise 
and patients’ values and preferences as separate and pre-existing 
entities. Rather, these concepts should be regarded as dynamic 
and inseparable through agential intra-action. In this way, they 
become the phenomena of evidence-based practice within the 
physiotherapy encounter. In so arguing, we acknowledge Barad’s 
concept of apparatus as key to what sets the intra-active process 
in motion, and which involves a form of boundary-making 
(Højgaard et al., 2012, p. 69). According to Barad, apparatuses are 
both materials and discursive practices through which “objects” 
and “subjects” are produced: “[They] are the material conditions 
of possibility and impossibility of mattering; they enact what mat-
ters and what is excluded from mattering […] Hence apparatuses 
are ‘boundary-making practices’,” (Barad, 2007, p. 148). Different 
apparatuses perform boundary-setting practices by way of agen-
tial cuts (Barad, 2007, p. 155). An agential cut is what creates 
boundaries, and Barad argues that agential cuts in intra-actions 
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produce phenomena, which are therefore inherently related to 
one another (Juelskjaer, 2013, p. 757).
Finally, in Barad’s view, apparatuses are “specific material recon-
figurations of the world that do not merely emerge in time but 
iteratively reconfigure spacetimemattering as part of the ongoing 
dynamism of becoming” (Barad, 2007, p. 142). This implies that 
although agential cuts are unique in each setting, the notion of 
spacetimemattering enables us to go beyond a linear perspective of 
space, time and matter. Barad outlines it as “ways to think about the 
nature of causality, agency, relationality, and change without taking 
these distinctions to be foundational or holding them in place” 
(Barad, 2012, p. 32).
In our analysis, we put Barad’s concepts into play through the 
examples of two physiotherapy students (Celine and Linda). We 
reframe the evidence-based model by reconceptualising the three 
key concepts of research, clinical expertise and patients’ values and 
preferences, viewing them as our apparatus under scrutiny, in which 
agential cuts draw boundaries between each apparatus or concept 
of knowledge. This reframing entails an intra-active analysis of the 
physiotherapy encounter in which agential cuts are dependent on how 
the space of each concept/apparatus varies individually. Concepts and 
material discursive reconfigurations of the world therefore become 
meaningful through agential cuts (Højgaard et al., 2012, p. 70). In our 
context, then, what counts as meaningful in each encounter with the 
three knowledge sources emerges as unique in each encounter.
Apparatus of analysis
In this paper, we draw upon empirical evidence from in-depth 
interviews with eight first-year physiotherapy students who 
visited physiotherapists before enrolling in an undergraduate 
physiotherapy programme in Norway. The data derives from the 
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first author’s PhD project (Dahl-Michelsen, 2015). The interviews 
were conducted face-to-face and lasted for 50-70 minutes each. 
They were digitally recorded and transcribed by Dahl-Michelsen. 
Barad’s (2007) approach of reading diffractively inspired us metho-
dologically. This approach entailed reading the students’ stories, and 
the research literature on evidence-based practice intra-actively, 
that is through Barad’s diffractive approach (Højgaard et al., 2012; 
Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). In our study, this diffractive approach 
had a particular bearing on the choice of analytical research ques-
tions. Initially, we analysed the interviews in accordance with the 
following empirical research question: How do the experiences of 
physiotherapy students who have encountered physiotherapists them-
selves relate to the concepts of evidence-based physiotherapy? Next, to 
allow for depth as well as variation, we conducted a more detailed 
analysis during which we selected the two interviews we thought 
best demonstrated the diverse experiences of students’ encoun-
ters with physiotherapists. Using a diffractive-narrative approach, 
we developed Celine’s and Linda’s stories (Zabrodska et al., 2011). 
In this phase of our analysis, we addressed the following research 
question: What can Baradian agential realism offer our understan-
ding of evidence-based practice within physiotherapy encounters?
The study was approved by the Data Protection Office for 
Research (NSD) and all students gave their informed consent. The 
empirical data was translated from Norwegian into English by both 
authors separately, and agreed upon, in two face-to-face meetings.
Encountering physiotherapy through a 
Baradian lens
In the following section, we address how Celine and Linda’s experien-
ces within different physiotherapy encounters relate to the concepts 
of evidence-based physiotherapy viewed through a Baradian lens. 
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First, let us briefly contextualise their experiences. Earlier, Celine 
had been an elite athlete in handball. During those years, she suf-
fered various injuries. Her recovery from different injuries involved 
encounters with various physiotherapists. In contrast, Linda had 
suffered and recovered from myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME). In 
this process, she encountered physicians and neurologists as well 
as different physiotherapists.
Celine’s story
I was good at handball from early on. Thinking back, as a child it was 
only fun. Of course, I trained a lot but, honestly, I remember it as only 
fun. When I was 15, I started to play on an international level as well and 
then it became harder. The training was tougher, of course; there was more 
training. I was forced to run harder, fight more, be more aggressive and, 
yes, I liked it but in one of the sessions, I was involved in an accident where 
I fell and unfortunately broke my leg so then I was out for some time. I 
went to see a physiotherapist. That is, I had thrown my crutches away and 
I had begun to walk ‒ but I was limping and had a lot of pain and it was 
painful to move… The treatment was active and I got an exercise pro-
gramme. There was nothing wrong with the programme, I think. It invol-
ved different exercises in weight-bearing positions, tailored to strengthen 
the weakened muscles in the leg that was broken. He [the physiotherapist] 
told me that the programme was evidence based. … But I felt that he did 
not understand me and my situation. … Although I could run a little, 
I was almost depressed because I could not play handball ‒ it hurt too 
much ‒ the pain made it physically impossible. … My goal was to get back 
to handball. My identity was … I am a handball player. I felt he had no 
understanding of that. It was difficult [the feeling of not being understood].
In this extract, Celine reflects on the physiotherapist’s reliance 
on clinical guidelines, which emphasise research evidence at the 
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expense of a more patient-centred approach. Considering how 
her pain persisted during treatment sessions and how she felt 
alone in dealing with it, Celine questions the physiotherapist’s 
clinical expertise. As she sees it, reflecting on the episode in 
retrospect, the physiotherapist was not sensitive to her prefe-
rences and needs during the treatment process. What Celine’s 
scepticism brings to the fore, interpreted through Barad’s terms, 
is how the apparatuses of patients’ values and preferences and cli-
nical expertise become cut off from the phenomena of evidence-
based practice. Indeed, the apparatus of research becomes the 
phenomena of evidence-based practice through agential cuts. 
Viewed through such a lens, one could argue that the physio-
therapist fails to engender an intra-active process with Celine to 
enhance her recovery process. To us, the absence of sensitivity 
towards how the various exercises affected her pain is striking, 
suggesting failure to adequately adapt research findings to the 
individual’s unique situation. What Celine emphasises most is 
the physiotherapist’s failure to recognise her identity as a hand-
ball player. In Baradian terminology (2007), an ongoing dis-
ruption of spacetimemattering inhibits a meaningful treatment 
process in terms of progress and effect. The disruption points to 
a future focus on what to do next, and thus a linear future focus, 
rather than acknowledging dis/continuity concerning Celine’s 
embodied experiences as a handball player. For Celine, future 
and past intra-act, intensifying her worries that she may never 
become able to play handball as well as she did before. Her iden-
tity as a sporty and fit handball player is threatened and is not 
addressed as intra-acting with her pain and worries during treat-
ment. The disruption concerns spacetimemattering as she strives 
to reconfigure ongoing subjectivities (Juelskjaer, 2013). In other 
words, Celine struggles to find meaningful coherence in how to 
handle her situation of being injured.
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In light of our Baradian analysis, it is no wonder that Celine cate-
gorises this physiotherapist as less competent. She tells us that she 
ended the physiotherapy treatment and slowly recovered. However, 
when she was 22, she again experienced injury.
My crucial ligament broke and, given my prior bad experience with 
physiotherapists, especially the first one that I told you about, I fol-
lowed some recommendations and contacted a physiotherapist I knew 
was a good one. And he truly was ‒ he was very experienced. He made 
me conscious about what kind of exercising I should do to strengthen 
my muscles. So, as such, it was similar to the other one ‒ it was evi-
dence based. [The treatment involved various exercises to strengthen 
the knee muscles in line with guidelines and research evidence as to 
which method is most effective]. However, it was different. I was in 
the therapy room doing various exercises but he observed how I was 
performing them and he kept asking me about what I felt when I was 
doing them; “what do you feel when you are doing it this way or that 
way” … and we developed the progression together. He involved me. 
That was what he was doing. He knew that my ambition was to be 
back in handball and was serious about that, and he worked with me 
all the time.
In this example, Celine seems much more enthusiastic as to the 
effects of the treatment. This enthusiasm relates to how the phy-
siotherapist combines research evidence, clinical expertise and 
patients’ values and preferences. Or, to put it in a Baradian agen-
tial framework, the cut-off of each apparatus takes a different, 
and more satisfactory, path, in contrast to Celine’s experience 
with the less competent physiotherapist. In other words, agential 
cuts produce the phenomena of evidence-based  physiotherapy 
differently in terms of intra-actions. In this example, research 
evidence, clinical expertise and patients’ values and preferen-
ces intra-act and produce the cut-off through each apparatus, 
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so that the phenomena of evidence-based physiotherapy incor-
porate all three concepts of evidence-based practice. Through 
the apparatus of patients’ values and preferences, this agential 
cut becomes more significant and cuts off clinical expertise 
and research evidence. In other words, the intra-actions of the 
three concepts (apparatuses) are dominated by the apparatus of 
patient’s values and preferences. In terms of subjectivity, iden-
tity and Barad’s notion of spacetimemattering, this points to 
how the physiotherapist’s approach seemingly supports Celine’s 
recovery process. As evidenced through Celine’s emphasis on 
feelings and effect, discourse and matter intra-act as her hopes 
of recovering to continue as a handball player resonate with the 
hopes of the physiotherapist. Spacetimemattering is emphasi-
sed as part of the intra-active process. In this regard, Celine’s 
past handball career is not something linked only to the past. By 
acknowledging that she can indeed play handball again, as well 
as being sensitive to the injury as a possible drawback to her 
being the same player as before, agential cuts are made during 
the treatment process, cuts that open up other possibilities; 
Celine can still be a handball player, albeit not exactly the same 
as before.
Linda’s story
My recovery period from ME lasted four years. Generally, I will say 
that my encounter with the health system was quite convoluted when 
I had such an perplexing illness. I was very sick and they [neurologists 
and physicians] attended to me in kind of odd ways. It was as if they 
did not really believe me. The focus was on finding out whether or not 
I had ME. The focus was on the diagnosis and not on how I should 
cope with the situation, so to speak. In addition, my experiences were 
troublesome because of arrogance.
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When I came into physiotherapy, then, I felt that they were not so con-
cerned with my diagnosis. It was like I had these kinds of problems, 
and we had to solve these, and so we collaborated to try to solve 
them. I felt … I felt more that they believed me in a way. … However, 
when I met physiotherapists, I was also in the recovery process, so it 
was a more positive side of my illness process. However, it is compli-
cated because recovering is not … just about recovery ‒ you are ill 
or you are in recovery. How can you actually know with this blurry 
disease? Nevertheless, I felt that something happened when I was in 
physiotherapy and it … felt so wonderful. … I met several competent 
physiotherapists during the period when I had ME. However, one of 
them made a profound impression on me. He was interested in my 
experiences of my illness (ME) and in my situation. He was in a way 
a sparring-partner and it was collaboration. For example, if I felt 
that the exercises were too easy and wanted to progress then he was 
very much in dialogue ‒ ok then we should try something else, but 
at the same time, he was good at forcing me to break when I got a 
relapse because I was doing too much. Therefore, it was ‒ we had this 
good cooperation. Also, it is complicated with ME because there is 
little research on it and it is not clear what it is and what treatment to 
do. So, surely, it is not easy. Nevertheless, he read a lot [of research], 
told me about it, and asked me what I thought. He was so engaged 
and had been in a Lightning programme [non-medical training pro-
gramme], but he was sceptical, I understood, but still open-minded 
and asked me what I was thinking. He was involved in research him-
self and was part of a team in England, I think, and gave them input 
from the clinical setting.
Linda’s story points to difficulties related to suffering from an ill-
ness lacking evidence both in terms of criteria for diagnosis and 
guidelines for effective treatment. The evidence concept (external 
evidence) is thus different in Linda’s story compared with Celine’s. 
Viewed through Barad’s agential realism, the cut-off through the 
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apparatuses, to use a Baradian term, produce the phenomena of 
evidence-based physiotherapy including research, clinical exper-
tise and patients’ values and preferences. However, the agential 
cuts here make research in terms of external evidence less promi-
nent, whereas clinical expertise and patients’ values and preferen-
ces become more significant. Once again, the apparatus of patients’ 
values and preferences predominate, producing the phenomena 
of evidence-based physiotherapy. This example brings to the fore 
a different agential cut than is seen in Celine’s story. The cut-off 
with regard to clinical expertise and patients’ values and prefe-
rences produces a different evidence-based phenomenon. Linda’s 
story highlights how the concept or apparatus of patients’ prefe-
rences becomes more uncertain and takes a different path, which 
suggests a closer intra-action with the apparatus of clinical exper-
tise. In other words, the clinical expertise of the therapists evolves 
into an intra-actional process with the bodily experiences of the 
patient (called values and preferences in the model of evidence-
based physiotherapy). In this example, the apparatus of research is 
also produced differently because there is significant uncertainty 
as to how to approach ME in terms of external evidence. However, 
this does not imply that the phenomena of evidence-based phy-
siotherapy as produced in Linda’s story cuts off research. We argue 
that the research is intra-acting in closer relation to clinical exper-
tise and patients’ values and preferences than in the story of Celine.
In a similar way as demonstrated in Celine’s story, Linda’s 
story discloses how the uncertainty of ME put her identity under 
pressure. Linda also seems to strive to reconfigure ongoing 
spacetimemattering subjectivities (Juelskjaer, 2013), showing how 
she struggles to find meaningful coherence for her identity and 
her situation of being ill and, at the same time, hopefully recove-
ring. From the point of view of her recovery process, Linda nar-
rates from within an agential cut. She is cut off from her illness as 
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past experience of becoming, and instead she enacts, and becomes 
enacted, as somebody who is experiencing recovery (Barad, 2007; 
Juelskjær, 2013). At the same time, she intra-acts between the past, 
present and future from the point of view of her experiences. In 
other words, spacetimemattering and subjectivity are threaded 
through each other (Juelskjær, 2013).
Thinking beyond traditional evidence-based 
practice in physiotherapy education
Remarkably, scholars, educators and textbooks seem to agree 
that challenges with using an evidence-based approach should be 
dealt with through increased emphasis on clinicians’ and students’ 
competences in searching, finding and critically evaluating rese-
arch literature regarding the effectiveness of different methods 
(e.g., Fetters & Tilson, 2012; Hebert, Jamtvedt, Hagen & Mead, 
2011; Jamtvedt et al., 2015; Olsen, 2015). We agree that clinicians 
and physiotherapy students need to be skilled to search for and 
critically evaluate research findings and thus identify the most 
effective treatment approach. Our main point here, however, is 
that what counts as effective is contextual, dependent on the very 
becoming of evidence-based practice within each physiotherapy 
encounter. Thus, clinicians and students need to develop com-
petence in understanding the intra-action of research, clinical 
competence and patients’ values and preferences. In addition, 
our Baradian-inspired analysis suggests that physiotherapy enco-
unters may be intra-active processes of becoming. In effect, these 
intra-active processes within each encounter come into being via 
unique agential cuts through the three apparatuses (circles) wit-
hin the evidence-based practice model. However, when Celine 
and Linda describe their treatment as being evidence-based, when 
referring to their encounters with different physiotherapists, they 
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denote research evidence as being synonymous with evidence-
based practice. This indicates that, as physiotherapy students, 
they perceived the model of evidence-based physiotherapy as 
giving priority to one of the circles within the model. Their per-
ceptions, therefore, comply with a hierarchal understanding of 
the model. As pointed out in our introduction, the main criticism 
of the model concerns how it promotes a  circular and harmo-
nic understanding despite functioning as a  hierarchal model in 
practice (Grimen, 2009; Heggen & Engebretsen, 2009). Needless 
to say, this discrepancy is bound to confuse students. As critical 
thinking is regarded as at the core of the student learning process, 
including professional development in the use of evidence-based 
practice, we argue that students would benefit from learning how 
to problematise the basic premises of the model. In this regard, 
critical thinking should not be limited to the competence of sys-
tematic searching for and applying best (external) evidence to 
practice. Critical thinking needs to include the ontological and 
epistemological premises upon which the model is based.
Sackett and colleagues (1996) pointed to the philosophical origins of 
external evidence and clinical expertise as a compelling topic for clini-
cians, public health practitioners, purchasers, planners and the public. 
Rowe and Oltmann (2016) argue that there are conflicting logics bet-
ween evidence-based practice in clinical medicine and learning theo-
ries. This conflict concerns the design of RCTs as an ontological and 
epistemological worldview, assuming context to be controlled.
Current theories of knowledge, however, point to learning as 
occurring in an open system that cannot be controlled (Rowe 
& Oltmann, 2016, p. 6). Rowe and Oltmann, thus conclude that 
because RCTs “risk forcing us to take up ontological and epistemo-
logical positions in a technical rationalist framework – a framework 
that perceives the world as having one truth, which is inconsis-
tent with a real understanding of learning” – RCTs should not be 
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the favoured method by which to investigate learning (Rowe  & 
Oltmann, 2016, p, 8).
Mumford and Anjum (2011) offer a new ontological foundation 
called causal dispositionalism. Here, evidence of causation invol-
ves how and why an intervention causes a certain effect. Causation 
concerns tendencies, which come in degrees, and the interaction of 
different factors is key for the outcome (Anjum et al., 2015, p. 1). 
These authors emphasise the need to broaden the perspective as to 
what counts as scientific evidence. This is especially the case with 
causal evidence. In the same way, we argue that Barad’s intra-active 
perspective offers a unique approach to understanding the rela-
tions between the circles within the evidence-based practice model. 
Indeed, Barad’s ideas of entanglement foster a new way of under-
standing evidence-based practice, and thus also evidence-based 
physiotherapy. In particular, we suggest that a Baradian approach 
proposes new ways to overcome the conflicting epistemological 
premises rooted in the different ontological understandings on 
which the circles within the evidence-base model are nurtured. 
Combining epistemology as the theory of knowing and ontology 
as the theory of being –“knowing in being” (Barad, 2007, p. 149), 
Barad provides a fruitful starting point for future discussions, 
debates and critical thinking about evidence-based physiotherapy.
Students in physiotherapy education emerge as physiotherapists 
through their entangled intra-relating: As Barad puts it:
Individuals emerge through and as part of their entangled intra-relating 
… thereby making it impossible to differentiate in any absolute sense 
between creation and renewal, beginning and returning, continuity and 
dis-continuity, here and there, past and future. (Barad 2007, p. ix).
In other words, learning how to use evidence-based practice 
in meaningful ways for physiotherapists and their patients’ entails 
acknowledging that they are entangled through  intra-active  processes. 
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Within these processes, theory and practice and external and inter-
nal evidence do not pre-exist their interactions. Rather, like all intra-
actions they, “extend the entanglements and responsibilities of which 
one is a part” (Barad, 2007, p. ix). Hence, evidence-based practice can-
not be learnt like a package of pre-existing models. Rather, a Baradian 
approach points to evidence-based physiotherapy as processes of beco-
ming. The circles (apparatuses) within the model are fluid, constantly 
shifting in their becoming, through ongoing agential cuts. We argue 
that this approach offers new but also challenging ways to enhance 
physiotherapy students’ learning of evidence-based physiotherapy.
Acknowledgments
We want to extend our appreciation to the workshop members at 
the Gendering in Research (GiR) Conference at Aarhus University 
(Denmark), which took place 23-24 October 2016. We specifically 
wish to acknowledge Karen Barad for providing inspirational com-
ments engendering the development of our voice in the field of 
evidence-based practice in physiotherapy education.
References
Anjum, R. L., Kerry, R. & Mumford, S. D. (2016). Evidence based on 
what? Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 6(21), E11–E12.
Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the 
entanglement of matter and meaning: Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press.
Barad, K. (2012). Nature’s Queer Performativity. Kvinder, Køn & 
Forskning (2).
Dahl-Michelsen, T. (2015). Gender in physiotherapy education. A study 
of gender performance among physiotherapy students and changes in 
the significance of gender. Centre for the Study of Professions, Oslo and 
Akershus University College of Applied Sciences, Oslo. (2015 nr. 4).
a bar adian approach to e v idence- ba sed pr ac t ice
261
Ekeland, T.-J. (2009). Hva er evidensen for evidensbasert praksis. 
In Grimen & Terum (eds.), Evidensbasert profesjonsutøvelse (145–168).
Ekeli, B. (2001). Det vokser ikke pærer på epletrær: Innlegg i debatten 
om evidensbasert fysioterapi [Pears do not grow on apple trees: 
Contribution to the debate about evidence-based physiotherapy]. 
Fysioterapeuten, 14, 14–24.
Ekeli, B.-V. (2002). Evidensbasert praksis: Snublestein i arbeidet for bedre 
kvalitet i helsetjenesten? Eureka Forlag, Høgskolen i Tromsø.
Engebretsen, E., Vøllestad, N. K., Wahl, A. K., Robinson, H. S. & Heggen, K. 
(2015). Unpacking the process of interpretation in evidence-based decision 
making. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 21(3), 529–531.
Fetters, L. & Tilson, J. (2012). Evidence-based physical therapy. 
Philadelphia: F.A. Davis Co.
Gibson, B. E. & Martin, D. K. (2003). Qualitative research and evidence-
based physiotherapy practice. Physiotherapy, 89(6), 350–358.
Greenhalgh, T., Howick, J. & Maskrey, N. (2014). Evidence based 
medicine: a movement in crisis? BMJ, 348, g3725.
Grimen, H. (2009). Debatten om evidensbasering–noen utfordringer. In 
H. Grimen & L. Terum (eds.), Evidensbasert profesjonsutøvelse. Oslo: 
abstract forlag.
Haugen, K. H. (1997). En utdanning i bevegelse: 100 år med 
fysioterapiutdanning i Norge. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Heggen, K. & Engebretsen, E. (2009). En dekonstruktiv nærlesning av 
arbeidsbok for sykepleiere. Sykepleien forskning, 4(1), 28–33.
Hebert, R., Jamtvedt, G., Hagen, K. & Mead, J. (2011). Practical 
Evidence-Based Physiotherapy. Churchill Livingstone. London, UK.
Hofmeijer, J. (2014). Evidence-based medical knowledge: The neglected 
role of expert opinion. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 20(6), 
803–808.
Højgaard, L., Juelskjær, M. & Søndergaard, D. M. (2012). The ‘WHAT 
OF’ and the ‘WHAT IF’ of agential realism–In search of the gendered 
subject. Kvinder, Køn & Forskning (12).
Jackson, A. Y. & Mazzei, L. A. (2011). Thinking with theory in qualitative 
research: Viewing data across multiple perspectives. London and New 
York: Routledge.
Jamtvedt, G., Hagen, K. B. & Bjørndal, A. (2015). Kunnskapsbasert 
fysioterapi. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.
tone dahl-michel sen and k aren s ynne g roven
262
Juelskjaer, M. (2013). Gendered subjectivities of spacetimematter. Gender 
and Education, 25(6), 754–768.
Kyvik, S. & Vågan, A. (2014). Forskningsbasert utdanning?: 
Forholdet mellom forskning, utdanning og yrkesutøvelse i de korte 
profesjonsutdanningene. Oslo: abstract forlag.
Mumford, S. & Anjum, R. L. (2011). Getting causes from powers. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Nicholls, D. A. & Cheek, J. (2006). Physiotherapy and the shadow of
prostitution: The Society of Trained Masseuses and the massage
scandals of 1894. Social Science & Medicine, 62(9), 2336–2348.
Nortvedt, M. W. & Jamtvedt, G. (2009). Engasjerer og provoserer. 
Sykepleien, 7(09), 64.
Olsen, N. R. (2015). Evidence-based practice in physiotherapy education. 
(PhD), University of Bergen, Bergen.
Olsen, N. R., Lygren, H., Espehaug, B., Nortvedt, M. W., Bradley, P. 
& Bjordal, J. M. (2014). Evidence-based practice exposure and 
physiotherapy students’ behaviour during clinical placements: 
A survey. Physiotherapy Research International, 19(4), 238–247.
Ottosson, A. (2007). Sjukgymnasten ‒ vart tog han vägen?: 
En undersökning av sjukgymnastyrkets maskulinisering och 
avmaskulinisering 1813–1934. (43), Göteborg Universitet, Göteborg.
Rowe, M. & Oltmann, C. (2016). Randomised controlled trials 
in educational research: Ontological and epistemological 
limitations: short report. African Journal of Health Professions 
Education, 8(1), 6–8.
Sackett, D. L., Rosenberg, W. M., Gray, J. M., Haynes, R. B. & Richardson, 
W. S. (1996). Evidence based medicine: What it is and what it isn’t. 
London: British Medical Journal Publishing Group.
Zabrodska, K., Linnell, S., Laws, C. & Davies, B. (2011). Bullying as intra-
active process in neoliberal universities. Qualitative Inquiry, 17(8), 
709–719.
263
CHAPTER 11
A critical pedagogy 
for online learning in 
physiotherapy education
Michael Rowe | Department of Physiotherapy, University of 
the Western Cape
Abstract
In order to graduate physiotherapy students who are able to 
thrive in increasingly complex health systems, professional 
educators must move away from instrumental, positivist 
ideologies that disempower both students and lecturers. Certain 
forms of knowledge are presented as objective, value-free, and 
legitimate, while others – including the personal lives and experi-
ences of students – are moved to the periphery and regarded as 
irrelevant for professional education. This has the effect of silenc-
ing students’ voices and sending the message that they are not 
in control of their own learning. While the integration of digital 
technology has been suggested as a means for developing trans-
formative teaching and learning practices, it is more commonly 
used to control students through surveillance and measurement. 
This dominant use of technology does little more than increase the 
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cost-effectiveness and efficiency of information delivery, while also 
reinforcing the rigid structures of the classroom. Physiotherapy 
educators who adopt a critical pedagogy may use it to create per-
sonal learning environments (PLEs) that enable students to inform 
their own learning based on meaningful clinical experiences, 
democratic approaches to learning, and interaction with others 
beyond the professional programme. These PLEs enable explora-
tion, inquiry and creation as part of the curriculum, and play a role 
in preparing students to engage with the complex and networked 
systems of the early 21st century. While the potential for pedagogi-
cal transformation via the integration of digital technology is sig-
nificant, we must be critical of the idea that technology is neutral 
and be aware that our choices concerning tools and platforms have 
important implications for practice.
“Intellectual dead zones”: Challenges in 
higher education
“There is no such thing as a neutral educational process.” (Freire, 1970, 
p. 34)
Health systems are increasingly being recognised as integrated, 
complex, and adaptive systems characterised by high levels of 
uncertainty and constant change (Bleakley, 2010). These features of 
complex systems make them inherently ambiguous and uncertain, 
with no clear boundaries and where predictable outcomes are lack-
ing. The knowledge and skills required to work with the kinds of 
problems found in complex systems are so diverse that it is impos-
sible for a single individual or profession to make any appreciable 
impact, which means that collaborative teams are essential for suc-
cess (Bleakley, 2010; Frenk et al., 2010). The ability of these teams 
to drive change in complex systems is a function of their ability 
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to connect existing ideas, leading to the development and imple-
mentation of new ideas. Not only do these activities take time but 
they are also highly social, as success depends on how we interact 
with people and information in dynamic environments. Yet educa-
tion for the health professions continues to follow traditional lines 
of thinking based on a pedagogical model that fails to consider 
the changing context of health systems (Frenk et al., 2010). Our 
pedagogies are instrumental and geared towards memorisation, 
conformity and high-stakes assessment, leading to classrooms 
that are what Giroux (2010) has called “intellectual dead zones”. 
The positivist ideology in medical and health professions educa-
tion (Swanwick, 2014) is evident in the way that teachers view 
knowledge, how it is mediated through teaching practices, and 
the way they teach students to engage with it (Rowe & Oltmann, 
2016). In this paradigm of technical rationality where knowledge 
is presented as objective and bounded, physiotherapy students are 
not well prepared for the “messy” and ill-defined reality of clinical 
practice (Schön, 1987). When knowledge is seen as something that 
can be neatly packaged and delivered to students, it is necessar-
ily also understood as an external body of information that is pro-
duced independently of human beings; universalised, ahistorical, 
and value-free (Giroux, 2011).
Educators working from a positivist perspective see teaching as 
an act of depositing information into the minds of students, where 
the sonority of words is emphasised rather than their transforming 
power and teaching becomes talking, an act of producing facts that 
are received, memorised and repeated by the student (Freire, 2005). 
This banking model of education cannot prepare students for the 
spontaneous and emergent learning seen in clinical practice, where 
the presence of a teacher is not even required for learning to take place 
(Boud, 2016). When classrooms limit the pedagogical space neces-
sary for imagining what is possible, students are not prepared for the 
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relatively open-ended and  complex learning environments provided 
by clinical placements (Trede & McEwen, 2016). hooks (1994)1 sug-
gested that teachers’ power over students dulls their enthusiasm and 
cultivates an obedience to authority and in fact, classrooms seem 
designed and optimised to keep students under control. The class-
room as a place of confinement (Illich, 1970) has not changed much 
since the emergence of universities about 500 years ago, with a lay-
out ensuring that control and authority are vested in the lecturer – 
the “legitimate” source of knowledge – and impresses upon students 
the notion that their words and their personal experiences have no 
value in their own learning (Freire, 2005). In the context of a profes-
sional education that aims to develop within students the collabora-
tive, thoughtful, and assertive dispositions that Trede and McEwen 
(2016) suggest are essential for responsible and deliberate clinical 
practice, we must consider alternatives to the dominant paradigm 
in physiotherapy education.
A higher education – regardless of discipline – should aim to cul-
tivate “citizens who are critical, self-reflective, knowledgeable, will-
ing to make moral judgments, and act in a socially responsible way.” 
(Giroux, 2011, p. 3). Instead, we find teaching and learning prac-
tices that have become fragmented processes reduced to a series of 
predetermined steps, and utterly disconnected from their philo-
sophical foundations. Educators and students become frustrated 
by the emphasis of assessment over engagement, management over 
creative exploration, content over community, and outcomes over 
discovery (Stommel, 2015). Physiotherapy departments around the 
world are exploring the use of technology to enable the develop-
ment of the kinds of transformative and morally responsible curri-
cula necessary to graduate clinicians who are capable of navigating 
the complexity of modern health systems. But rather than using 
1 bell hooks does not capitalize her first and last name
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technology to create socially just spaces for undergraduate educa-
tion, it is most often used to reinforce a system of authority and 
control over student learning (Martindale & Dowdy, 2016).
Command and control: The Learning 
Management System
“We shape our tools and then our tools shape us” (McLuhan, 1994, 
p. xxi)
The ubiquitous institutional Learning Management System (LMS) 
has become the de facto standard for online learning in almost all 
higher education institutions around the world (Wilson, et al., 2006). 
The integration of this technology into the classroom has enabled 
lecturers to enhance their lessons with shared online notes and pre-
sentations, encouraged the use of digital resources in institutional 
repositories, and enabled online forum discussion. These are posi-
tive but incremental improvements in the flexibility and efficiency 
of professional education but fall far short of being transformational 
(Laurillard, 2007). The LMS offers a set of features that facilitate 
student administration, content storage and dissemination, assess-
ment submission, record keeping, grading, and student tracking 
(Sclater, 2008). While these features may enhance the management 
of students and content, it is difficult to see how they improve learn-
ing. The implementation of the LMS, often at enormous cost has, 
in most cases, been little more than a “digital facelift” that makes 
content distribution more cost-effective and efficient (Arvan, 2009; 
Campbell, 2009). The LMS is rooted in a teacher-centric model of 
learning where curricula are pre-determined, collaboration extends 
only to the boundaries of the institution, and participation is lim-
ited to paying students in isolated courses (Martindale & Dowdy, 
2016). At its core, the LMS places the course behind a wall where 
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“The teachers are at the centre. The content is at the center. The 
learner is not at the center” (Watters, 2014).
In order to better understand the emergence of the LMS as the 
dominant paradigm of technology use in higher education, it is 
useful to reflect on the history of the Internet. Castells (2001) has 
argued that the social and cultural norms within which new tech-
nologies are created determine how the technology is used and 
understood. In other words, the culture of the Internet was derived 
from the culture of the creators of the Internet. As it grew from an 
unlikely collaboration between international university-based aca-
demics and students and the United States government, Castells 
(2001) describes the growth of community networks that reflected 
the culture of freedom and independent thinking that was flourish-
ing across campuses throughout the 1960s and 70s. The Internet 
thus emerged as a tool of liberation, expressive of the individual 
freedom that was produced through the practice of openness in 
both its technical architecture and its social organisation (Castells, 
2001). However, the technology was also being influenced by the 
contributions of government-based entities with an interest in con-
trolling the nascent network, as well as entrepreneurs focused on 
commercialising it. These entities had little incentive to embrace 
the openness that was crucial for the Internet to be an instrument 
for freely acquiring information, sharing knowledge, aiding inno-
vation, and encouraging democratic engagement. Today we see a 
tension between the historically and theoretically open architecture 
of the network, and the growth of software and services strongly 
influenced by capitalist and governmental concerns (Watters, 
2014). The vision of the Internet as a democratic space that enabled 
the free spread of ideas is devolving into a centralised handful of 
walled gardens controlled by commercial entities that have sole 
authority to determine what is allowed (Leetaru, 2016). Watters 
(2014) notes that the open web is fast becoming the corporate web 
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and that despite the frequent invocation of the “personalisation” 
of learning, educational technology is increasingly developed by 
companies that aim to increase shareholder value rather than to 
enhance student learning.
In the context of higher education, the LMS is the manifesta-
tion of a teaching ideology that substitutes centralised control for 
democratic processes and goals, making both teachers and learn-
ers passive. Designed for observation and measurement – rather 
than learning – it resembles Jeremy Benthem’s Panopticon, a cir-
cular prison structure with an observation tower in the middle, 
from which a guard can observe inmates without their knowl-
edge (1843). The Panopticon is a representation of power in its 
ideal form, increasing the number of people who can be moni-
tored, recorded, and controlled, while at the same time decreas-
ing the number of people needed to operate it (Foucault, 1977). 
The LMS functions as an Information Panopticon; a form of cen-
tralised power that uses digital technology for observation, data 
gathering, and control mechanisms that do not rely on physi-
cal structures like classrooms and buildings (Berner, Graupner 
& Maedche, 2014). The software tracks and records students’ 
online interactions, including the time it takes to complete a task, 
along with every click along the way. Based on the data that the 
process generates, a single teacher can monitor many students’ 
performances and intervene when necessary, leading to a new 
domain of ethics considerations that educators need to be aware 
of (Prinsloo & Rowe, 2015). The most common use of technol-
ogy in higher education is therefore not to enhance or transform 
learning, but to increase control over students through surveil-
lance and measurement. New communication paradigms should 
change what can be imagined and expressed and not simply 
reproduce what has come before. The printing press did not lead 
to more efficient ways of producing illustrated manuscripts and 
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the web is not just a more efficient telegraph (Campbell, 2009). 
Online learning environments should be designed as spaces for 
students to communicate, create, and innovate without needing 
permission to challenge the status quo (Gillmor, 2014; Watters, 
2014). Critically, we must recognise that technologies are not 
neutral and that our decisions about the tools and platforms we 
use have pedagogical implications.
Critical pedagogy: Teaching as the practice 
of freedom
“The classroom, with all its limitations, remains a location of possibil-
ity.” (hooks, 1994, p. 207)
If the integration of technology in physiotherapy education is 
to transform teaching and learning then educators must stop 
presenting the discipline as a “citadel of knowledge” guarded by 
experts (Barradell, 2017). In order to graduate clinicians who 
can navigate the uncertainty of complex clinical environments, 
we must move beyond the focus on knowledge, skills and com-
petencies that have for so long been the focus of physiotherapy 
programmes. Educators must encourage the development of a 
community of practitioners that is inclusive of different per-
spectives, and where a wide range of knowledge, behaviors, 
and dispositions are valued (ibid.). Freire (2005) believed that 
education offered students the conditions for self-reflection, 
a self-managed life and critical agency but that these condi-
tions could not be developed under conditions of oppression. 
Critical pedagogy is an approach to teaching and learning that 
offers students an opportunity to develop and assert their rights 
and responsibilities so that they are not simply being governed. 
They are encouraged to act on the knowledge, values, and social 
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relations they develop by being responsive to problems that they 
identify in their own lives (Giroux, 2011). Thus, a critical peda-
gogy connects learning to social change, challenging students 
to actively engage with the world in order to make a difference 
(Giroux, 2010). Under these circumstances, information is not 
simply delivered to students but is challenged and related to the 
self in order to produce new knowledge as they learn how to 
expand their own capacity to act. This could have radical impli-
cations for physiotherapy educators who aim to create dynamic 
and transformative learning spaces that lead to the development 
of critically reflective practitioners (Patton, Higgs & Smith, 
2013). At its most ambitious, critical pedagogy helps students 
learn how to lead a meaningful life, hold power and authority 
accountable, and develop the skills, knowledge, and courage to 
challenge common sense assumptions while working towards a 
more socially just world (Giroux, 2011).
A critical pedagogy asks that lecturers connect learning tasks 
to the experiences, histories, and resources that students bring 
with them to the classroom, and to link these tasks to the goal 
of increasing students’ capacity to be critical agents who are 
responsive to the social problems that they experience in their 
own lives (Coles, 2014). In this way, students become critical co-
learners in dialogue with the teacher rather than passive learn-
ers of facts about the world. The role of the teacher is to thus to 
create with students the conditions under which new knowledge 
is constructed (Freire, 2005). Lecturers and clinical supervisors 
who provide students with opportunities to engage in a culture of 
questioning and inquiry, foreground the important issue of who 
is in control of the students’ learning and of what counts as legiti-
mate knowledge. When students see how specific modes of knowl-
edge, identity and authority are constructed by their interactions, 
they learn to engage critically with others while at the same time 
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being accountable for their own views and actions (Giroux, 2010). 
Physiotherapy educators, clinical supervisors and clinicians must 
work with students to develop a critical perspective on practice 
that explores how knowledge, truth and power are inherently tied 
to professional discourse and that these concepts are not objec-
tive and value-free (Nicholls, 2012). These challenging interac-
tions may be the impetus to develop within students the bravery 
and moral courage that are necessary to challenge the idea that the 
knowledge revealed to them during their studies may not be the 
only form of knowledge that is legitimate. A critical pedagogy in 
physiotherapy education sends the message that students’ voices 
and lives are meaningful and powerful, and that by questioning 
the taken-for-granted assumptions that drive their education, they 
have the capacity to change it.
A traditional physiotherapy course is a well-defined container 
for outcomes, learning tasks, assessment and content, and the con-
figuration of these courses determines largely the nature of the 
interactions that are possible within them. When students and lec-
turers believe that knowledge is static, stable and something that 
exists “out there”, apart from human beings, teaching and learn-
ing take place through the controlled transmission of information 
from authorities into the minds of passive learners (Giroux, 2011). 
Within this paradigm, an online learning environment serves only 
as a container for the components of a course, and facilitates the 
movement of information from lecturers to students. It is not sur-
prising therefore, to find that the most common use of technol-
ogy in higher education – the LMS – is to define courses in digital 
space, where they are used to develop compliance and conformity 
via the limited number and types of interactions that are allowed. 
But these centralised, authoritarian and hierarchical structures 
cannot adapt quickly to change (Cabrera, 2016) and do not enable 
the learning encounters that develop the characteristics of health 
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professionals necessary to thrive in the 21st century (Frenk, et al., 
2010). Nor do they encourage students and teachers to question 
the positivist paradigm that promotes a conception of knowledge 
that is objective and value-free, and upon which much of physio-
therapy education is based (Higgs, Richardson & Dahlgren, 2004). 
If we aim to graduate capable students who are successful in mod-
ern clinical practice, we cannot use online learning environments 
that simply reproduce the rigid, centralised control found in the 
classroom. We are therefore beginning to see a shift from vertical 
communication structures that privilege hierarchies of control, to 
horizontal structures – like networks – that embody coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration (Bleakley, Bligh, Browne & Brice 
Browne. 2011). In open and networked learning environments, 
participants can negotiate the structure of a course, in the context 
of their own life experiences, values and beliefs. This framework 
enables content to be built around the critical examination of con-
cepts, hierarchies and assumptions that exist within individuals 
and the group (Morris & Stommel, 2015). If learning is personal 
and knowledge is constructed in the context of our own life experi-
ences, then we need online learning environments that not only 
acknowledge this but are built around it.
A personal learning environment: Creating 
space for the student’s voice
“The truly creative changes and the big shifts occur right at the edge of 
chaos” (Bilder, in Schwartz, 2014).
Recognising the personalised nature of learning requires an 
approach to online environments that position the learner at the 
centre of the process, enabling them to support learning directed 
at educational goals that they determine for themselves (Wilson 
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et al., 2006; Martindale & Dowdy, 2016). While some discussions 
of personal learning environments (PLEs) focus on specific tools 
and services, the term includes all of the resources that a stu-
dent uses to answer relevant questions, provide personal context, 
and illustrate processes that are an inherent part of meaningful 
learning. In this context, a PLE does not refer to a collection of 
services or applications but is rather a conceptual framework that 
describes how students approach the task of learning in online 
environments (Martindale & Dowdy, 2016). There are no single 
technology platforms that constitute a PLE and no set framework 
that describes how they work because they are unique to each 
individual, emerging as part of the learning experience. Downes 
(2009) has suggested that a PLE should incorporate a diversity of 
perspectives, enable student autonomy with respect to guiding the 
direction of learning, produce new knowledge through the inter-
action with others, and provide open boundaries that allow new 
perspectives into the environment. While it is possible for a PLE 
to be integrated with an LMS, it is also clear that as far as learning 
within the PLE is concerned, connection is more important than 
compliance, which creates a tension in the way that the two sys-
tems are configured (Wilson, et al., 2006). A PLE may therefore be 
achieved “using a combination of devices (laptops, mobile phones, 
portable media devices), applications (newsreaders, instant mes-
saging clients, browsers, calendars) and services (social bookmark 
services, weblogs, wikis) within what may be thought of as the 
practice of personal learning using technology” (Wilson et al., 
2006, p. 36).
In a PLE, the goal for the student shifts from a need to collect 
information to a need to draw connections from it – to acquire it, 
disseminate it and collaborate in its application to their own lives. 
The student therefore takes responsibility for organising his or her 
own learning environment instead of operating within one that is 
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determined by the teacher or the institution (Martindale & Dowdy, 
2016). An example of a PLE for a physiotherapy student might 
include a collaborative workspace in the form of a personal blog 
where they reflect on meaningful clinical experiences. They should 
then be able to find and aggregate relevant information from a vari-
ety of both formal and informal sources, including clinical supervi-
sors, lecturers, peer reviewed publications and textbooks, as well 
as practitioner blogs, YouTube and Physiopedia. The PLE should 
enable the student to reinterpret, combine and edit those resources 
using their own personal insights derived from clinical practice 
and then publish these new artefacts that can themselves be inte-
grated as resources into the learning of others (Kop, 2010). In this 
way, students are not unquestioningly receiving information from 
authority figures but are actively engaged in a process of creating 
new knowledge where it is transformed, challenged, and person-
ally relevant (Rowe, 2016). Unlike historical approaches to learning 
that see students as the recipients of objective and value-free infor-
mation, the learner-centred nature of PLEs emphasises “partici-
pation over presentation, encourages focused conversation...and 
facilitates innovative explorations, experimentations, and purpose-
ful tinkerings that often form the basis of a situated understanding 
emerging from action.” (Seely Brown & Adler, 2008). Learning, in 
this context, is not separated from learning how to change one’s 
personal reality (Giroux, 2010).
The implementation of PLEs as part of undergraduate physio-
therapy programmes is not unproblematic. Because every student’s 
PLE is different, the provision of training and support is more com-
plex and expensive than providing support for an LMS with its ver-
tically integrated stack of common tools. In addition, the public 
nature of PLEs brings with it concerns over patient privacy and the 
exposure of student data (Martindale & Dowdy, 2016). However, 
instead of choosing systems that “protect” students from these 
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issues, a critical pedagogy could help them learn how to manage 
the risks associated with public online practices by, for example, 
developing professional online identities and ensuring that discus-
sions of clinical interactions protect patient, private and institu-
tional information. Educators interested in online learning would 
also need to confront the challenges of helping students avoid infor-
mation overload, making effective use of the digital tools embed-
ded in a PLE, and designing a learning environment that supports 
self-directed learning (Kop, Fournier & Mak, 2011). This puts more 
responsibility on students to engage with verifiability and credibility 
of information, tasks that were previously performed by the teacher 
but which are increasingly relevant for a profession that emphasises 
the importance of an evidence base for clinical decision-making. 
Physiotherapy educators will need to grapple with the tensions that 
now exist between the traditional, linear, and bounded models that 
define current educational contexts, and the fluid, unstable and 
collaborative learning environments that are emerging as technol-
ogy advances. While the implementation of PLEs in physiotherapy 
programmes will introduce new challenges, current approaches to 
professional education may be  inadequate to develop the attributes 
necessary for graduates to thrive in the uncertain clinical environ-
ments of modern health systems.
Conclusion
It is easy to convince ourselves that the world in which we find our-
selves in is inevitable; that history progresses in a regular, stepwise 
fashion leading from one rational outcome to another. This may 
lead us to accept things as they are without considering the possi-
bility that alternatives may even exist. This chapter has suggested a 
rationale for why we struggle to graduate students who are capable 
of addressing the problems that arise in complex health systems. 
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Physiotherapy education traditionally positions knowledge as 
being independent and objective, separate from the reality of our 
personal lives and experience, which has implications for teaching 
and learning practices. This perspective not only informs our class-
room activities but also the choices we make with respect to the 
development of online and digital learning environments. Rather 
than using the Internet to create a democratic space for learning, 
we have seen the emergence of a teacher-centric technology that 
prioritises content and administration above student learning. The 
LMS is just one example of the idea that technologies are not neu-
tral and that our decisions about tools and platforms in teaching 
and learning have pedagogical implications.
Critical pedagogy is a pedagogical approach that offers students 
an opportunity to develop and assert their right to not simply be 
governed, and may help to create an environment in which they 
are able to respond to the problems that they experience in their 
own clinical practice. This integration of professional knowledge, 
new information, and personally relevant learning helps stu-
dents develop the capacity to hold power and authority account-
able, while working towards a more socially just world. A critical 
pedagogy in physiotherapy education highlights for students that 
their lives are meaningful and powerful, and that by questioning 
the taken-for-granted assumptions that drive their education, they 
have the capacity to change it. Adopting a technology that serves 
to reinforce the status quo rather than empower students with 
the necessary characteristics to challenge it does little to prepare 
them for the challenges of health care in the 21st century. While 
the concept of the PLE is a new and evolving construct that is not 
yet fully understood, it has the potential to disrupt online and digi-
tal learning practices in ways that are difficult to imagine, mainly 
because we have so few examples to draw from. By giving students 
the chance to explore, question and create as part of the curriculum 
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we not only provide them with the technical skills to thrive in a 
digital, networked society, but also demonstrate that professional 
education includes more than the development of knowledge, skills 
and competencies. The combination of a critical pedagogy with 
technology platforms that enable open and networked learning 
environments may offer exciting opportunities for a professional 
education that encourages students to develop a healthy disregard 
for the status quo.
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Abstract
Drawing on the phenomenological tradition, contemporary phys-
iotherapy practice may be understood as an embodied experi-
ence; one that requires standardized approaches to evidence-based 
examination, treatment, and evaluation while simultaneously 
requiring adaptation of each of these elements of practice to indi-
vidual patients. Drawing on material from a study of encounters 
between physiotherapists and patients, this chapter addresses 
how the work of reconciling the needs for standardization and 
adaptation is accomplished in physiotherapy practice. The 
research approach and analysis of the material draws on a num-
ber of scholars in the phenomenological tradition, beginning 
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with Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The study illuminated the ways 
in which both explicit and tacit forms of knowing are brought 
together in the physiotherapy encounter. Physiotherapists use 
explicit knowledge primarily as a framework for thinking about 
assessment and intervention; however, it is the inter-subjective, 
communicative practice of being-with-another from which the 
therapeutic encounter draws its power. It is this being-with-
another that enables the physiotherapist to adapt abstract, explicit 
knowledge for the individual with whom they co-construct phys-
iotherapy care. The study revealed how the knowledge put into play 
in physiotherapy depends on the sensitivity and reflective embod-
ied knowledge of the physiotherapist, and their bodily style and 
developed professional skills. This is the bodily style that in some 
way transforms the therapist’s relation to the world, and especially 
to various and creative ways of knowledge translation at different 
moments in the process of practicing physiotherapy.
Introduction
An epistemology of physiotherapy practice that can justify and legiti-
mize the sources of knowledge that underpin the inter-subjectivity of 
interpersonal relationships as well as the proven use of physical inter-
ventions in effective practice has not been fully explored or defined 
(Edwards & Richardson, 2008, p. 185).
This opening quotation summarizes a longstanding challenge 
in physiotherapy that represents an important tension in the 
broader literature on evidence-based practice in the health 
professions. The tension is between the instrumental, rational 
thought that accompanies an experimental approach to generat-
ing and using research evidence in clinical care, and the inter-
personal, lived experience through which practical knowledge is 
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generated and put to use. In conceptual terms, these two ends 
of the spectrum of clinical knowledge can seem impossible to 
reconcile. However, one point is clear: many physiotherapists 
can and do reconcile these different forms of knowledge in their 
clinical practice every day. But how can we describe this recon-
ciliation? What are these physiotherapists actually doing as they 
integrate explicit, scientific knowledge with tacit, experiential 
knowledge in their practices?
Our chapter addresses these questions by drawing on parts of 
the material from a study of encounters between physiotherapists 
and patients. The research approach and analysis of this material 
draws on a number of scholars in the phenomenological tradi-
tion in order to articulate the ways in which different forms of 
knowledge are embodied in clinical encounters. Specifically, we 
use the concept of “embodiment” to examine the roles of knowl-
edge and interaction, incorporated through the body, into phys-
iotherapy practice. Physiotherapy offers a unique and, we believe, 
particularly insightful example of the integration of different ways 
of knowing in practice. This is because physiotherapy relies on 
the body of the clinician, and the physical interaction between 
the bodies of the patient and the physiotherapist, in explicit ways 
(e.g., physical cueing while a patient learns a new motor skill). 
Such explicitly embodied modes of intervention provide ideal 
grounds for exploring the role of the body in the enactment of dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge in practice. Examining the embodied 
nature of knowledge in physiotherapy thus provides an entryway 
into commentary on different forms of knowledge-in-use more 
generally in the health professions.
The specific conceptual challenge that we hope to address may be 
summarized as follows: contemporary physiotherapy practice is an 
embodied experience, often arising from standardized approaches 
to evidence-based examination, treatment, and evaluation which 
wenche s .  b jorbæk mo and ja me s a .  shaw
288
need adaptation to individual patients. The specific question we 
address is then, “how is this work of reconciling the needs for stan-
dardization and adaptation accomplished in physiotherapy prac-
tice?” In order to elucidate this question, we first summarize select 
arguments from the literature on evidence-based practice. We then 
describe the study methods and specific phenomenological per-
spectives that informed our analysis. We then present two excerpts 
from the data and analysis interwoven with phenomenological 
commentary to illuminate responses to our overarching question, 
and finish with future directions for this important question.
Prevailing and prominent perspectives of 
the knowledge at stake in physiotherapy
During recent decades, research within the field of physiotherapy 
has grown substantially, and has predominantly been based on 
bio-physiological and biomechanical perspectives that focus on 
the development of standards regarding treatment (such as “best 
practice” guidelines) and the assessment of “outcomes” for patients 
(Nicholls & Gibson, 2010). This growth in research and guidelines 
raises as many questions as it provides answers. Important ques-
tions include the overarching issue of what evidence-based prac-
tice means in the context of physiotherapy care, and what are the 
implications for the epistemologies that underlie physiotherapy as 
a professional discipline? We begin to address these questions in 
our review of select arguments from literature on evidence-based 
practice.
Evidence-based practice (EBP)
The claim for the superiority of evidence-based practice (EBP) is 
fundamentally inspired by the idea of evidence based medicine 
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(EBM), which is said to be the parent discipline of EBP (Nicholls & 
Gibson, 2010). There continues to be a transfer of ideas about evi-
dence and quality of services originating in medicine and spread-
ing into areas not only within health, but also fields like education, 
social work, management, policy and many others (Bouffard & 
Reid, 2012; Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009; Standal, 2008; Rousseau, 
2006). This has led to an ongoing debate about whether or not 
the principles of “evidence based everything” (Fowler, 1997) can 
be imported from medicine to such a variety of other domains 
(Standal, 2008). We think it is timely to critically examine the 
importance and significance of applying EBP to physiotherapy and 
the possible impact on professional practice and research within 
this field.
EBM, its transmission, and evidence-based 
physiotherapy
The term “evidence-based medicine” was coined in 1992 by a 
group of academic physicians at McMaster University in Canada, 
who claimed that EBM constituted a new “paradigm for medical 
practice” (Sackett & Haynes, 1995; Mykhalovskiy & Weir, 2006). 
The basic premise of the EBM approach is now well rehearsed: that 
medical practice should be based on the conscientious and judi-
cious application of best available research evidence to decision-
making regarding clinical care (Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes 
& Richardson, 1996). Although EBM further developed to pur-
portedly incorporate patient preferences and the clinician’s experi-
ence, a number of authors suggest that these additional dimensions 
clearly occupy a lower priority for decision-making in EBM educa-
tion and practice (Hammel & Carpenter, 2004; Goldenberg, 2006). 
The primary reason for this devaluing of the personal dimensions 
of clinical practice arises from the particular philosophical views 
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bound up in EBM (Hammel & Carpenter, 2004; Grypdonck, 2006; 
Goldenberg, 2006).
The EBM movement quickly spread across a number of fields, as 
stated above, leading in health-related literature to a broader con-
ceptualization of “evidence-based health care” (Grypdonck, 2006). 
The success of the evidence-based health care (EBHC) movement 
may be attributed to a variety of causes. Grypdonck (2006) outlines 
three important reasons. The first is that the definition retains 
a great deal of room for interpretation, as the three elements of 
best evidence, patient preferences, and clinical experience may 
be understood in widely different ways. The second is that the 
approach offers the perception of greater certainty in the decision-
making process, which acts as a protection for the decision-making 
clinician. The third and final reason is that EBHC allows for the 
objectification of suffering, which creates an impersonal distancing 
between the clinician and the patient. Other authors add that the 
power of the medical discourse in influencing thought in a wide 
variety of other fields is a key reason for the rapid dissemination 
and popular growth of EBHC (Mykhalovskiy & Weir, 2006).
The profession of physiotherapy was relatively quick to take 
up the evidence-based discourse, despite the challenges inherent 
in experimental research designs for physiotherapy interventions 
(Jette & Haley, 2005). This may relate to the profession’s close align-
ment with medicine and its general commitment to a positivist 
perspective (Hammel & Carpenter, 2004).
A growing body of research in physiotherapy examines the 
skills and knowledge that physiotherapists require to adopt more 
evidence-based practices, illuminating barriers and facilitators 
to achieving a more evidence-based approach (Salbach, Jaglal, 
Korner-Bitensky, Rappolt, & Davis, 2007; Shaw, Connelly, & 
Zecevic, 2010). Research promoting the use of more evidence-
based approaches has tended to take for granted the philosophical 
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beliefs and ultimate value of the broader EBHC perspective, 
neglecting to consider whether and how the EBHC approach 
might conflict with physiotherapy care. However, recent litera-
ture has begun to challenge the assumptions of EBHC within the 
physiotherapy profession (Bjorbækmo & Engelsrud, 2011; Shaw & 
DeForge, 2012; Smith, Sparkes, Phoenix, & Kirkby, 2012). Some 
authors have pointed out the need to include qualitative research 
along with randomized controlled trials if all of the dimensions of 
EBP are to be brought into the rehabilitation encounter (Hammel & 
Carpenter, 2004; Carpenter & Suto, 2008). Drawing on literature in 
both physiotherapy and the broader EBM/EBHC domains, we now 
provide a brief overview of the philosophical assumptions that we 
believe need to be further challenged and explored. These assump-
tions primarily relate to issues of epistemology and the application 
of knowledge in practice.
Epistemology in EBHC
Anjum et al. (2015) have suggested that criticisms of EBM have 
tended to focus on one of two key points: either (1) the episte-
mology or (2) the mechanics of the evidence-based approach to 
care. Epistemologically, EBHC is widely recognized as a positiv-
ist-informed perspective that orients its inquiry toward the iden-
tification of generalizable truths. Mechanistically, this has meant 
embracing the value of experimental design and the hierarchy of 
research evidence, in which meta-analyses of randomized con-
trolled trials are at the very top (Morse, 2005; Sackett et al., 1996; 
Sackett & Haynes 1995). The randomized trial is regarded as the 
arbiter of causal association, allowing professional disciplines 
access to the probabilistic knowledge of what causes particular ail-
ments to occur and which clinical interventions can alter the course 
of disability and disease (Sehon & Stanley, 2003). Embedded in 
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this perspective is thus a particular type of knowledge about cau-
sation, characterized most basically as “explicit” knowledge, and 
the general lack of recognition of more “tacit”, experiential ways of 
knowing.
The distinction between tacit and explicit ways of knowing pro-
vides a useful heuristic for thinking about the tensions between 
standardized approaches to treatment in physiotherapy and indi-
vidualization for patient needs (although we acknowledge that the 
question of generalizable knowledge extends well beyond the issue 
of tacit versus explicit knowledge). Polanyi (1967) popularized the 
distinction between these forms of knowledge by bringing together 
literatures from both psychology and philosophy. He explained that 
explicit knowledge is that knowledge which can be stated aloud or 
written on a page, such as “factual” knowledge, for example, of the 
muscles of the body. Conversely, tacit knowledge exists within the 
body differently, and can generally not be written or stated in sat-
isfactory ways. Tacit knowledge is represented by such activities as 
riding a bicycle, or applying the right amount of pressure during 
active assisted stretching of a particular patient in physiotherapy 
care. These are “felt” and “practiced” activities as opposed to those 
that can be entirely learned in a classroom.
The implications of the tacit-explicit distinction for EBHC have 
been addressed at length in the literature. A now classic study 
examining the extent to which medical practice is “evidence-
based” identified that clinicians followed “mindlines” as opposed 
to evidence-based guidelines in their care (Gabbay & le May, 
2004). These mindlines represent the tacit dimensions of enacting 
medical care, defined as “collectively reinforced, internalised tacit 
guidelines” based on professional networks and clinical experi-
ence (Gabbay & le May, 2004, p. 3). Mindlines are not portrayed 
by these authors as something that need to be combated, but as 
a central source of knowledge related to enacting medical care.
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Similarly, Thornton (2006) suggested that tacit knowledge is 
the conceptual link that connects the three elements of EBM (best 
available evidence, clinical experience, and patient preferences). 
In this sense, tacit knowledge enables the clinical judgment that 
informs decision-making about medical care (Thornton, 2006). 
The shift from a focus on explicit, scientific knowledge toward 
a more concerted effort to understand the ways in which differ-
ent kinds of knowledge are brought together has led to a stronger 
focus on the practice of clinical judgment in EBHC (Engebretsen, 
Vøllestad, Wahl, Robinson, & Heggen, 2015; Greenhalgh, Howick, 
& Maskrey, 2014). In this sense, expert clinical judgment occurs 
when “rule following gives way to expert judgments, characterized 
by rapid, intuitive reasoning informed by imagination, common 
sense, and judiciously selected research evidence”(Greenhalgh et 
al., 2014, p. 3). However, key questions about the ways in which 
these processes unfold still remain.
The literature summarized above on clinical judgment as a 
means to bring together tacit and explicit forms of knowledge pro-
vides the starting point for our work. There remains little empirical 
examination of the ways in which clinicians actually bring these 
forms of knowledge together in practice in physiotherapy, navigat-
ing the tension between (more explicit) standardized, evidence-
based principles and (more tacit) individualized, personalized 
approaches to care (Engebretsen et al., 2015). We help to address 
this gap with our phenomenological investigation into the practice 
of evidence-based physiotherapy.
Methodology
Methodology refers to the theory behind the method, including 
the study of what method to follow and why (van Manen, 1990). 
Our study was approached from a phenomenological perspective 
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and methodology (Finlay, 2009; van Manen, 2014). Before giving 
an account of the theoretical perspective and method, we provide a 
short presentation of the research context.
The current study is a sub study within a larger research pro-
gram the main purpose of which has been to develop a program 
of research and build capacity to investigate primary care1 physio-
therapy in Norway2. The regional committee for medical research 
ethics approved the project.
The aim of the present study was to examine what individually 
adapted physiotherapy is about. Specifically the aim was to gain insight 
into how physiotherapists experienced tailoring therapy to the indi-
vidual, and how patients experienced the therapy they receive. The 
participants (nine physiotherapists and nine patients) were recruited 
from five clinics in two parts of the country. The physiotherapist 
participants had several years of work experience, including settings 
of manual therapy, ergonomics, and other outpatient primary care. 
All participating patients suffered from long lasting neck problems, 
defined as muscle-skeletal problems that had lasted for more than 
one month (inclusion criteria set by the research program). In this 
chapter, we report findings from physiotherapist data only.
Phenomenological perspective
The phenomenological perspective for this study was informed by 
the work of Merleau-Ponty (2005), which entails seeing human 
1 Primary care physiotherapy involves physiotherapy provided at municipal level by 
either a private or public practitioner.
2 The program has three main aims: 1. through research create new knowledge 
about clinical practice. 2. through the development and testing in clinical prac-
tice establish methods and tools for systematic and standardized recording of data, 
relevant for clinical practice. 3 through testing different models of cooperation 
between clinicians in primary care and researchers create a basis for enduring col-
laboration environments. 
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existence as a personal, relational and always situated bodily exis-
tence. Of particular significance is the recognition that we both are 
and have a body -- which means that we always are both subject 
and object, never either /or. This duality and ambiguity of our exis-
tence in the world is described by Nancy as an existence of always 
being “singular plural”. He writes: “Being cannot be anything but 
being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as the with of 
this singularly plural coexistence” (Nancy, 2000, p. 3). In line with 
Nancy, Merleau-Ponty (2005, p. 530) has stated: “Man is but a net-
work of relationships, and these alone matter to him(sic)”.
Within a phenomenological perspective, the only way to under-
stand the function of the living body is by enacting it oneself. 
As bodily beings situated in a physical and social world, it is always 
the body that understands and experiences meaning (Merleau-
Ponty, 2005). Merleau-Ponty (2005, p. 213) names as “ready-
made-meanings” the dominant ways different phenomena are 
understood and talked about within a certain society and culture at 
certain times. Such “ready-made-meanings” are pre-understand-
ings, the discourses that constitute the general understandings of a 
phenomenon at a defined historical time and place – for instance 
the phenomenon of evidence-based practice is from a health-
political perspective considered representing what is best practice.
Method
Phenomenology is best suited to investigating meaningful aspects 
of lived experience (van Manen, 2014). When examining lived 
experience, the intent is to explore directly the originary or pre-
reflective dimensions of human existence from a first-person 
perspective. In order to produce knowledge from a first-person 
perspective, specifically, experiences of practicing physiotherapy, 
the researcher (first author) had to be with physiotherapists in 
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their practice and to talk with them. The study data were gener-
ated based on 16 close observations of the enactment of physio-
therapy care, and interviews with nine physiotherapists and nine of 
the patients/ persons seeking their help.
One-to-one interviews were conducted with physiotherapists 
and patient participants in separate rooms at the physiotherapy 
clinics. They were audio recorded and later transcribed into writ-
ten text. The interviewer’s intention was to follow the descrip-
tion of empathic interviewing (Fontana & Frey, 2005) and that of 
conversational interviewing (van Manen, 1990). Both empathic 
and conversational interviewing emphasize partnership between 
the interviewer and the interviewee as a fundamental condition. 
During the interviews, the interviewer aspired to be open and 
interested in what the participants said and to encourage them to 
reflect on those experiences. Since the interviews and transcrip-
tions are in Norwegian, the first author translated the excerpts 
from the interviews presented later into English.
During the close observations, the first author attempted to be 
present in the encounters as an interested party and without actively 
interrupting therapy. In writing notes after each observation, she 
sought to capture the lived experience of the observed situations 
rather than merely reporting what had been seen, done and/or said. 
The observations were conducted prior to the individual interviews 
with the physiotherapist and patient.
The phenomenon of practising evidence-
based physiotherapy
Our participants, and the data co-produced throughout the course 
of this study, pointed our analysis toward a particular kind of phe-
nomenology. We began the study acknowledging that we would 
phenomenologically focus on the role of the human body in the 
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incorporation (etymologically, to “bring into the body”) of stan-
dardized and personalized approaches to physiotherapy care. The 
tradition of work done by Maurice Merleau-Ponty was thus an 
obvious starting point. However, our findings encouraged us to 
move towards strands of phenomenology that even more explicitly 
examine the nature of inter-subjective experience and its relation-
ship to the being and knowing of each individual (and especially the 
work of Jean-Luc Nancy). In our case, the individual physiothera-
pist seeking to provide care in an evidence-based way is the individ-
ual in question; however, their experience of providing care cannot 
be separated from the “patient” co-constructing the care provided.
First example
The experience of Lynett conveys the importance of the inter-
subjective experience of enacting physiotherapy care. In her inter-
view, she demonstrated the ways in which she shifts her practices 
of knowing in order to better understand how “standardized” rules 
and guidelines (i.e., her explicit knowledge) relate to the individu-
alized human experiences of her patients. This shift represents the 
lived experience, always constructed inter-subjectively, of enacting 
evidence-based practice in real-life contexts of care.
When asked about how scientific knowledge is important for the 
quality of care in physiotherapy, Lynett interrupted to change the 
direction of the conversation:
Yes, [Lynett interrupted] – [But] I think it is a lot about communica-
tion -, to listen to the person, to get their picture and understanding of 
their own situation at the moment, to hear their story, their version is 
important. I have to understand how that specific person understands 
her or his own situation and also what they think might help – and 
what they hope for… And, and I, I spend a lot of time and effort to 
explain to the individual what I see, think, what I know about the 
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body, about such pain and the combination of symptoms displayed. It 
is important; both to listen and to explain.
In this quotation, Lynett conveys the interactive nature of knowing 
as a tacit, lived experience in the enactment of physiotherapy care. 
Knowing, or the epistemology of evidence-based physiotherapy, is 
first and foremost (for Lynett) about establishing a communicative 
relationship with her patient. The sharing of explicit knowledge 
only arises after such a relationship is established. She continued 
explaining the importance of this communicative relationship with 
each patient through an example:
… Let me give an example. I have two patients, both women, same 
age and educational level and…. yes,… quite similar lives. Both had 
received the same surgical treatment for the same kind of knee injury. 
They both got the same post-operative follow-up program and home 
program. One of them has followed the home program and done the 
exercises recommended. The other has also followed the program, but 
felt it was so painful that she has taken it easy a bit more. How then – 
How, then, can I use the same approach with both of them?
Lynett explained that standardized approaches to care can only be 
understood within the context of the lived experiences of individ-
ual patients. Her explanation conveys more than a simple “patient-
centred approach”; it represents the basis of an epistemology of 
physiotherapy care.
Jenny Slatman (2014), who is both a physiotherapist and a phi-
losopher, holds that lived embodiment does not simply involve 
subjective and individual experiences of one’s body; rather, it con-
ditions the meaning of a shared world. She builds her argumen-
tation on the ideas of Merleau-Ponty (2005), who has posited 
the perceiving, experiencing body as always personal, relational 
and situated in inter-subjective arrangements (it is shared). 
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The  first-person perspective is itself constituted and conditioned 
by the inter-subjective world it discloses (Slatman, 2014). Slatman 
states that a first-person perspective on embodied experience can-
not be isolated from the Other’s view of one’s body. In the field of 
health care, and physiotherapy in particular, this is highly relevant. 
Just as Merleau-Ponty (2005) and Nancy both suggest, being can 
only be understood in relation to the other human experiences 
that provide our own individual experience with meaning. The 
epistemology of evidence-based physiotherapy, therefore, must be 
based on the primacy of the interpersonal realm as the foundation 
of being-in-the-world, and hence of engaging in a practice of any 
kind; or as Nancy (2000) suggests, on “being singular-plural”.
In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty (2005) sum-
marizes this latter point with his usual clarity and insight:
The phenomenological world is not a pure being, but the sense which 
is revealed where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and 
also where my own and other people’s intersect and engage each other 
like gears. It is thus inseparable from subjectivity and intersubjectivity, 
which find their unity when I either take up my past experiences in 
those of the present, or other people’s in my own ( p. xxii).
The central point to emphasize here is that in order to understand 
the ways in which physiotherapists reconcile tacit and explicit 
knowledge in the enactment of evidence-based physiotherapy, we 
must first understand the primacy of the intersubjective relationship 
between physiotherapist and patient. By the same logic, we must 
think more critically about traditional humanist approaches to 
care delivery (Todres, 2007), which take the individual experi-
ence of the patient as their starting point. Knowledge (both tacit 
and explicit) is the presence of meaning, and as Nancy explains, 
“there is no meaning if meaning is not shared… meaning itself 
is the sharing of being” (Nancy, 2000, p. 2). Any understanding 
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of knowledge as it is mobilized in the physiotherapy encounter 
must therefore be built upon this fundamental recognition. We 
now turn to explore the second example, where we gained further 
insight into the centrality of this intersubjective grounding for 
the reconciliation of standardized knowledge with individualized 
approaches to care.
Second example
This example is based on the observations and interview with 
Catherina. Catherina had been observed in action in three treat-
ment sessions with three different patients. In each observation she 
appeared to be engaging in similar treatment techniques, and was 
asked about this in her interview.
Interviewer: I have observed three treatment sessions today and in 
a way it seems that you have used a quite similar approach in these 
three encounters?
Catherina: It, it builds on the experience, on clinical experience [She 
pauses briefly and adds] one has to find one’s way...
Interviewer: Even if similar - there was one difference that I particu-
larly noticed today. It was, with the last person; during this session, 
you asked more than you did of the others - asked this man “how it 
was” etc.
Catherina: Yes, yes [pause], it was his feedback. It was very, there 
have been very – it took a really long time before I got him. I felt he 
did not believe in what we were doing.
Interviewer: How do you notice that?
Catherina: I have to concentrate – try to capture tensions,  responses – 
how what we do is to the actual person – is it Ok, is it uncomfortable, 
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or... Sometimes I may ask a bit too much – but it’s – it is sort of to get 
confirmation [pause]. With him I was not sure....
Interviewer: I see [pause]. Research does exist that says something 
about what is recommended as best treatment for people with dif-
ferent diagnoses, ailments and disabilities?
Catherina: Yes, of course but, I must adapt and dose differently – 
must take into account the individual. It is not – by all means – I do 
not do the same thing even though people have the same functional 
problem or medical diagnosis. Even if it might look quite similar.
In this excerpt Catherina emphasizes communication. In this 
sense, communication implies listening and explaining (as Lynette 
explained previously) and also the wordless communication in 
touching and moving expressed by Catherina. She tries to “capture 
tensions, responses” that help her to better understand the meaning 
that is co-created between physiotherapist and patient as they both 
engage in the encounter. This is an inter-corporal communication; 
an inter-bodily communication in which she seems to be ready to 
change and try new ways of doing therapy with individual patients 
according to their response at the moment. Her experiences and 
reflections show how therapy is always enacted in the present and 
constantly co-created between therapist and patient. In order to get 
in touch with her patient she has to concentrate to attune to her 
patient, and to be ready to change and improvise in her therapy.
The implicit improvisation described by Catherina here, and 
echoed by other physiotherapists in this study, represents a form 
of reflective practice. Such reflective practices has been addressed 
in a variety of fields, including education, management and phys-
iotherapy (Sommerro, Steinsholt, & Juul, 2006). In improvisation, 
each person is viewed as unique and with his or her own specific 
potentials that become actualized during the encounter. Each indi-
vidual’s potentials are seen not only as valuable, but as decisively 
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important for the collective in the actual context – in this case, 
between physiotherapist and patient as they enact physiotherapy 
care (Sommerro et al., 2006).
The physiotherapists in this study emphasized the importance 
of what one (Thomas) called “getting in touch with” one another, 
in order to create common ground and an atmosphere in which a 
therapy process can develop and flourish. This “getting in touch” 
or “getting on board” as Thomas explained it, demands that the 
physiotherapist use more than explicit knowledge (i.e., from guide-
lines and experimental research). These types of explicit knowledge, 
generally applicable only to populations of patients as opposed to 
individuals, cannot be simply and linearly adopted in the encoun-
ter with an individual patient. Another physiotherapist participant 
(Georg) labelled this type of explicit knowledge “frameworks”, sug-
gesting that a different kind of knowledge is necessary to actually 
transform a framework so that it is useful with a given patient at a 
given time.
Discussion and conclusion: What this 
study revealed
Physiotherapists use explicit knowledge primarily as a frame-
work for thinking about assessment and intervention; however, 
it is the inter-subjective, communicative practice of being-with-
another from which the therapeutic encounter draws its power. It 
is this being-with-another that enables the physiotherapist to adapt 
abstract, explicit knowledge for the individual with whom they are 
co-constructing physiotherapy care. In this concluding section, we 
provide summative comments on the “bringing together” of these 
forms of knowledge in the constitution of physiotherapy practice, 
and provide a call for further attention to ways of better understanding 
what it means for physiotherapy to be “evidence-based”.
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In learning to be a physiotherapist, and through practising one’s 
profession physiotherapists refine and develop their professional 
skills – this means developing embodied knowledge that in differ-
ent ways transforms their relation to the world. This is a knowl-
edge-based transformation that becomes incorporated into the 
habitual body and opens up the way for refined and/or new possi-
bilities of acting at a pre-reflective level: knowing what to do in the 
moment, knowing when to change. “The acquisition of habit” is a 
“rearrangement and renewal of the corporeal schema”. It is “…. the 
grasping of a significance, … it is a motor grasping of motor signif-
icance”. Habit is “knowledge in the hands”, and it is only forthcom-
ing “when bodily effort is made, and which cannot be formulated in 
detachment from that effort” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, pp. 164-166). 
Human understanding is thus embodied understanding. The 
two examples presented reveal how reasoning in physiotherapy 
is a bodily activity based on theoretical knowledge, feelings, and 
embodied habitual physiotherapy knowledge. It is about signify-
ing the inter-corporal experiences in-between physiotherapist and 
patient.
The primary implication of this work for the practical effort to 
improve physiotherapy practice and enhance physiotherapy educa-
tion is this: The profession must acknowledge that standards (such 
as evidence-based guidelines) are useful as frameworks, but that the 
most important knowledge necessary to bring those frameworks to 
life lies in the encounter between physiotherapist and patient. This 
encounter gives explicit reason grounding in tacit, embodied lived 
experience. The inter-connections between the three components 
of evidence-based practice (best available research evidence, clini-
cal experience, and patient preferences) remain largely ignored in 
the literature on this topic. In this chapter, we have begun to unravel 
the ways in which physiotherapists leverage embodied, relational 
knowledge-as-practice as they bring these three components 
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together. Importantly, as we have argued throughout, the “bring-
ing together” of these three components of evidence-based practice 
constitute a distinct form of practice. These are not simply three 
distinct ways of working in the world, but constitute instead a new, 
unified practice. As Gendlin (2004) might say, the physiotherapy 
encounter is an “unseparated multiplicity”. Van Manen (2007) 
summarized nicely what we believe physiotherapy as a profession 
must come to understand:
What distinguishes practice from theory is not that practice applies 
thought or concepts technically to some real thing in the world upon 
which it acts. Rather, the phenomenology of practice involves a dif-
ferent way of knowing the world. Whereas theory “thinks” the world, 
practice “grasps” the world – it grasps the world pathically (p. 20).
There is still very much work to be done to understand how 
physiotherapists grasp the world and how they might become 
more sensitive and attentive in doing so. We have provided a 
starting point for thinking phenomenologically about evi-
dence-based practice and the incorporation of different forms 
of knowledge into practice, in the context of the encounter 
between physiotherapist and patient. We encourage other phe-
nomenologically-inclined researchers to further explore the 
practice of the physiotherapy profession, engaging in the effort 
to produce a physiotherapy that is grounded in an understand-
ing of lived-experience, and that gains inspiration from a variety 
of ways of knowing.
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Abstract
Physiotherapy practice aims to optimize movement in order to 
improve functional abilities within peoples’ lives. Effective com-
munication between patient and therapist is central to achieving 
these aims. The biopsychosocial model and patient-centred care 
are two established approaches to health communication and are 
promoted as frameworks to inform physiotherapy practice. In this 
chapter, we use empirically derived examples of communication in 
practice to explore whether and how these approaches are related 
to communication in physiotherapy. We draw data from two sepa-
rate qualitative studies of communicative interactions in primary 
practice physiotherapy settings. Findings from these two studies 
demonstrated that physiotherapy  clinical  communication is struc-
tured and physiotherapist-directed, and is adaptive and responsive 
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to the needs of the individual patient. Although communica-
tion was structured and clinically orientated, findings suggested 
that adaptations such as casual conversation, humour, and touch 
acted as subtle mediating forces. Such communicative adaptations 
represented dynamic, interpretive, and relational components 
occurring in patient-physiotherapist interactions. These findings 
contrast with descriptions of patient-centred and biopsychosocial 
approaches to communication which focus on how communica-
tion should explicitly include the patient’s perspective. Our discus-
sion provides possible explanations for the apparent discrepancy 
between theory and practice of communication in physiotherapy. 
Taken together, the studies highlight a need for further research 
examining physiotherapy communication processes to generate 
interactional theories that both represent and frame physiotherapy 
clinical communication.
Introduction
A recognised tenet and philosophy of physiotherapy practice is that 
all aspects of treatment are grounded in and guided by relevant the-
ory and available evidence (Hills & Kitchen, 2007; Moseley, Herbert, 
Sherrington & Maher, 2002; Trede & Higgs, 2009). This ideal extends 
to the communicative processes and deliberative thinking required 
for clinical reasoning, and ethical and reflective communication. 
Theories and evidence about skills, knowledge, and values inherent 
in physiotherapy practice provide conceptual explanations of how 
and why procedures and treatment paradigms work (Reeves, Albert, 
Kuper & Hodges, 2008). Similarly, theories of communication in 
physiotherapy should help practitioners to clarify how, when, and in 
what format, to obtain information from a patient and how to give 
information, advice, educational material, and support back to the 
patient (Schiavo, 2007).
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To continue to advance understanding and practice in health 
communication applied to physiotherapy, a mix of inductive 
(derived from actual practice) and deductive (derived from 
a research base or philosophical theory) analysis is required 
(Schiavo, 2007). This chapter has four main sections. We begin by 
presenting findings from research about communication occur-
ring in the private practice patient-physiotherapist encounter 
that were largely inductively derived. Second, we present key 
features of two established theoretical approaches to commu-
nication: the patient-centred and biopsychosocial approaches. 
Third, we analyse whether and how our empirical findings relate 
to these theoretical approaches and discuss likely reasons for 
the resultant discrepancies. Finally, our conclusions highlight 
the need for theoretically-driven work regarding the specifics of 
optimal communication in physiotherapy practice.
Communication is integral to physiotherapy 
practice
Communication is included as one of the core professional com-
petencies in physiotherapy codes of conduct (Health & Care 
Professions Council, 2013; Physiotherapy Board of Australia, 2014; 
WCPT, 2011). Through their communicative interactions, physio-
therapists can educate, motivate, empower or disempower, express 
empathy or authority, demonstrate interest, and build trust (Hiller, 
2017). Physiotherapists’ processes of questioning can direct the 
amount and type of information they obtain about a person’s condi-
tion and circumstances and facilitate or impede patients’ capacities 
to express what matters to them about their health and wellbeing 
(Afrell & Rudebeck, 2010).
The process of communication between therapist and patient 
is increasingly recognised as therapeutic in itself, because of its 
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potential to directly influence patient outcomes (Hall, Ferreira, 
Maher, Latimer, & Ferreira, 2010; Jeffels & Foster, 2003; Klaber 
Moffett & Richardson, 1997). For example, there is growing 
research interest in the effects of particular communicative tech-
niques, such as motivational interviewing and counselling, on 
outcomes of physiotherapy treatment (Lonsdale et al., 2012; 
O’Sullivan, 2012). Studies have also shown that patients perceive 
that therapists’ communicative capacity is a pivotal characteristic 
of good physiotherapy (Cooper, Smith, & Hancock, 2008; Potter, 
Gordon & Hamer, 2003).
Two studies of communication in 
physiotherapy
The studies presented in this chapter draw from two PhD 
projects (Delany, 2005; Hiller, 2017) that examined how phys-
iotherapists communicate with their patients. The studies were 
independently conducted (12 years apart). Both collected audio-
recordings of the one-on-one communication between patients 
and physiotherapists in primary practice treatment settings in 
Australia. Although some aspects of these studies have been 
published (see Hiller, Guillemin, & Delany, 2015; Hiller, 2017; 
Delany, 2005), the research findings have not previously been 
combined.
Study 1 (completed in 2005) investigated how physiotherapists 
provide information to their patients and obtain their informed 
consent to treatment (Delany, 2005). The data comprised seven-
teen transcripts of audiotaped treatment encounters and inter-
views with the participating physiotherapists. Recording and 
analysing the communication was conducted using an interpre-
tivist methodology (Packer & Addison, 1989). The focus was on 
how physiotherapy communication in the private practice setting 
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reflects the ethical ideal of communication that respects a patient’s 
autonomy.
The aims of study 2 (completed in 2016) were to describe com-
munication occurring in practice and to compare findings with 
established approaches to healthcare communication (Hiller 
et al., 2015; Hiller, 2017). Drawing from the same interpretivist 
framework, study 2 used aspects of ethnographic and grounded 
theory methodologies and incorporated observations and audio-
recordings of 52 patient-physiotherapist consultations. Data were 
analysed inductively with steps involving transcription, data cod-
ing, memo-writing, and concept mapping described by Braun and 
Clarke (2007) and Charmaz (2006).
Ethics approval for both studies was granted by the Human 
Research Ethics Sub-committee at the University of Melbourne: 
ethics ID DPH 1/2003 (study 1) and ethics ID1238974 (study 
2). Informed consent was obtained from all participants in both 
studies. These two studies had similar methods but different 
aims. We, the authors, met several times to compare and con-
trast the findings of each study. Our analysis of these findings 
highlighted strikingly similar patterns of communication occur-
ring in physiotherapy private practice. These patterns included:
•  A consistent and repeatable structure of communication transi-
tioning through phases of the treatment session;
•  an overall tone of directiveness on the part of the therapist, and 
prominence of the physiotherapist’s agenda;
•  a level of responsiveness and preparedness to adjust to the indi-
vidual patient to facilitate understanding and build rapport.
Table 1 presents the key themes derived during analysis of the 
audio-recorded observational data from each study that are then 
explained in the text.
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Table 1: Findings from studies of physiotherapy communication
Study Theme Explanation and interpretation 
Study 1 
(2005)
Structured 
communication: 
“building fences”
•   Content and focus was consistent across treatments
•   Consistent and recognisable communicative 
structure that correlates to descriptions of clinical 
reasoning patterns
•   Physiotherapists communicated as an 
authoritative, problem-solving and/or helping 
figure
•   Assumption from the therapist that the patient will 
comply
•   The metaphor of building a fence represents the 
idea that the therapist was separate to the patient 
as evidenced by a clear and consistent pattern and 
structure to their communication 
Gaps in the fence •  Gaps existed in this communicative structure
•   Physiotherapists attended to cues from each 
patient by watching and listening during 
conversations
•   Intuitive reasoning or personal judgement was 
used by physiotherapists to respond to individual 
patients 
Study 2 
(2017) 
Physiotherapist-
led 
communication
•  Physiotherapists provided a consistent structure
•   Physiotherapists provided communicative 
direction
•  Physiotherapists made decisions
•   Content consistently focussed on physical aspects 
and pain
Adapting to 
build rapport
•   Physiotherapists intuitively adjusted elements of 
communication for individual patients, including:
- Body language and eye contact
- Touch
- Casual conversation
- Humour
•   Our interpretation was that communication was 
often adapted in order to build rapport with 
patients
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The theme “structured communication: building fences” from 
study 1 depicted the consistent patterns of communication occur-
ring in patient-physiotherapist encounters. Physiotherapists 
directed the biomedically focused content of communication 
and used a consistent structure as described by Jones, Jensen, 
and Rothstein (1995). A key feature of the structured approach 
was methodically gathering information to form hypotheses, and 
to continue to test those hypotheses. The language used in this 
approach reflected objectivity and precision and often included 
short, closed questions from the therapist with similarly short 
responses from the patient. This communicative approach has also 
been found in other authors’ descriptions of the communicative 
and cognitive processes of clinical reasoning (Jensen, Shepard & 
Hack, 1990; Parry, 2004; Talvitie & Reunanen, 2002).
The structured pattern is evident in the following example:
Physiotherapist: What sort of pain?
Patient: Um, it’s like a sharp pain.
Physiotherapist: Is it there all the time?
Patient: No. Umm.
Physiotherapist: So it just comes back?
Patient: Sort of when I twist, when I’m twisting or moving.
Physiotherapist: Twisting and moving?
Patient: Yeah.
 (Study 1, treatment encounter 5)
An overall message of expertise, authority, and certainty was 
conveyed through the physiotherapists’ structured communica-
tion. There was also a corresponding, but largely unstated assump-
tion that the patients would comply with the therapist’s agenda. 
This pattern is demonstrated in the following example:
 Physiotherapist: Alright. Then. You have come to the move-
ment…test. So I would like to look at your middle back first.
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Patient: Mmm.
 Physiotherapist: If you would like to put your hand like this. 
Right. Is there any pain?
Patient: No.
 Physiotherapist: Okay. Try and keep your elbows together, and 
try to point it up towards the ceiling. That’s good.
Patient: I’m feeling it sort of now.
Physiotherapist: Try and go a bit further. There, okay?
Patient: Yep.
 Physiotherapist: How about trying to touch your opposite shoul-
der with your elbow. Does that still hurt?
Patient: No, that feels fine.
Physiotherapist: Elbows out like this. Try to turn. Anything?
Patient: No.
 (Study 1, treatment encounter 8)
A second theme about communication in study 1 was the idea 
of communication breaks, or “gaps in the (communication) fence”. 
These were described as subtle gaps in the structured communica-
tion occurring between patient and therapist. Physiotherapists incor-
porated strategies such as watching and pausing to listen in order to 
perceive patients’ level of comfort, engagement and reactions during 
treatment sessions. Subtle changes in communication, such as the 
use of open questions, were used to tailor the interaction to the indi-
vidual patient and to allow an opportunity for the patient to incorpo-
rate their agenda. Physiotherapists, however, rarely directly asked the 
patients for their opinion or perception, and they controlled almost 
all the gaps and adjustments in the communication fence.
The example below demonstrates one of these gaps. It included 
an open question from the physiotherapist that was then followed 
by space for the patient to answer. This extract is characterized by 
pauses that suggest the physiotherapist was listening and encouraging 
the patient to elaborate.
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Physiotherapist: How have you been since last week?
 Patient: Well after my workout with you, that night it was terrible, I 
got home and I, before I went to bed, I did those…the exercises and 
might have done it too much, I’m just not sure…um, you know…and 
that was a bad night, but then the night before last I found I could lie 
on my side.... And whenever I think of it I’m doing my tummy pull-
ing, but I found that very difficult to do.... I’m thinking of it.
Physiotherapist: Good….
Patient: You, know. I’m thinking of my posture a lot more too.
 Physiotherapist: Well done. It will probably get easier to do it 
when you’re doing activities as well and I guess it’s, as much as 
anything it’s almost on the return from bending over that you 
need to draw the tummy in to support the spine.
 (Study 1, treatment encounter 14)
The process of creating gaps in the fence by adjusting the routine 
structure seemed to represent a way of providing a space for the 
patient to speak more. It was a technique commonly used by par-
ticipants in the study.
Two central themes were also developed in study 2. The 
theme “physiotherapist-led communication” encapsulated how 
physiotherapists directed many aspects of communication. 
Physiotherapists were observed as creating a consistent structure to 
the treatment session that involved an initial greeting, conversation 
about the presenting problem, physical assessment, treatment and 
education, and finally, closure. Within this structured interaction, 
physiotherapists further directed the communication by initiating 
conversation, asking predominantly closed questions, sometimes 
interrupting or redirecting communication, and using biomedical 
language. In addition, physiotherapists made almost all decisions 
that were communicated during treatment encounters. Such deci-
sions included: goals of treatment, type and amount of treatment, 
home exercise programs, and when the patient should return for 
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their next appointment. As an example, in the following extract, 
the physiotherapist set goals, and made decisions about the patient’s 
exercises, home activities, and when he should return for further 
treatment.
 Physiotherapist: So your goals for me mainly are  – to add another 
day of walking.
Patient: Yeah.
Physiotherapist: Continue doing the exercises.
Patient: Yeah.
 Physiotherapist: Um… and… yeah and we’ll touch base in the 
new year and see how your back is feeling then. And I also want 
you to keep an eye on how the mornings are going.
Patient: Yeah.
(Study 2, treatment encounter 40)
The physiotherapist-led communication theme also incorporated 
a consistent focus on pain and biological aspects of patient con-
ditions. The following example demonstrates a physiotherapist 
repeatedly asking closed questions about pain.
Physiotherapist: Pain here when I touch?
Patient: Not much, no.
Physiotherapist: Not much? What about here?
Patient: Nup.
Physiotherapist: Is that pain now?
Patient: A little bit, not much.
Physiotherapist: But if I touch here there is pain?
Patient: Yep (slightly pained).
Physiotherapist: Okay, it’s the muscle.
(Study 2, treatment encounter 1)
These transcript extracts also demonstrate how physiotherapists 
directed the communication by initiating all questions and conversa-
tion, with the patient generally providing short responses.
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The second central theme from study 2, “adapting to build 
rapport”, depicted many elements of communication occurring 
during patient-physiotherapist encounters that were respon-
sive to the needs of individual patients – and appeared to 
be aimed at developing rapport. For example, touch was adapted 
through adjustments in therapist hand positions, rhythm, and 
pressure during manual treatment. In the following transcript 
example, the physiotherapist’s touch adapted to the patient’s 
cues.
 Patient: Ah he he he he (laughing)… Ohhh that’s really sore 
(in a pained expression) ah he. So um.
 Physiotherapist: Very gentle (hands observed to soften and slow 
in response).
 Patient: Thank… Yes you are [name of physiotherapist]. Ah he 
he. I just know my, my um, muscles are sensitive…. As I said I 
wouldn’t come back if I didn’t have full confidence with you… 
and I know in the end it feels better in the long run you know. 
Ah he he.
Physiotherapist: Ah (slight smile).
(Study 2, treatment encounter 17)
In addition, a form of “caring” touch, such as a rubbing the patient’s 
shoulder, was observed to be incorporated by physiotherapists as 
an adaptive form of communication that conveyed empathy.
Observations also established that physiotherapists: changed 
their body positions to reflect and accommodate those of their 
patients; engaged or disengaged eye-contact regularly, depend-
ing on perceived patient comfort; engaged in casual, social con-
versation with patients; and incorporated humour. Patients, in 
turn, adjusted their communication in response to physiotherapists, 
using their body positions, head nodding and notably, humour, to 
demonstrate their engagement and position within the encounter. 
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These communicative tools were dynamically included in treat-
ment encounters between patients and physiotherapists in con-
junction with the physiotherapist-led aspects of communication.
The similarities in how therapists communicate with their 
patients derived from these two studies are significant, given that 
they were conducted a decade apart and with different overall study 
goals. The themes “structured communication: building fences” 
and “physiotherapist-led communication” highlight a therapist-
controlled communication style that has also been captured in 
other studies. For example, research from Denmark and the United 
Kingdom demonstrated that decisions within treatment sessions 
are made by physiotherapists with minimal patient involvement 
(Dierckx, Deveugele, Roosen, & Devisch, 2013; Jones et al., 2014). 
Other communication research has shown that physiotherapists 
drive goal-setting processes (Parry, 2004); talk twice as much as 
patients (Roberts & Bucksey, 2007); use closed questions (Cruz, 
Moore, & Cross, 2012; Opsommer & Schoeb, 2014); focus predom-
inantly on pain and understanding the clinical condition (Cruz et 
al., 2012; Opsommer & Schoeb, 2014); and limit incorporation of 
the patient perspective (Josephson & Bülow, 2014; Opsommer & 
Schoeb, 2014).
The communicative dominance of physiotherapists, however, 
is complemented by another strong finding of “adaptation” (study 
2) and “gaps in the fence” (study 1). These findings suggest that 
nuanced communicative approaches are also occurring within 
patient-physiotherapist encounters. Despite being led by the 
physiotherapist, the interaction contains dynamic, interpretive, 
and relational components. While the structured clinical orien-
tation of the communication acts to control the overall direction 
of the communication, there are subtle mediating forces at work. 
These forces or influences include the use of casual conversation 
and humour, and the use of touch not only as a form of therapy, 
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but also to convey interest, care, and attention. The findings of 
these two studies portrayed physiotherapy communication as 
a combination of structured, directed, negotiated, and adaptive 
interactions. There is, however, a need for further research to 
examine therapists’ explanations of these styles and their impact 
on patients.
Other research has similarly highlighted an often tacit, 
but responsive aspect in physiotherapy clinical communi-
cation (Bjorbaekmo & Mengshoel, 2016; Tasker, Loftus, & 
Higgs, 2011; Thornquist, 1991). Tasker and colleagues (2011) 
explain how casual conversation and active listening are used 
to develop responsive relationships between patient and phys-
iotherapist in the community setting. The responsive nature of 
physiotherapists’ communication is also clearly demonstrated 
in the work of Bjorbaekmo and Mengshoel (2016) who describe 
the types and impact of touch in the therapuetic encounter. 
Thornquist (1991) described physiotherapists’ use of eye gaze 
to convey interest in  each patient and to inform the constant 
adjustments made to  both patient and therapists’ body posi-
tions in  physiotherapy consultations. In conjunction with our 
results,  these findings affirm that an adaptive, responsive com-
ponent exists within  patient-physiotherapist communication. 
Tasker and colleagues (2011) emphasise that this responsiveness 
creates a  human  connection, or rapport, between patient and 
therapist.
Unlike these studies where the authors attributed a particular 
purpose to therapists’ communication, the key question this chap-
ter seeks to address is how our empirical findings relate to, or are 
represented by, prominent approaches to healthcare communica-
tion. In the second half of this chapter, we detail some of the main 
features of patient-centred and biopsychosocial approaches to 
enable this analysis.
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Key features of biopsychosocial and 
patient-centred theoretical approaches to 
communication
In physiotherapy, as in other healthcare professions, patient- centred 
and biopsychosocial approaches are established as the guiding 
frameworks for how practitioners and patients should communi-
cate with their patients (Pinto et al., 2012; Sanders, Foster, Bishop & 
Ong, 2013). A biopsychosocial approach to healthcare is premised 
on the idea that poor health or physical dysfunction is not only 
grounded in a physical problem, but is influenced by a person’s 
feelings, their ideas about health and events and circumstances in 
their lives (Engel, 1977). Extrapolated to health communication, 
a biopsychosocial approach requires a practitioner to incorporate 
biological, social, and psychological factors when assessing, diag-
nosing, providing treatment, and interacting with their patient 
(Engel, 1978; Epstein et al., 2003). Each of these three inter-related 
components of communication should be purposefully included 
and integrated within clinical interactions. Roter and colleagues 
(1997) described biopsychosocial communication as evidenced 
by a practitioner including more social talk and fewer practitioner 
questions in order to achieve some balance between psychosocial 
and biomedical content. More recently, Smith and colleagues 
(2013) suggested that the use of open-ended questions illustrates 
this approach in practice.
The patient-centred approach to communication is closely 
related to the biopsychosocial approach. Overarching features are 
that communication is explicitly used to share information and 
responsibility, reduce perceived power differences and incorpo-
rate the needs and perspectives of individual patients (Bensing, 
2000; Mead & Bower, 2000). Within a patient-centred approach, 
communication is used to demonstrate respect for, and inclusion 
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of, each individual patient’s knowledge and experience (Bensing, 
2000; Byrne & Long, 1976). Being patient-centred requires the use 
of communicative strategies to elicit and incorporate the patient’s 
narrative and experiences to inform and shape the encounter 
(Epstein & Street, 2011). Decisions about care are shared and the 
patient-practitioner relationship is viewed as a collaborative alli-
ance. Specific communicative features include the use of open-
ended and non-directive questions; including and responding to 
emotional aspects of a person’s experience; and avoiding interrupt-
ing patients (Epstein & Street, 2011; Grol, de Maeseneer, Whitfield, 
& Mokkink, 1990; Mead & Bower, 2000; Smith, Fortin, Dwamena 
& Frankel, 2013; Winefield, Murrell, Clifford, & Farmer, 1996).
Does communication in physiotherapy 
practice align with the biopsychosocial and 
patient-centred approaches?
Physiotherapy literature and codes of conduct suggest phys-
iotherapists should aspire to incorporate biopsychosocial and 
patient-centred approaches into their clinical communicative prac-
tice (National Physiotherapy Advisory Group, 2009; Physiotherapy 
Board of Australia, 2014; Pinto et al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2013). 
One interpretation of the research findings presented in this chap-
ter is that this may not be explicitly and purposefully happening. 
The findings demonstrated a distinct communicative focus on 
the biomedical aspects of a patient’s presenting problem: thera-
pists paid little overt attention to psychosocial aspects of their 
patients’ condition or experience. Physiotherapists also controlled 
the communication by using closed questions, initiating conver-
sations, interrupting patients and making decisions. These phys-
iotherapist-directed styles of communication and the biomedical 
focus align more closely with practitioner-centred and biomedical 
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approaches than biopsychosocial and patient-centred approaches 
to health communication. Documented communication features 
of a patient-centred approach such as open questions, minimal 
interruptions, and shared decision making (Bensing, 2000), were 
not overtly incorporated into observed physiotherapy treatment 
encounters. Other scholars of physiotherapy communication have 
also reached similar conclusions about the predominance of com-
munication that represents biomedical and practitioner-centred 
approaches (Cruz et al., 2012; Josephson, Woodward-Kron, Delany, 
& Hiller, 2015; Opsommer & Schoeb, 2014).
The data did, however, demonstrate the presence of adaptive 
or responsive communication. This style of communication is 
closer to a patient-centred approach because it involves adjusting 
to the perceived needs of the individual patient, although these 
adaptations did not derive from the patient’s perspective. Rather, 
the key function of adaptive communication seemed to be 
instrumental, that is, to build rapport between patient and ther-
apist. This focus distinguishes adaptive communication from a 
patient-centred approach where the communication content and 
direction should draw from the patient’s stated needs. Touch and 
other forms of non-verbal communication were prominent fea-
tures of adaptive communication (particularly in study 2), and 
are not documented as features of biopsychosocial or patient-
centred theories.
Why is there a discrepancy between 
communication theory and communication 
in practice?
Research demonstrates that physiotherapists find biopsychosocial 
and patient-centred approaches difficult to implement in practice 
(Mudge, Stretton, & Kayes, 2013; Sanders et al., 2013; Singla, Jones, 
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Edwards, & Kumar, 2015). Studies have shown that physiothera-
pists recognise and acknowledge the need to incorporate patients’ 
perspectives and psychosocial factors and understand broad fea-
tures of both patient-centred and biopsychosocial approaches 
(Hiller, 2017; Sanders et al., 2013; Singla et al., 2015). Despite this 
awareness, however, how to practically integrate these elements 
remains elusive, and physiotherapists’ “fall back” position is to 
focus on biomedical aspects of a patient’s presenting condition 
(Mudge, Stretton, & Kayes, 2013; Singla et al., 2015). The challenge 
of practical translation of these models resonates with previous cri-
tiques. For example, Cooper and colleagues (1996) suggested that 
there has been little theorisation regarding how the three domains 
within the biopsychosocial model might be integrated, including 
how they are relate to and influence each other, and whether they 
are regarded as equally valuable for each health encounter. Other 
authors have stated that the biopsychosocial approach is an ideol-
ogy and a vision for practice, rather than a clear clinical method 
(Epstein & Borrell-Carrio, 2005; McLaren, 1998). It is left to the 
health practitioner to determine how to include and combine each 
of the biological, social, and psychological dimensions.
Similarly, some critiques of patient centred care suggest it is 
a “fuzzy concept” that is poorly defined and therefore difficult 
to operationalize (Bensing, 2000, p. 21; Nolan et al., 2004). The 
patient-centred approach was derived from an impetus to shift 
away from medicalization toward individual personalization of 
medical care for each patient (May & Mead, 1999). Pulvirenti and 
colleagues (2011) suggest that if care is to be defined by a patient 
rather than by the health professional, patients will need active 
support and empowerment from practitioners. Interactive com-
ponents of patient centred care have been specified as: validation 
of the patient’s experience, consideration of their broader con-
text, working towards mutual understandings between the health 
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professional and patient and taking a partnership approach to the 
therapeutic encounter (Stewart et al., 2003). These more specific 
components, however, were not visible in the data presented in this 
chapter and have not been actively translated to physiotherapeutic 
theories that capture how to communicate with patients.
A second explanation for why there may be a discrepancy 
between communication theory and practice is that the physio-
therapy profession has focused on generating evidence and align-
ing their clinical practice techniques and outcomes of treatment 
with biomedical constructs (Chipchase et al., 2006). This biomedi-
cal and “practitioner as expert” focus, has permeated physiotherapy 
communication research which demonstrates that physiotherapists 
predominantly practice in a practitioner-centred manner. It is pos-
sible that physiotherapists have neglected to consider strategies 
that might help them understand the individual patient perspective 
and achieve psychosocial aspects of communication (Sanders et al., 
2013; Singla et al., 2015).
A further possible reason for the discrepancy between com-
munication practice and theory in physiotherapy is that both the 
patient-centred and biopsychosocial approaches were originally 
developed for medicine. A psychiatrist, Engel (1978), first formally 
described the biopsychosocial approach. He challenged the bio-
medical perception within medicine and proposed that social and 
psychological aspects of each patient be incorporated into medi-
cal practice and communication alongside the biological content 
(Engel, 1978).
Despite the obvious similarities between medicine and physio-
therapy as healthcare professions aiming to alleviate pain and other 
symptoms, aspects of physiotherapy communicative practice differ 
considerably from its medical counterpart. For example, physio-
therapists use touch as a responsive and central communicative tool 
(Nicholls & Holmes, 2012), and this is notably different from medical 
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practice. Used as a form of communication in physiotherapy, touch 
can assist understanding, perception of, and preparation for move-
ment; demonstrate care; and form a core part of treatment and 
education (Roger et al., 2002). In physiotherapy, touch establishes a 
physical relationship that has been described as a sensitive, respon-
sive, and expressive bodily conversation (Bjorbækmo & Mengshoel, 
2016; Poulis, 2007; Roberts & Bucksey, 2007).
The significance of touch and other types of physiotherapy-spe-
cific communication, including extensive education and advice, and 
the reliance on active patient involvement (Poulis, 2007), means that 
any discussion and analysis of communication in physiotherapy 
should include these interactional dimensions.
Conclusions
This chapter has compared physiotherapy communication as it 
occurs in physiotherapy treatment encounters, with two com-
mon theoretical approaches to healthcare communication: the 
biopsychosocial model and patient-centred care. These two 
established approaches emphasise the importance of shifting tra-
ditional provider authority from the practitioner to the patient 
and the need to incorporate each patient’s perspective and pref-
erences within communication exchanges. These focuses were 
not evident in our studies, conducted in physiotherapy private 
practice settings. Instead, our findings demonstrated that despite 
physiotherapists being responsive and open to include a patient’s 
individual needs and concerns, the dominant model of interac-
tion was a practitioner-centred approach. Although the phys-
iotherapy profession supports the ideals of patient- centred and 
biopsychosocial approaches (National Physiotherapy Advisory 
Group, 2009; Physiotherapy Board of Australia, 2014), our 
findings suggest that therapists’ approaches to treatment and 
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communication (in the primary practice setting) are firmly 
grounded in biomedical models of practice.
Our aim in this chapter has been to stimulate further debate and 
discussion and promote an interest in theorising physiotherapy com-
munication. The features, goals, and styles of physiotherapy commu-
nication need to be thoroughly described and analysed to examine 
possibilities for physiotherapy-specific adaptation of biopsychoso-
cial or patient-centred approaches, or alternative approaches that 
capture the distinct communicative goals of physiotherapy treat-
ment. The findings lead to questions that future research should 
address. These questions include: How is physiotherapy commu-
nication used to educate, motivate, empower, disempower, express 
empathy, authority, humility, and interest in a range of clinical situ-
ations? How effective are physiotherapy communication strategies 
according to patients? What type of communication theory could 
frame and support the practice of communication in physiotherapy 
professional practice?
The comparison between communication in theory and in 
practice in this chapter also provides opportunities for physiother-
apy educators to consider how other behavioural and social sci-
ence theories (many of which are discussed in this book, see also 
Schiavo, 2007) might be used to frame and clarify the goals and 
strategies of communication.
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Abstract
There is frequent messaging in scientific and popular discussions that 
point to a childhood “obesity epidemic” worldwide. There have been 
significant responsive efforts to combat this (perceived) public health 
problem. These have primarily taken the form of individual, lifestyle 
interventions (i.e., diet and exercise). In this study, we considered the 
experiences of adolescents enrolled in a lifestyle intervention (aimed 
at weight control) organized by a specialized health service in Norway. 
We drew on interviews with two young women to answer the ques-
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tion: How do adolescents experience group-training sessions, regu-
lar weight screening, dietary counselling, and fitness testing? In 
this chapter, we critically analyse how the adolescents made sense 
of their bodies in relation to and through the lifestyle intervention. 
We focus on the practice of regular testing and show how feelings 
of shame emerged in relation to the testing. This was particularly 
evident when the young women did not achieve significant “prog-
ress”. In our analysis, we adopt a critical embodiment approach 
drawing from the work of phenomenological scholars, including 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body as a primary means of experi-
ence and Luna Dolezal’s writing on shame in the clinical encounter. 
We integrate poststructuralist perspectives to challenge contempo-
rary hegemonic ideas about weight (loss) and fatness. Considering 
our findings on how shame can be exacerbated as well as avoided, we 
argue that lifestyle interventions should be implemented with cau-
tion. Moreover, we suggest that physiotherapists should exercise care 
when employing body measurement tools in these contexts. Focus-
ing on enjoyment, meaning, and fulfilment could offer alternatives to 
more traditional measures of progress.
Introduction
When considering the notion of shame in relation to weight loss 
interventions, it is easy to look to The Biggest Loser, an American 
reality television show that is now franchised across the globe. This 
popular series publicly shames people with obesity into changing 
their “lifestyle” – namely diet and exercise – with the ultimate goal 
of losing weight (Domoff et al., 2012). In this regard, many contes-
tants are successful during the taping. However, the often-dramatic 
weight loss achieved by contestants has incited controversy – popu-
lar media has claimed that eating disorders and other health issues 
have resulted (e.g., Bricker, 2014; Evans & Elliot, 2015). Past con-
testants have also experienced weight re-gain and stated, “we are all 
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fat again” (Evans & Elliot, 2015). Body shaming at the core of the 
public weight loss journeys documented in The Biggest Loser aligns 
with contemporary neoliberal ideals of responsibility, self-control, 
body regulation and discipline (Lupton, 2013). The widespread 
popularity of the show reveals how entrenched these ideals are in 
our collective psyche.
Media representations of health, illness, and bodies create public 
perceptions of particular conditions and embodied realities (Lyons, 
2000), including “obesity” (Boero, 2007). In this way, The Biggest 
Loser re/enforces popular understandings of fat bodies as problem-
atic, deviant and in need to fixing, and normalizes shame as a means 
by which to “motivate” weight loss (Lupton, 2013). What is more, 
it shows weight reduction via lifestyle modification as achievable 
and “fun” when in fact research has confirmed that the exact oppo-
site is true. That is, sustained weight loss through diet and exercise 
is nearly impossible (Weiss, Galuska, Khan, Gillespie & Serdula, 
2007) and shame can result in worsened health among obese indi-
viduals and interferes with the success of weight loss interventions 
(Puhl & Suh, 2015, Rugseth, 2011). Nevertheless, frequent testing 
and weight screening persist as part of lifestyle-oriented programs 
in both public and private health care settings and there is little 
discussion of failure and shame in reference to such interventions 
(Dolezal, 2015). Clearly, there is a need for more focused research 
in the area, which can inform the creation of healthcare practices 
that better support individuals in achieving health and wellness 
(independent of body weight). This is of particular relevance for 
physiotherapists who are frequently involved in such anti-obesity 
programs (Snodgrass, Carter, Guest, Collins, James et al., 2014). 
With this goal in mind, we used a critical-embodiment lens to 
examine experiences of a lifestyle intervention for teens. We asked: 
what is the connection between measurement, testing, “progress,” 
and shame within this context?
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Within the face-to-face encounter that occurs in the context of 
weight loss interventions, shame and failure are often unspoken, 
hidden, or repressed (Rugseth, 2011; Glenn, Raine, & Spence, 2015; 
Knutsen 2011). This is not to say, however, that they do not exist. 
As a participant observer in a lifestyle program for adults, Rugseth 
(2007) noted that shame was present in the room as a relational 
phenomenon, that is, there was a shared sense of discomfort and 
exposure that nobody talked about. This was particularly evident 
when weight was measured:
My sense of discomfort being part of another persons’ weight screen-
ing was unavoidable. We shared and took part in the shame. We felt 
shamefully involved and at the same time curious as to the result of the 
weight screening. (p. 138, our translation)
The weight measurement described by Rugseth as a source of shame 
is also a prominent fixture in anti-obesity programs involving chil-
dren and adolescents. Critical scholars have voiced concerns about 
calls for regular weight monitoring (among adults and children) as 
part of on-going campaigns against the “obesity epidemic” by health 
authorities across the globe (Gard & Wright, 2005). Concerns 
include the potential unintended harms caused by construction of 
an “epidemic” in relation to obesity whereby health professionals 
are expected to intervene in the management of people’s weight; 
particularly among people under 18 years of age who are thought to 
be the “responsibility” of the state (as well as parents). Interventions 
include the establishment of lifestyle programs designed to “help” 
young people categorized as overweight or obese.
Critical embodiment perspective
In this chapter, we take a critical embodiment approach to under-
standing adolescents’ lived experiences of various testing situations 
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that were part of a lifestyle intervention aimed at weight control. This 
involved questioning established weight control and measurement 
practices by privileging first-hand accounts and embodied experi-
ences, as expressed and reflected on during interviews with the first 
author. Our goal was to unpack and challenge the potentially hidden 
effects of testing and weight control and highlight the role of shame 
therein. We were inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2002) phe-
nomenology, which posits the body as central to all human experi-
ences. According to Merleau-Ponty, it is through the body that we 
come to know, make meaning of, and relate to the world around us. 
For example, it is the feel of the breeze on our cheek rather than a 
description from a book that transforms an abstract idea like wind 
into something knowable and concrete.
Dolezal (2015) draws on these ideas to explore experiences of 
body shame. She writes that shame is an embodied and relational 
phenomenon that is likely to happen when individuals are con-
cerned with how they are seen and judged by others:
Body shame can be understood to be shame that arises as a result 
of some aspect of the body or bodily management, perhaps appear-
ance, bodily functions or comportment. It is shame that is centred 
on the body where the subject believes their body to be undesirable, 
 inadequate, or unattractive, falling short of social depictions of the 
“normal,” the ideal or the socially acceptable body. (p. 569)
At the same time, shame (as a self-conscious emotion) can affect 
an individual’s sense of agency (i.e., the ability to inter-act with and 
on one’s surroundings). Dolezal argues, “When faced with shame 
common reactions include hiding, escaping, disappearing from 
view and shrinking into the floor” (p. 569). In other words, peo-
ple find their own ways of avoiding or relating to shame, which 
involves some kind of action.
Body weight has become a global obsession in the service of over-
coming the “obesity epidemic” (Gard & Wright, 2005; Lupton, 2013). 
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Consistent with neo-liberal principles of individualism and personal 
responsibility, people are categorized and compared to putative norms 
via measurements (weight screening; i.e., “obese” or “overweight” 
based on Body Mass Index [BMI]). These are purported as necessary 
components of the “war on obesity” and often carried out under the 
supervision of health professionals (Guthman, 2013; Lupton, 2013). 
BMI categories are somewhat arbitrary since there is no clear rela-
tionship to clinically meaningful outcomes (Flegal Kit, Orpana, & 
Graubard, 2013). For example, in research conducted by Flegal and 
colleagues (2013), being “overweight” by BMI category was associated 
with a reduced all-cause mortality rate when compared to “normal” 
BMI, and “grade I obesity” had the same mortality rate as “normal” 
BMI. Drawing on Dolezal’s (2015) argument that shame is relational 
arising in and through our interactions with others, moments of com-
parison, such as those that occur in the context of anti-obesity pro-
grams, are ripe for the production of shame. Moreover, as noted by 
Lupton (2013), shame can also develop in socio-cultural contexts 
(e.g., healthcare systems), where “overweight” people are made to feel 
indebted to the citizenry because of the “cost” of their fatness on oth-
ers. In what follows, we explore the embodiment of shame in reference 
to a weight control intervention and provide a vital, critical perspec-
tive to this burgeoning area of scholarship. To our knowledge, no prior 
research has questioned the impact of measurement and testing within 
the context of a clinical lifestyle program, among adolescents. We hope 
these findings will inform practice – to shift healthcare (including 
physiotherapy) away from potentially body shaming practices.
Context
We take as our analytic starting point the experiences of young 
women who participated in a group based lifestyle program for 
adolescents in Norway. The one-year program was publicly funded 
and ran at an out-patient clinic. Entry into the program was usually 
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via referral from a general practitioner or school nurse based on a 
BMI of more than 35 Kg/m2. Participation involved attending two 
exercise sessions per week, as well as monthly nutrition sessions. 
The program was interdisciplinary, run by physiotherapists and 
dieticians. The first author conducted individual, semi-structured 
interviews with ten participants in the program. In the interviews, 
she asked participants to talk about the reasons they attended the 
program as well as their experiences within it. In addition, she 
asked about their experiences of physical activity and food and eat-
ing in other settings. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and 
the first author translated relevant excerpts into English.
For the analysis, we drew on elements of Mattingly’s (1998) 
narrative-phenomenological approach and Kvale and Brinkman’s 
(2009) critical analysis. We carefully read excerpts from the 
transcripts related to the young women’s experiences of partici-
pating in the program and of testing and measurement situations. 
We searched for recurrent or unique themes and discussed these 
to reach consensus. We then crafted narratives, borrowing from 
narrative-phenomenological writing traditions (Mattingly, 1998; 
Zaner, 1993). The narrative influence can be seen in the arc of 
the stories, the threading through time, and provision of contex-
tual details. The phenomenological influence is apparent in the 
reliance on Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2002) embodiment (i.e., body 
as primary to experiences), which was reflected in the anecdotes 
(i.e., experiential moments) we crafted from the participants’ sto-
ries (Mattingly, 1998; Zaner, 1993). Participant narratives were 
then subjected to critical interpretation, which involved contex-
tualizing the stories in terms of existing critical scholarship on 
embodied fatness, weight loss and shame as well as prevailing 
cultural, social, medical, and institutional understandings (e.g., 
Boero, 2007; Dolezal, 2015; Gard & Wright, 2005; Lupton, 2013). 
We focused on two young women’s stories/experiences because 
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they highlighted the complex and divergent ways the experience 
can be lived, and provided sufficient data to achieve a depth of 
understanding and experiential resonance, which was the aim this 
exploratory study.
Alva’s story: I do not regard myself as 
overweight
Alva was 15 years old when a doctor recommended that she par-
ticipate in the program. Reflecting on this conversation, Alva 
expressed surprise and anger directed at the doctor because she 
did not see herself as overweight. “I am not overweight. I am totally 
sure of that. . I hate being called that and I am not overweight. 
I do not regard myself as overweight.” The discrepancy between 
her sense of her body and the doctor’s assessment was upsetting. 
Alva said it made her want to scream, “I am NOT overweight!” 
However, in the clinical encounter with her doctor, she said she 
did not voice her dissent because she feared it would prevent her 
getting what she really wanted: a referral for breast reduction sur-
gery. Imagine her surprise when the doctor told her she needed to 
lose weight instead:
I had to reduce my BMI to get breast surgery. And that is why the doc-
tor referred me here. So that I could get help and guidance with regards 
to diet and exercise and things like that.
Alva said she reluctantly agreed to participate in the program even 
though she maintained she was not overweight. This notion was 
challenged again upon entry to the program, this time by one of the 
health professionals: “The first time I came here they told me that 
I was overweight and then I thought, ‘am I really that big because 
I cannot see that myself.’ ” This led her to question, “Am I over-
weight?” After her first encounter with the group she concluded, 
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“No. I’m not!” Comparing herself to the other teenagers made her 
feel uncomfortable. She explained:
I recall coming here the first time, feeling like an outsider, that I did not 
fit in, because I am not overweight. . . I had tears in my eyes and things 
like that because I felt that I did not fit in at all. . . this is perhaps a bit 
mean of me to say, but there were many others there who were much 
bigger than me.
At first, Alva said she was ashamed to be part of the program, to 
be grouped with these “bigger” others, and kept it a secret from 
her friends. However, as the weeks passed, she described how she 
enjoyed participating in the group. In particular, she said she felt 
enthusiastic about the exercise sessions. She said that she found 
some activities more meaningful than others; she liked feel-
ing strong and capable, and she frequently felt like this during 
weight-training. The physiotherapists commented on her efforts, 
and she pointed out: “I do get cred. They talk positively about 
me, because I am so strong. They find it sort of impressive.” Alva 
noted this experience was in stark contrast to her experience 
from physical education class at school. Compared to her school-
mates, Alva felt less capable because she could not keep up. In that 
context, she saw her body as problematic, clumsy, and less skilled 
than the others. She found strategies to avoid participating. She 
explained: “So I rarely participate with the class. I exercise alone 
in the weight room.”
In contrast to physical education at school, Alva said she found 
exercise sessions at the clinic meaningful. She explained that she 
could sense that she was making progress and saw evidence of 
this in the biweekly testing, for which program participants were 
responsible. For example, during testing, the participants worked 
in pairs but kept track of their own results. The physiotherapist(s) 
did not conduct the tests, but were present, observing and 
what ’s  in  a  numb er?
343
encouraging the participants. Alva emphasized feeling inspired 
by this encouragement:
About 2-3 weeks ago, I managed to lift 42 kilos. Which means I have 
improved, increasing my record by 2-3 kilos. And that is empower-
ment. And then I noticed that all my exercising has given me results. 
And I am a competitive person, so I want to do better every time.
By the end of the program, Alva said she had gained enough self-
confidence to try exercising in a fitness centre, although, she said 
she would have preferred to stay in the program:
I am determined to start exercising at a local fitness centre near my 
new home. But I would have preferred continuing here. Because I do 
enjoy being here. The place and the physiotherapists – I have a bond 
with them. They are very motivating.
According to Alva, the physiotherapists were able to help her prog-
ress in her strength training by being positive and encouraging. “Yes 
you can do it, come on, great work, keep up the good work Alva,” 
were examples of the kinds of praise she received. She said they also 
supported her pursuit of other activities she found meaningful (like 
weight lifting). Alva also mentioned that she really appreciated that 
the physiotherapists never commented on her weight:
Nobody talks about us being overweight, they never use that word, and 
I am happy with that, because I am not overweight.
Alva’s description of her experiences of the monthly weigh-ins was 
quite the opposite. Indeed, Alva said she felt she was scrutinized 
and mistrusted when she had not lost weight:
I do not lose weight no matter what I do – nothing happens. . . And I 
exercise a lot, I eat less and more healthy, but nothing happens. But it 
seems like [the nutritionist] is not really convinced that I have changed 
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my diet. But I have changed my diet, I have. I have made drastic changes 
actually. Previously, I used to skip breakfast or I ate some crappy stuff like 
yoghurt or stuff like that, not that it is crappy, but now I eat yoghurt with 
oil, nuts and spinach, and all of that, but it has been challenging and now 
I only eat salad with chicken or fish for lunch and we eat a healthy din-
ner, so I have really changed my diet. And my weekend sweets are frozen 
strawberries, and nuts, that is my candy, because when I feel like eating 
candy I eat that instead. So I am almost totally avoiding sugar.
Alva said that she had done everything she could have in terms of 
exercise and changing her diet. Nevertheless, rather than supporting 
her and emphasizing the progress she made, Alva highlighted 
that the nutritionist questioned whether she tried hard enough. 
Weight loss was the professionals’ barometer of Alva’s success in 
the program. Alva, however, discussed that she felt otherwise:
But muscles weigh more than fat. My muscles have grown significantly. 
So in that sense, I am satisfied with the result, because I have lost 10 cen-
timetres around my waist since I started here. And 10 centimetres is a 
lot. I cannot sense that I have lost 10 centimetres there, but I saw it when 
I was measured around the waist. I saw the numbers. So that means 
that I have tightened up there, and I am pleased with that [change]. 
And I do not care how much the scale shows, how much I weigh, I only 
care about the way I look, my body shape in a way. Because, as far as 
I am concerned I might weigh 90 kilos as long as I am happy with my 
appearance and my body, because muscles are important to me.
For Alva, BMI and the numbers on the scale were irrelevant because 
she could feel progress in other ways – she finished the program with 
a fitter, stronger, and more muscular body. Her sense of achieve-
ment was tied to gains in strength and fitness – that is what she 
could do – as well as how she appeared, not how much she weighed. 
Nevertheless, Alva still reproduced the notion of “fat as shame-
ful” even while she worked to reformulate what “counted” as fat. 
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She did this by claiming she was not overweight, nor one of the 
“big” people in the group. She also argued that her body composi-
tion and shape changes were positive because they marked a loss in 
fat even though her weight had not declined.
Hannah’s story: The scale never lies
Hannah entered the lifestyle program because she was afraid of 
future illness. She discussed her fear of becoming diabetic because 
both of her parents had the disease: “I was worried and wanted 
to do the right things. . . So the school nurse was there as a sup-
port . . . she told me about this program and managed to get me 
in.” Hannah said she had lost and then regained weight during 
the program, which led her to seek advice from the nutritionist. 
Hannah was offered a detailed eating plan, yet she described that 
adhering to it was challenging. She discussed having “relapses” and 
described how getting on the scale every month caused her anxi-
ety. Her fear was tied to the possibility of weight regain, or lack of 
weight loss. She explained: “The scale never lies. Unfortunately, it is 
scary, in a way, to think that you actually weigh so much, kind of . 
. . It seems a bit hopeless.” At the same time, she expressed ambiva-
lence about the salience of numbers as an outcome or indicator 
of her (lack of) progress: “You get yourself so stuck on a number 
that it means everything, in a way, and I do not really want that.” 
Hannah said that stepping on the scale occasionally initiated nega-
tive thoughts, like considering making herself vomit. “I could get 
rid of the bad food this way,” she explained. This behaviour is consis-
tent with advice in the literature on eating disorders, which encour-
ages avoiding the quantification of weight as a measure of health 
(e.g., Burns & Gavy, 2004). Although we do not know if Hannah 
actually purged, thoughts of self-harming behaviour are concern-
ing in and of themselves.
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Hannah reported that she enjoyed the exercise sessions in the pro-
gram and experienced them as “fun,” “entertaining,” and “artistic”. 
She found that the positivity and playfulness of the physiotherapists 
contrasted sharply with the demeanour of the nutritionists who 
conducted the weigh-ins. Hannah’s enthusiasm can be interpreted 
as a sense of pride. She could do much more than she had thought:
I like the exercise sessions here. I am very satisfied because I am able 
to do more than I thought I could do. Because the physiotherapists are 
so positive and you see in a way, I personally feel that the group is good 
for me, I feel good and I am very proud of it. It is kind of “exercising is 
super easy, it is super fun, it is entertainment art, I can do more with 
it”. The food is much harder, because then you are on your own. Then 
there is nobody holding your hand.
Hannah explained that she was progressing even when it was not 
visible on the scale. She felt better, she explained:
Even though you do not see the results with your eyes, or those eyes, it is 
in a way, it is because if you are going to see progress, I feel that I have 
better endurance and all of that, so I feel very good about that.
“Feeling” progress was not something that was quantitatively mea-
sured but rather embodied for Hannah. It developed not because 
of, but rather in spite of, stepping on the scale. Hannah also experi-
enced changes in her everyday life: running to the bus, train station 
and school were suddenly easier. She explained:
And this is not how things used to be; then it was like, huff and puff, 
huff and puff (breathes heavily in the interview). It used to be like 
that; I used to breathe like that for about 15 minutes, and then get the 
rhythm back again.
Regardless of her felt experience of progress in terms of fitness, 
since starting in the program Hannah had become more focused 
what ’s  in  a  numb er?
347
on and critical of her weight and appearance. She expressed dis-
appointment in herself and continued to worry about developing 
diabetes. She indicated that a lot was at stake:
I feel for the first time in my life that I am dissatisfied with what I see. 
I think it is a bit harder now, not because they weigh me but because I 
focus on it, that I am actually trying to do something about it. Previ-
ously I was not disappointed over gaining weight. . . But now that I 
want to do something about it is much more disappointing. . . because 
I want to be better. It is the health aspect of it too. I do not want to 
become ill like my parents.
Hannah’s account suggests a young woman who was very con-
cerned about weight and the health related consequences. As such, 
a weight loss and regain, although only a few kilos, triggered feel-
ings of failure, worry and sadness because she thought she had let 
down herself and the people caring for her. Hannah identified that 
“the numbers”, that were central to the program’s understandings 
of progress, rather quickly began to affect how she viewed herself 
regardless of her embodied experiences of wellbeing and progress. 
Although exercise sessions were associated with positive experi-
ences, she noted a strong sense of disappointed that she did not 
lose the weight she wanted to lose.
The meaning of numbers
Our findings, from the exploration of two adolescent women’s 
accounts of measurement within a lifestyle weight loss program, 
illuminate the potential impact of these forms of body scrutiny, 
and how responses can differ with regards to how shame is embod-
ied, expressed, and resisted. In what follows, we draw on Dolezal’s 
(2015) theorization of shame, which she builds on Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1945/2002) ideas of embodiment to better understand how 
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measurement and “progress” within a lifestyle program can create 
opportunities for shame and pride among adolescent women.
Both participants made changes to their lifestyle in response to 
the program, although neither lost any weight. These two young 
women expressed quite different ways of making sense of their 
experiences. Through Alva’s account we saw agency and resistance 
in the way she redefined success on her own terms. While she com-
plied with “disciplinary lifestyle choices and practices” (Dolezal, 
2015, p. 572), Alva refused to judge her body based on weight 
(loss) and instead focused on the pleasures and pride she derived 
from movement and newly gained physical strength. Hannah, on 
the other hand, saw herself as failing to sufficiently comply with 
the requisite “disciplinary lifestyle changes” (Dolezal, 2015). Unlike 
Alva, Hannah openly discussed feelings of shame, particularly in 
relation to her experiences of being weighed within the program. 
We see in Hannah’s account that “although it can have a clear cogni-
tive dimension, shame for the most part is an embodied response” 
(Dolezal, 2015, p. 570), which was exemplified through her urge to 
purge consumed food. There is also a self-protective dimension to 
her shame; for example, through non-disclosure of the challenges 
she faced with the program’s nutrition plan. Dolezal describes this 
dimension: “The individual feels exposed and this leads to a (para-
lyzing) inner scrutiny, a moment of extreme self-consciousness” 
(p. 569). Social encounters such as those in a clinical setting can 
trigger shame, particularly when they involve an explicit bodily 
focus (Dolezal, 2015). Hannah’s experience of shame may have 
been exacerbated by her sense of personal responsibility for hav-
ing chosen to join the program, and the significance of weight loss 
to her as a way of avoiding future illness. Dolezal explains that the 
closer the connection between illness and personal responsibility 
for self-control (or lack thereof) the greater the potential there is 
for shame to arise.
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While there were differences in Hannah and Alva’s responses to 
being measured, there were also similarities. Both young women 
described being compared to a putative norm where they felt they, 
“did not measure up” (Gibson, 2016). Alva responded by mov-
ing the goal posts to make them consistent with her pre-program 
understanding of her body, she highlighted that improvements 
in her exercise capacity were more important to her than weight 
(loss). She described feeling pride rather than shame, regardless 
of the numbers or what others said. Given that Hannah came to 
the program with a very different view of her body (as an object 
of risk), it was perhaps not surprising that she had a different 
response. Her feelings of self-worth shifted according to the con-
text – when she was being weighed she felt bad about herself, yet 
when she was moving in the exercise sessions she felt accomplish-
ment and renewed confidence.
The differences between these two young women’s experi-
ences could be due, at least in part, to the internalization of dis-
courses equating weight with health, and the acceptance of BMI 
and other medical categorisations as meaningful. Although Alva 
and Hannah both described gaining physical capacity and “feeling 
progress” through their abilities to do more, they were also aware 
that according to the primary goal of the program (i.e., weight loss) 
they had come up short. In contrast to Hannah, however, Alva put 
little value in losing weight because she rejected the program’s con-
flation of weight and health as well as being categorized as “obese.” 
This may explain her feelings of pride in her accomplishments even 
while “failing” to meet programmatic goals.
It is not surprising that neither Hannah nor Alva lost weight 
despite largely adhering to the program protocol. There is bur-
geoning literature that demonstrates the relative ineffectiveness 
of lifestyle programs (Doutketis, 2005; Franz et al., 2007). Given 
the lack of evidence to its efficacy, in addition to the blame and 
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shame involved in measuring weight, the ethics of recommending 
weight loss within the healthcare realm has been critiqued else-
where (Glenn, 2013; Hoffmann, 2016), including within “lifestyle” 
weight loss programs for adolescents and children (Holm et al., 
2014; Evans & Colls, 2009; Foresight, 2007).
Although the measurement of fitness appeared less traumatizing 
for Hannah and Alva than weigh-ins, it too could be interpreted 
as a practice that reduces the body to an object to be measured 
and compared to a putative norm. Other research with children 
and adolescents has shown that repeated body testing can result in 
diminished self-worth (Bjorbaekmo & Engelsrud, 2011). Moreover, 
measurement in a group setting unavoidably elicits comparison 
regardless of the sharing/not sharing of results (Evans & Colls, 
2009). We see this in Alva and Hannah’s accounts where they com-
pared themselves to others in the program. This, in turn can create 
a competitive and evaluative space where bodies can be compared 
to each other and/or a norm. Thus the stage is set for the possibil-
ity of success or failure (Evans & Colls, 2009). With the continued 
focus on testing, these young women learned to connect their sense 
of achievement and self-worth (at least partially) to external mea-
sures. Although they commented on how they felt stronger and fit-
ter, they also focused on how much they had improved according 
to their monthly test scores and measurements (including waist 
circumference). One is compelled then to question the value and 
consider the potential risk of measurement within the context of 
lifestyle programs such as this one.
Instead of focusing on measurement and numbers on a scale, 
we suggest that these programs could be reimagined. Reflecting on 
Hannah and Alva’s experiences, we wonder what a program would 
look like that did not involve comparison to norms or quantified 
outcomes. We argue that programs could focus instead on the joy 
of movement, feelings of physical strength and endurance, and on 
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increased capacity to participate and enjoy actives that are part of 
everyday life (e.g., running for the bus, walking the dog, carrying 
the groceries up the stairs). A shift in focus such as this might pro-
vide an avenue to strengthen the body and one’s self-worth. For 
physiotherapists, there are lessons here about the pitfalls of promot-
ing bodily change that could ultimately do more harm than good. 
While the physiotherapists in this study did not measure weight, 
there are many that do, and this study shows that this should be 
undertaken with caution.
We also wish to bring attention to the potential negative 
effects of measurement per se. Alternative approaches might 
focus more on individual needs, desires, and preferences and 
build on what is valued and enjoyed while acknowledging fears 
and challenges. This diverges from following a set of standard 
approaches, norms, and/or outcomes. Such lessons are impor-
tant to consider in physiotherapy practice and also curricula. 
Calls for less shaming approaches to obesity have been made 
in the context of training physiotherapy students and include: 
shifting the focus from diet and exercise as sole contributors to 
obesity, using collaborative styles of communication, and incor-
porating understandings of weight stigma (Setchell, Watson, 
Jones & Gard, 2015; Setchell, Watson, Gard & Jones, 2016). 
Physiotherapists could also benefit from critical reflection on 
the possible negative impacts of using weight-based outcome 
measures such as BMI on the people (particularly young people) 
who seek their care.
In conclusion, through a critical phenomenological examina-
tion of the experiences of two young women undergoing a group-
based weight loss intervention, we have highlighted that such 
“lifestyle interventions” should be implemented with caution. In a 
current context of growing global stigmatisation of bodily fatness, 
shame is a key consideration. Physiotherapists and other health 
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professionals could use our findings to help attend to experiences 
of shame and how they might be exacerbated as well as avoided. In 
particular, we suggest that physiotherapists exercise caution when 
employing tools of body measurement in the context of lifestyle 
interventions. A shift of focus away from body weight or behav-
ioural changes to considerations of enjoyment, meaning, and ful-
filment could offer alternatives to more traditional measures of 
progress.
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Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to show the potential of narrative 
approaches in the practice of critical physiotherapy. By com-
bining a narrative approach with gender perspectives, we focus 
on the significance of social context and gender for how illness 
stories may develop in the clinical encounter. The empirical data 
are drawn from interviews with 10 men undergoing a rehabilita-
tion program for chronic pain in Norway. The findings highlight 
how the men’s stories usually present pain in terms of a localized 
physical disruption caused by forces outside the men’s influence 
and control. Their stories adhere to a traditional norm of mas-
culinity which highlights the importance of staying independent 
and in control. However, the men’s stories also refer to changes 
at work, worries about sick children, divorce and loss of contact 
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with children: in other words, social disruptions and relational 
and emotional distress. In the men’s recovery stories, a tradi-
tional masculine emphasis on the importance of building muscle 
strength is intimately interwoven with a profound human need 
for relational support and help from others. By focusing on how 
the men’s stories are told, the chapter reveals how changes in fam-
ily relations and working conditions enter into the men’s illness 
narratives through a process of ongoing negotiation between 
interviewer and participant. We argue that narrative perspec-
tives are important to critical physiotherapy as a way of promot-
ing individualized treatment and care that transcend traditional 
gender norms.
Introduction
The stories people tell about their own experiences of illness and 
disability can provide powerful insights into the meaning of ill-
ness in an individual’s life (Kleinman, 1988; Mishler, 1984). In 
medicine and the health care sciences, the patient’s illness nar-
rative is generally discussed as being a valuable source of knowl-
edge – in addition to knowledge from research and the therapist’s 
own professional experience – in clinical reasoning and decision-
making (Edwards, Jones, Carr, Braunack-Mayer, & Jensen, 2004; 
Greenhalgh, 1999). For clinicians, the patient’s story provides 
an essential means of translating generalized knowledge, based 
on research involving many patients, into strategies that address 
the particular needs of individual patients (Montgomery, 2006). 
Clinical reasoning implies interpretation – of the patient’s story as 
well as physical findings.
Emphasizing the importance of interpretation work in clinical 
practice, a body of research in the field of physiotherapy argues for 
the use of narrative as a pedagogical tool, one that can help students 
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and clinicians develop a capacity for critical reflection about their 
own experiences as well as those of their patients (Cruz, Caeiro 
& Pereira, 2014; Greenfield et al., 2015). Specifically, these studies 
argue for the usefulness of narrative skills in facilitating patient-
centred care in clinical practice. The aim of this chapter is to show 
the potential of narrative approaches in critical physiotherapy. We 
demonstrate why a narrative approach is important in physiotherapy 
– and how it may be performed. Combining narrative approaches 
with a gender-sensitive perspective on the illness narrative of men 
with chronic muscle pain, we focus on the significance of social 
context and gender for how illness stories are expressed and unfold 
in the clinical encounter. The chapter comprises two parts. In part 
one, we present our theoretical framework on illness narratives and 
gender, a framework principally informed by social constructivist 
perspectives. Here we develop our case for the need to combine 
narrative and gender perspectives, arguing that illness narratives 
often end up analysing people’s stories as if there were no gen-
der patterns in the larger social environment. We also show how 
studies of gender and illness often end up claiming that men and 
women represent illness in very different ways. We find the latter 
to represent an essentialist, binary perspective on gender, one out 
of step with the idea of gender as a social (and therefore mutable) 
entity (West & Zimmerman, 1987; Butler, 1990). Instead, we argue 
for a combined application of narrative and gender perspectives 
towards viewing a patient’s illness story as both deeply personal 
and shaped by their social environment, including changes at work 
and within the family. In part two, we use this theoretical viewpoint 
to analyse the narratives told by ethnic Norwegian men about their 
experiences of chronic muscle pain and recovery. By combining a 
narrative approach with a non-essentialist (constructional) con-
ception of gender, we hope to make visible the ways in which cul-
tural norms of masculinity manifest themselves in the men’s needs 
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and values, as expressed in the illness stories they tell in the clinical 
setting. We argue that our approach has the potential to open up 
physiotherapy to new possibilities for individualized treatment and 
care, ones that capture social structures and reach beyond tradi-
tional cultural gender norms. In doing this, we aim to show that 
narrative perspectives can make a valuable contribution to critical 
physiotherapy.
Part one: Theories on illness narratives and 
gender
The illness narrative
The term “narrative” is used in a variety of ways by different dis-
ciplines (Chase, 2005). In this chapter, we emphasize narrative 
as verbal actions and accomplishments. This means, rather than 
focusing on the events or the reality to which the narrative refers, 
we focus on  the reality shaped by the narrative. Specifically, we 
focus on how the men’s selves, experiences and reality are shaped 
through their accounts of illness experiences (Bruner, 1991; 
Chase, 2005).
The narrative is a fundamental way of giving meaning to experi-
ence. As such, narratives are part of people’s everyday life. However, 
when someone falls ill, the need for a story becomes particu-
larly important. This is particularly the case with chronic illness, 
which seriously affects people’s lives and sense of self (Bury, 1982; 
Williams, 1984). Based on interviews with relatively young peo-
ple who had just been diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis (RA), 
Bury (1982) conceptualized chronic illness as a major “disruptive 
experience”, impacting an individual’s relationship with their body, 
their selfhood and the people around them and provoking them 
to ask such questions as “Why me?” and “Why now?” Research by 
Williams (1984), also involving participants with RA, showed how 
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the informants sought to explain their illness by finding a legiti-
mate and meaningful space for RA in their lives. Williams con-
cluded that by enabling individuals to rewrite their own biography 
so as to achieve coherence between past, present and future, self 
and society, illness narratives offer a way of repairing the disrup-
tion between body, self and the world (Williams, 1984, p. 197).
It does indeed seem the case that patients construct their own 
illness stories as a way of repairing the self and making sense of 
their illness experiences. At the same time, individual narratives 
are nourished and shaped by common stories that circulate within 
a specific culture (Riessman, 2008; Frank, 1995). Personal illness 
narratives are therefore, on the one hand, individual and particu-
lar and, on the other, common and shared; they convey something 
about the surrounding world (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). This is 
the basis for Atkinson and colleagues’ criticism of what they call 
a “narrative turn” in the health sciences (Atkinson & Delamont, 
2006). Here they criticize what they see as a sentimental and 
romantic vision of illness narratives—the notion that narrators 
reveal their authentic selves and speak only in their own voice, as 
if those selves and voices were not already mediated by their social 
context. In line with others, these authors argue that individual sto-
ries do not simply mirror some antecedent reality; rather they help 
create that reality through the way they are told.
The view of illness narratives as socially constructed embraces 
the gendered aspects of illness: the existence of different cultural 
expectations to live up to according to one’s gender, precisely 
because of which illness narratives are permeated with cultural 
gender norms. In critical physiotherapy research, we would stress 
the need to take an interest not only in the content of the story—
what the story is about—but also in how the story is told. It is 
important to explore how people communicate meaning through 
a range of linguistic and social practices; how their stories are 
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embedded in the interaction between the researcher and the 
patient; how they make sense of personal experience in relation 
to cultural norms; and how they draw on, resist or transform 
those discourses as they narrate their experiences (Chase, 2005; 
Riessman, 2008). In addition, we argue that narrative approaches 
can help clarify what physiotherapy may be able to accomplish for 
individual patients.
Gender
One aspect of illness narratives, until now largely neglected 
within the field of physiotherapy, is precisely how such narratives 
may be influenced by gender—that is, the socially constructed 
norms and performances of femininity and masculinity (West 
& Zimmerman, 1987; Butler, 1990). For example, research on 
women coping with and recovering from long-term conditions 
such as chronic pain and fibromyalgia suggests that the women 
negotiate stereotypical presumptions associating femininity 
with weakness (Grape et al., 2017; Werner & Malterud, 2003). 
Studies have explored how women living with chronic pain (pain 
that is medically unexplained) engage in performative work dur-
ing medical encounters to prove they are really sick in an attempt 
to counteract “the stereotype medical discourse of the crazy, lazy, 
illness-fixed or weak woman” (Werner et al., 2004). Broader-based 
sociological investigations have shown how notions of feminin-
ity infuse medical knowledge and specific diagnoses (Annandale 
& Riska, 2009). For example, Lian and Bondevik (2015) found 
that diagnoses of conditions such as Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (ME/CFS) – conditions carrying con-
notations of a lack of individual strength – seemed to resonate with 
historical constructions of femininity that remain entrenched in 
medical knowledge and clinical practice (Lian & Bondevik, 2015). 
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This suggests that studies of gender in the medical context have 
considerable relevance for physiotherapy, given that norms regard-
ing femininity and masculinity are likely to affect therapists’ clini-
cal reasoning and decision-making.
Recent studies have drawn attention to the risks attached to a one-
sided focus on women in gender research on illness and health. As 
Annandale and Clarke (1996) note, by ignoring men and treating 
women as a priority distinct from men, such a focus ends up con-
structing women’s health as “poor” against the implicit assump-
tion that men’s health is “good”. Given such a binary perspective, 
“women ‘cannot’ be well and importantly, men cannot be ill; they 
are ‘needed’ to be well to construct women as sick” (Annandale & 
Clark, 1996, p. 32).
Research on the illness narratives of men with chronic muscle 
pain has challenged such assumptions and offered a corrective to 
the one-sided focus on women. Ahlsen and colleagues suggest that 
the tendency of previous studies of people with chronic muscle 
pain to use phrases such as “women’s experiences” and “women’s 
needs” may be misleading; in fact such experiences may represent 
profound human needs in the context of chronic illness (Ahlsen, 
Mengshoel & Solbraekke, 2012; Ahlsen, Mengshoel & Solbraekke, 
2012; Ahlsen, Bondevik, Mengshoel & Solbraekke, 2014). Such 
studies address the past tendency to draw sharp distinctions 
between men and women, suggesting that for men just as much as 
for women, chronic illness involves a fundamental experience of 
change of self, one which needs to be addressed in physiotherapy 
practice (Ahlsen et al., 2014; Paulson et al., 2002).
At the same time, distinct gendered social transformations do 
shape how illness experiences are understood and narrated. One 
example is the transformation that takes place in people’s lives 
when a loving relationship changes from being a stable, secure 
phase of life to an unstable, risk-ridden entity that may end in 
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divorce (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1996). We would argue that 
this alteration merits strong social and emotional support for both 
women and men in the context of illness and recovery. Taking 
into account that men’s identity and values have traditionally been 
connected to work, sport and public life, we claim that there is 
a need to focus on the ways in which men’s illness experiences 
might be embedded in family relations and the private sphere. 
Based on empirical studies of families in Norway, Aarseth (2009) 
argues that the current heteronormative “gold standard” of the 
modern family structure (comprising a working mother and a 
working father) allows fathers greater involvement in parenting 
than was the case when they were the sole breadwinner in the 
partnership. However, fathers, like mothers have long experi-
enced, now find themselves in a situation where they are required 
to be both an emotionally competent parent and a strong, reliable 
employee (Aarseth, 2009). In other words, modern parents need 
a trustworthy, intimate relationship in order to stay close to their 
children, and they need an intimate, fulfilling family life to help 
them cope with growing pressures at work. Yet, we believe the 
implications of this intensified experience of private life on men’s 
experiences of illness and recovery, especially when these intensi-
fied relations disrupt, are under-researched. In line with our criti-
cal narrative understanding of illness, in which social constructs 
such as gender are seen as to have profound implications for how 
physiotherapists understand and treat their patients, we advocate 
a more thorough investigation of the ideas and practices relating 
to men’s emotional life.
With these perspectives as our point of departure, we now 
explore how different aspects of masculinity are played out in the 
illness and recovery narratives of men with chronic muscle pain. 
Our intention is to illustrate how these gendered narratives can be 
used as resource in the practice of physiotherapy.
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Part two: Unpacking gendered aspects of 
men’s narratives of recovery from chronic 
pain
The analysis that follows is based on data collected as part of 
a larger study on the illness experiences of Norwegian men and 
women in rehabilitation because of chronic pain. The study was 
conducted in line with the Helsinki Declaration act, and was 
approved by Norway’s Research Ethics Committee of Medicine 
(Ref. 2009/1017).
A total of 10 men and six women participated in the study. 
All were attending, or had recently attended, a multidisciplinary 
chronic pain rehabilitation program at a clinic in Norway. The reha-
bilitation clinic specializes in treating people with musculoskeletal 
pain. The treatment offered was developed by a multi-disciplinary 
team consisting of professionals with expertise in various fields of 
medicine, including physiotherapy, nursing, and psychology; oth-
ers were specialists in nutrition and sports.
The data discussed in this chapter came from qualitative 
interviews with the 10 male patients, most of whom were on full-
time sick leave because of their pain. Their ages varied from 28 to 47 
years. Although most were skilled workers, a few were craftsmen, 
and one had tertiary education. All were of Norwegian ethnicity.
We regard interviews as active interactions between inter-
viewer and participant (Gubrium & Holstein, 2003). In order 
to encourage participants to speak about what was important 
to them in their own world, the interviewer asked open ques-
tions where possible. She then asked follow-up questions to 
draw out the specific features of each narrative, with participants 
(for example) invited to elaborate on their treatment experi-
ences. The interviews were conducted by the first author, a phys-
iotherapist – a fact that the participants were made aware of. 
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Interview quotations presented below were translated from 
Norwegian into English by the authors.
Overall, the men’s illness narratives conveyed vulnerability 
and suffering. Their stories referred to a number of painful events 
and difficult life situations, including the serious illness of a child, 
conflicts or unhappiness at work, unfaithfulness on the part of a 
spouse, and divorce. At the same time, emotional experiences were 
usually downplayed in favour of an emphasis on concrete, objective 
facts: for example, an accident or a physical impairment. In order 
to unpack gendered aspects of the illness narrative of men with 
chronic pain we will present three different narratives: 1) ‘‘blows to 
the head” and ‘‘backs that lock’’, 2) social and emotional disruptions 
and losses, and 3) recovery as a rebuilding of body, self and social 
connections.
‘‘Blows to the head” and ‘‘backs that lock”
Rupert, a divorced father in his 50s, worked as a plumber in the 
oil industry. His narrative placed great emphasis on the neck pain 
he currently suffered following an accident at work. He described 
what happened thus:
There is a damaged disc in the neck. It was damaged, not last year, 
but the year before, in December—or at the end of November, I think 
it was—when I banged my head against a girder at work…We’d gone 
back and forth under that girder for a whole week, but I was in a hurry 
that day, and I went too far up …and then I bumped my head against 
the girder, and my head was jerked backwards.
When narrating their pain experiences, most participants likewise 
emphasized a sudden physical collapse or malfunction as a result 
of powerful external forces beyond the men’s control. As such, 
the men’s stories invoked a masculine self that is constructed as 
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habitually autonomous and in control of events and where chronic 
pain is associated with heavy work and powerful physical forces.
Jim, a married man in his 30s, had three children, one of whom 
was seriously ill. Jim worked as a helicopter pilot but was currently 
on a sick leave due to back pain. While Jim articulated considerable 
worry and concern about his sick child, the plot of his illness narra-
tive was firmly linked with physical injuries he had suffered:
There are two incidents that may have contributed [to me being here]. 
The first time I strained my back was when I was doing some redeco-
rating four years ago. […] I lifted some boxes of tiles in order to place 
them in the back of the car. They were heavy, and then my back was 
completely locked. That was the first time […] The next was in May 
2007. I was working all day with a rotary cultivator on a hillside, and 
my back became numb. Later that day, I sneezed while sitting in my 
car. And then it happened: I could not move.
Jim’s example illustrated how participants’ illness stories, while 
often conveying emotional pain and distress, presented pain as 
definite, localized and linked to the physical body. In this type of 
plot, the men’s need for help was to identify the injury. Presenting 
oneself as an active agent in this process, as Jim did in this extract, 
was very striking:
[…] After a couple of weeks, I took action by going to see my GP. I got 
an MRI, which showed a problematic area in L4, L5[…]What I really 
was after was a clinic that could rehabilitate me. I have a couple of 
friends who have been here [to the clinic] and recommended it, and 
then I got the doctor to refer me [to the clinic].
As Jim’s story revealed, participants’ illness narratives usually 
couched a need for help in terms of the men adhering to traditional 
masculine norms by taking action. The need for help was typically 
first conveyed as a need for medical investigation, such as an X-ray 
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or an MRI scan. The illness narrative then concluded with the iden-
tification of a localized physical problem, and efforts to fix it.
Social and emotional disruptions and losses
In addition to descriptions of sudden blows and other bodily inci-
dents, the men’s stories contained elements that suggested they per-
ceived pain as more than simply an event arising within the body 
and caused by ‘‘external forces”. In this section, we will unpack 
these fragmentary references to social and emotional disruption 
and loss. We wish to clarify that emotional and social aspects of 
the men’s pain and illness in this study were not articulated directly 
during interviews. It was when reading the transcripts that we were 
struck by the implicit presence of a social interaction (Gubrium & 
Holstein, 2003), which manifested itself in avoidance of any talk 
about emotional aspects of the illness by both the female interviewer 
and the male informants. Such avoidance could be seen as a tra-
ditional way of performing illness and masculinity in the medical 
encounter. We noted that several interviews were characterized by 
a form of ‘‘circular talk” revolving around ‘‘the body”, ‘‘the causes 
of the pain” and ‘‘the working conditions”, to the exclusion of other 
topics.
As we explored the interview transcripts closely, we identified 
that the men were taking small steps (or dropping hints) to redi-
rect conversations: towards the idea of their suffering having some 
connection with disruptions or losses in their social and emotional 
lives. Disruptions and losses primarily related to two social are-
nas— work and family life – and the dynamic between them.
Rupert’s story illustrated this dynamic well. Rupert, 45 years old 
and the divorced father of one child whom he saw every fourth 
weekend, worked in the construction industry. His worksite was 
far from home, and his pattern was to work for two weeks, followed 
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by four weeks off work. Rupert mentioned these contextual factors 
during the interview, but when the interviewer asked how he dealt 
with the situation he simply replied, “It’s okay.” Still, the story he 
went on to tell, in some detail, described constant changes of loca-
tion at work:
I’m not on one specific platform. I’ll be on a platform once, and then I 
can be on another the next trip, and another next time. [...] It may take 
a year before I’m back on the same platform. So it’s very varied. I meet 
new people, more and more new people [...] But in this way, you lose a 
sense of belonging. You notice the fact that those who are permanently 
on the platform are united as a group. For those of us who are there 
only a few times…. And the first time I’m there, I’m a little unsure as 
to whether I have taken someone’s place.
Rupert’s story is thought provoking when read in the light of the 
widely held notion that men develop and confirm their identity by 
virtue of their access to paid work and work-based camaraderie. 
As we read it, Rupert’s ‘‘lack of belonging” may be linked to the 
phenomenon of increasingly ‘‘greedy” working institutions, and 
growing pressure at work that heightens employees’ need for a 
compensatory personal sphere.
Towards the end of the interview, the interviewer raised the 
subject of Rupert’s divorce. He then discussed his emotional dis-
comfort following his former wife’s leaving him for another man, 
a situation he described as resulting in “a whole year of being con-
stantly on edge.”
A close reading of how the men’s narratives unfolded during 
the interviews therefore revealed moments when masculine ideals 
of self-control and independence were transcended, illuminating 
other qualities such as vulnerability, and a need for belonging.
If the men’s stories of pain and recovery are viewed as a whole, 
several forms of social disruption emerged. In Tony’s narrative, 
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his daughter’s illness, and unstable family situation were gradually 
shown to be very emotionally distressing:
Tony: I have a sick daughter, who is struggling terribly. I accompanied her 
to the doctor’s yesterday, and she had a collapse, you may say, at the doctor’s 
office, and it was no fun. And as I told you, it has been very hard lately […]
Interviewer: What kind of disease is it? 
T: I do not know if you are familiar with it, but she has been diagnosed 
with ME fatigue syndrome. You might have heard about it, and it’s no 
fun. There’s very little that can be done about it, really. In our despair 
we try everything, but it...
I: Well, that must be a desperate situation. She lives permanently with 
you or …?
T: No, we had shared custody, but now she lives mostly with her mom. 
And then, unfortunately... Last summer it was revealed that she has a 
particularly difficult relationship with my new live-in partner. I was 
not aware that it was so bad.
I: It sounds like you’re in a terrible squeeze.
T: Yes, that’s what the psychologist also said. “You’re in a thumbscrew,” 
she said. So, of course, all this has not made my back problems any bet-
ter. Because you tie yourself up—mentally—quite unconsciously, you do.
While most of the men’s stories focused on physical damage, Tony’s 
story had a different emphasis, one that set it apart from the “exter-
nal mechanical forces leading to internal pain” plotline. As we see 
it, Tony’s story was explicitly about “being battered emotionally”: 
physical pain was entangled with his daughter’s illness and diffi-
cult family relations. Illness stories tend to have a turning point. In 
Tony’s case, the turning point was primarily emotional, rather than 
to do with his physical condition. As he explained:
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[It was] after the holiday, we [my live-in partner, my child and me] 
had been together for 14 days. Then I took a battering, because she 
[the daughter] said, “Sorry, Dad…I can’t stay with you as long as she 
[the live-in partner] is there.” I felt like I almost had to choose between 
my daughter and my partner… no fun. […] I think it was so sad when 
she told me that she did not want to live with me that I reported sick, 
because I was at a loss about what to do.[…]My back was completely 
locked. I could not drive the car. I couldn’t even manage to get out of 
bed. I couldn’t do anything.
This part of Tony’s story clearly expressed human suffering and 
emotional distress as part of his illness experience. Tony felt 
emotionally “battered” by his daughter’s not wanting to live in his 
house. A careful reading of his story suggests that this loss may be 
interrelated with his back becoming “completely locked.”
In addition to physical disruption, expressed in terms of an 
injury, the illness narratives of men in rehabilitation for chronic 
pain demonstrated other types of disruption: relational break-
downs, losses, and enduring emotional distress. Such expressions 
of despair and fragility suggested that a de-construction of gender 
was taking place in the men’s narratives. In our exploration of how 
the men’s stories unfolded during interviews, we became aware of 
how their narratives emerged through a process of close, dynamic 
cooperation between participant and interviewer. What came to 
the fore during an interview, and what was left in the background, 
seemed to result from an ongoing negotiation between the two. 
Participant and informant appeared to work collaboratively to find 
a way for social disruption and emotional loss to enter the illness 
narrative.
In the next section, we show how the men’s recovery stories 
convey needs that extend far beyond simple repairing of physical 
damage.
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Recovery as a rebuilding of body, self and social 
connections
Bury’s (1982) conception of chronic illness as involving a major 
disruption of the relationship between body, self and environ-
ment resonates within the experiences of our participants, as 
expressed in their illness narratives. In our analysis of the men’s 
recovery narratives, we found three particularly relevant aspects. 
Replete with references to pain and physical problems, the sto-
ries first conveyed changes in the men’s relationship to their 
own body. Second, by referring to emotional blows, a sense of 
loss and moments of bewilderment, the accounts pointed to a 
changed perception of self. Third, the narratives told of disrup-
tions in the men’s social networks: for example, no longer having 
a sense of belonging at work, or losing contact with children fol-
lowing divorce.
In terms of their bodily condition, the men commonly discussed 
a need to rebuild muscle strength. For example, Rupert here spoke 
enthusiastically about the training program:
There’s a lot of group training for fitness, and spinning and strengthen-
ing exercises. But there [is] also individual training, with three, four, 
five exercises. Three exercises for the neck in a sling […]. It has helped 
a great deal. And then … The stiffness in my arms… has become bet-
ter, too. So, fitness and everything has become better after coming here 
[to the clinic].
Jim’s story of recovery emphasized a need to strengthen his back 
muscles:
I really need help for my back pain, and they [the physiotherapists] 
have set up an exercise program for me, and they have seen that I’m 
very weak, very weak—those stabilizing muscles at the back [are] very 
unstable.
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Training and exercises held a dominant place in the men’s recovery 
narrative. Even so, this focus on training did not entirely conceal 
other aspects of recovery. Although physiotherapists and other 
health professional were often referred to in terms of their profes-
sional expertise, the men’s stories also showed a more emotional 
aspect, in particular their desire to be accepted and cared for by 
these professionals. As Rupert put it:
The expertise here is very good. And it turns out that they’re very 
forthcoming. I listen to and notice those who are new in the group, 
and then when we start the group session, they [the therapists] say, 
“Do as much as you can” and things like that. If someone has a neck 
problem, they can do the exercises in the way that best suits them, 
and then they [the therapists] follow up if you have questions. They 
answer your questions and help you with the exercises and correct 
you if you do them wrong […] You are looked after all the time… 
you are valued as [the person] you are, in the shape you are, with the 
problems you have.
The need to be cared for, revealed by Rupert’s noting that his 
therapists asked those attending group sessions how they were 
doing, was a frequent, if rarely explicit theme in the men’s stories 
of recovery. The men’s need for comfort and care was often linked 
with physical training and muscle building: traditional masculine 
notions of recovery.
Mike, an unmarried teacher in his 30s on sick leave because of 
persistent headaches, spoke of his need to be comforted when he 
felt afraid:
Sometimes I react negatively to training. Often not straight away, but it 
comes the day after, or in the evening or something, and it’s very good 
to have someone to talk to about it. [I] could tell them [the therapists], 
for instance, what has happened and simply be reassured that it’s not 
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dangerous, because I’m afraid to turn bad into worse, and then I get 
the message: “Do an easy workout today and see how it goes.” It’s given 
me confidence in how to exercise correctly.
A close reading of how the men’s illness narratives unfolded 
revealed individual experiences and personal needs that challenged 
traditional cultural notions of men as self-reliant and independent. 
In fact, the men’s recovery narratives spoke to a profound human 
need to rebuild a disrupted self through care and support. While 
health professionals figured most prominently in the men’s stories, 
other factors were seen as aiding the project of reconstructing the 
self. Rupert was buoyed up by some comments he got in the locker 
room:
Sometimes I occasionally hear when I enter the locker room… some 
of the elder men… one of them said to me, “Yes, you are much stron-
ger than me,” he says. He nearly always mentions that I’m in good 
shape. He thinks I’m in much better shape than him. Well, we’ve been 
[training] for a while, so we do get in better shape as we keep going.
The men’s illness narratives also expressed a need for others as 
they continued their rehabilitation. As Aarseth (2009) notes, cre-
ating a self requires self-reflection, and this in turn depends on 
close relations with others. Given the men’s narrative inclusion of 
professional and personal relationship difficulties, relational and 
emotional support was likely to be important in the physiotherapy 
treatment of men with chronic pain. Like other participants in our 
study, Mike voiced a profound human need for a sense of connec-
tion with others:
It’s not bad having this arrangement to go to when you’re on sick leave. 
I try to do something every day and not just stay at home. Doing 
exercises, getting good follow-up and meeting others with the same 
problems—it’s pretty good. At work, my friends… aren’t in the same 
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situation. It’s good to have someone to talk to who has the same experi-
ences as I do.
In summary, the recovery narratives of men in rehabilitation for 
chronic pain carried many layers of meaning. While the men 
overtly emphasised the importance of physical training, there 
were also suggestions of a human need for connection with others. 
Traditional norms of masculinity therefore appeared to co-exist 
with other types, ones that seemed out of step with stereotypical 
and essentialist readings of gender.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we sought to highlight the potential of narrative 
approaches in critical physiotherapy. By combining a narrative 
approach with gendered perspectives on the illness narrative of 
men with chronic pain, we demonstrated how people’s commu-
nication of their experiences of illness and recovery cannot be 
separated from social context, including prevailing gender norms. 
Our analysis showed how men’s illness narratives were shaped by 
cultural expectations that men be strong and independent, by pre-
senting pain as a definite condition in the body and a need to build 
muscle strength. At the same time our analysis showed how men’s 
illness narratives included less typically masculine aspects, such as 
relational disruptions and emotional distress, and a need for com-
fort and care. Importantly, our study showed how the narrator and 
listener constructed gender norms collaboratively. In ‘individual’ 
illness narratives, what comes to the fore and what remains in the 
background was a matter of continual negotiation. Given these 
findings, an uncritical acceptance of dominant gender norms by 
therapists may contribute towards keeping the men’s needs veiled 
with regard to physiotherapy and health care. Our work thus high-
lights that the patient’s illness narrative is an important source of 
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knowledge in physiotherapy practice. A narrative approach, which 
includes not only what is communicated in a clinical setting, but 
also how individual experiences are shaped, can contribute to 
ensuring the physiotherapist’s clinical reasoning and decision-
making processes suit the needs of the individual patient.
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